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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
EXCHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT




The institutions and structures of the International 
Economic System (IES) become increasingly questioned as the 
countries of the Third World insistently demand a New Inter­
national Economic and Political Order (NIEPO). In this con­
text, the analysis of international economic exchange requires 
a more detailed and differentiated set of actors, and a multi­
dimensional conceptualization of economic valuables and actors' 
goals, including, besides the economic dimension, social, po­
litical, cultural and military aspects of exchange. Further­
more, a dynamic analysis of international exchange has to in­
corporate the constraints placed on actors by IES institutions 
and structures, the actors' attempts to shape institutions and 
structures favorable to their action opportunities, and the 
feedback patterns which link the aggregate multi-dimensional 
exchange outcomes to the maintenance or transformation of the 
IES. Such an analysis has to include as inputs into and out­
puts from the operation of the IES inequalities in control by 
actors over valuables and power resources and in actors' po­
sitions in the structure of relationships. The existence of 
conflict between actors, and of patterns of dominance and de­
pendency, is fundamental to this conceptualization of the IES.
This focus implies a political economy approach to inter­
national economic exchange where economic behavior is analyzed 
as an integral part of behavior in a social system encompassing 
economic, social, cultural, political and military spheres.
The multi-dimensionality of economic exchange, the feed-back 
patterns between the multiple levels of the IES, and the role 
of power inequalities necessitate the use of a systems method
of analysis.
A review of International trade theories and their em­
pirical verifications shows that the strict assumptions of 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model have undergone modifications and re­
laxations and have been alternatively formulated to include, 
mostly implicitly, elements of the systems model mentioned 
above. Accordingly, Chapter III presents a more formal de­
scription of systems elements: the hierarchy of actors and 
their goals and action opportunities; the multi-dimensionality 
of valuables; the occurrence of systemic ramifications, i.e., 
the non-evaluated spin-off and spill-over effects of exchange 
activities by lower-level actors. The unequal accrual of power 
resources to actors in the IES through systemic ramifications 
is defined as unequal exchange. Higher-level actors particu­
larly attempt to structure and restructure the IES to generate 
unequal exchange patterns where a country's lower-level actors 
have action and exchange opportunities which produce positive 
systemic and power ramifications.
Chapter IV elaborates on systems internal restructuring 
in response to events in the IES. The reactions of five Eu­
ropean countries to the fall in the wheat price after 1870 
illustrate the proposition that restructuring is in part de­
termined by the interests of those groups which possess meta­
power with which to institute adjustments favorable to their 
group interests.
Chapter V elaborates on two aspects of the structuring 
of the IES. The first, the development of an unequal exchange 
system between Portugal and England in the 17th century,
viii
demonstrates how the dominant groups in Portugal exchanged 
economic concessions with long-term negative developmental 
ramifications for short-run military and political support 
measures by England. These higher-level exchanges helped to 
maintain the groups' continued dominance and favored their 
economic interests,, all, however, to the detriment of the 
political and economic long-run development of Portugal. The 
second case demonstrates the use of a position of world dom­
inance by the U.S. during World War II to realize, through 
the IMF, World Bank and GATT, the American conception of a 
democratic economic world order with favorable consequences 
for her own commercial interests. However, the power relations 
implied by the Bretton Woods institutions were different than 
those actually existing at the end of World War II and those 
later emerging with the economic development in Europe and 
Japan, with the result, that these institutions played their 
assigned role only for a few years after 1958.
Chapter VI deals with the problem of domination and de­
velopment and the origins of systems transformations. The case 
of Comecon illustrates the dilemma faced by a dominant country, 
here the Soviet Union, between a strategy of divide and rule 
to ensure its continued dominance, and the development of in­
stitutions and structures favoring cooperation, growth and de­
velopment necessitated by competition with another developing 
system. The second case traces the origins of the present con­
flict between OPEC and OECD. On the one hand, the exploita­
tion of the oil producing countries led to the formation of 
OPEC. On the other, the rapid economic growth in the OECD area
shifted patterns of oil production and consumption. Both 
factors increased the relative power of the countries united 
in OPEC leading to increased oil revenues and control over oil 
production. OPEC is therefore in a position to engage, to­
gether with other Third World countries, in further attempts 
to restructure the IES in tune with their interests and vision 
of a less unequal world.
The concluding chapter suggests that the case studies 
have demonstrated the usefulness and fruitfulness of the sys­
tems approach to the political economy of the IES. Yet, this 
is clearly only the beginning of a further elaboration, formal­
ization and verification of the systems approach to problems 
of international economic exchange, development and transforma­




Today’s international economic system (IES) is under 
attack. The countries of the Third World (UDC) demand with 
increasing insistency,at least since UNCTAD I in 1964 but
especially since the events of October 19733 a revision of
the rules and institutions governing international trade and 
investment as well as international financial and monetary 
matters.'*' Academic and official views in the industrialized 
countries (DC), confronted with the failure of the development 
strategies of the 1950’s and 1960's to reduce inequality on the
world level and to bring about self-sustained growth except in
a few highly favored countries, are increasingly willing to 
consider and discuss such a course of action. The speech of 
the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the 7th Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly in 1975 provided assurances 
of an American willingness to participate in such discussions 
(Kissinger, 1975b).
However, UDC demand the establishment of a New Inter­
national Economic and Political Order (NIEPO) (Bergsten, 1975;
For the present purpose all countries not belonging 
to the Comecon or the OECD (the developed countries -DC) are 
included in the category of Third World or underdeveloped 
countries (UDC). This is a short-hand way of talking about 
the world situation and fundamental interests in the world 
system.
1
2Gardner et^ . al., 1974)2 while the larger industrialized 
countries belonging to the OECD seem to consider at most some 
marginal adjustments. On the other hand, some representatives 
of OECD countries take the increasing interdependency of the 
world’s countries as a fundamentally new fact which demands 
basic adjustments in the world system (Cooper, 1968, 1972a; 
Brown, 1972; Duchene at. al., 1974; Moynihan, 1975)*^ Some 
believe on the one hand in the need for, and the coming of, 
some form of world government. Their research is consequently 
directed towards the development of 'preferred world futures', 
the institutions made necessary by them, and the desired 
transition paths who could get us from the present to these 
futures.^ Others have subsumed the fact of world wide inter­
dependency in the metaphor of 'spaceship earth'. They argue 
that the global system is facing in the near future limits to
2The declaration and action program "The Establishment 
of a New International Economic Order" passed at the Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly on "Problems of Raw Materials 
and Development" in May 1974 is reprinted in the UN Monthly 
Chronicle, May 1974. The resolution passed at the Special 
Session in September 1975 on "The Development of International 
Economic Cooperation" is contained in the UN Chronicle of 
October 1975*
^However Waltz (1970) maintains that at least the 
larger DC still possess an absolute freedom of action.
^The World Order Models Project is centrally concerned 
with the conceptualization of such alternative 'just world orders' 
(Bhagwati, 1972a; Mendlovitz, 1975)* The concerns and goals of 
this project are not necessarily the same as those underlying 
the views and demands of the UDC with respect to a NIEPO.
3its growth in population and material well-being (Meadows et. 
al. , 1972; Mesarovic and Pestel, 197*0- The implicit or ex­
plicit conclusion is that only structural and institutional 
changes both on national and world levels will keep the world 
system safely within the limits of a finite environment. The 
only difference is that some believe that the world will 
gradually and almost automatically evolve towards such a new 
structural and institutional setting while others see the need 
for rapid, planned and coordinated policy responses in the next 
few decades.
But whatever view or approach is taken, the structure and 
institutions of the International Economic System (IES) are 
centrally involved in these considerations and deliberations.
Or, whatever the future changes in the global system, if 
brought about through agreed upon and planned action or through 
unplanned and chaotic struggle, the world economic order will 
be qualitatively transformed (Jolly, 1975-" *0 • This suggests 
that the analysis and modelling of international economic 
exchange as it relates to systems development and transformation 
will have to deal explicity with at least four aspects of 
economic action. These four aspects -- dealt with in the
5
past in a very limited if not arbitrary way —  are-.
Economic historians, institutionalists, neo-institu­
tionalists and, to some extent, Marxists, studies in the fields 
of industrial organization, development, and more recently also 
urban and environmental economics, as well as numerous area, 
industry and case studies have frequently touched upon these 
aspects both descriptively and analytically. But the statement 
is true in the same sense that Gardiner Means' comment is true 
when he argued that theoretical economists have sofar refused 
to reformulate "over-all theory in terms of the pervasive non- 
classical competition" which has been shown to exist so much
4(i) Economic Actors. Theory is still based on un­
differentiated sets of households and firms, and in the case 
of international trade theory, of countries. While households 
have hardly changed since the time Adam Smith developed classical 
economics, firms form today a hierarchy of organizations of 
vastly different size, scope, and organizational structure.
In the theory, the multinational corporation (MNC) with its 
"global reach" (Barnet and Mueller, 1974) is conceptually the 
same as the corner grocery store, a point central to the 
criticism of neo-classical theory by Galbraith (1968). Further­
more, to this day, governmental units are only implicity included 
in theoretical macro-analysis as undefined managers of aggregate 
demand, exchange rates, tariffs, and as providers of foreign 
aid, to mention a few of the more important activities that im­
pinge on the IES.^  But not only are they unspecified, they re­
main organizations without multiple goals and interests, and 
contradictory internal and differentiated power structures 
which characterize them in real life. Even more complete
(Means, 1972:ix) .
Kolm (1975:136) argues that economists in the past 
have already covered almost any subject and dealt with most 
problems. References quoted here and in subsequent chapters 
represent therefore an eclectic selection in support of the 
arguments presented.
^The 'New Political Economy' recognizes the need to 
analyze government in order to understand economic policy.
To this end, its representatives apply the propositions and 
tools of neo-classical economic theory to the analysis of 
political behavior. First contributions were made by Downs 
(1957) and Buchanan (1968), more recent treatments are by 
Bartlett (1973) and Breton (1974).
5abstraction is made of the rapidly increasing number of sub­
national governmental units, non-governmental national and 
international organizations, governmental international 
organizations, and even some supranational organizations with 
almost independent powers. Many of these organizations partici­
pate and intervene in the international economy and are also 
often heavily involved in the efforts at economic development 
(Hawkins, 1970:98-110).
(ii) Economic Values. Theory limits itself to the ana­
lysis of households, firms, countries and, to a limited degree 
as just argued, governments. These economic actors try to 
maximize economic goal functions within constraints. The 
latter are often economic in nature, especially when formulated 
explicitly, although the economic action space is implicitly 
understood to be also constrained by non-economic institutional 
factors. It is clear that social life is more than economic 
life. It includes in addition to the latter political, social, 
cultural and,military aspects (Chodak, 1973; Galtung, 1971)*
This multi-dimensionality characterizes interests and goals of 
actors, the material and non-material valuables which are the 
means and often the ends of social life, as well as the outcomes 
of the many interactions between actors.7>8
^Organizational theorists like Maslow (195^:80-106) 
and March and Simon (1958) were some of the first social 
scientists to stress the importance of non-economic goals for 
individuals in their roles as homo oeconomicus once they had 
reached a certain material subsistence threshold. Galbraith 
(1968) and Boulding (1969) for example argued that therefore 
tastes and preferences could not be assumed to be autonomously 
determined but were the result of social processes (including 
advertising). Myrdal (1972), and also Boulding (1969)3 argue
6(iii) Institutions and Economic Activity. Main­
stream economic theory takes institutions as given. Actors 
belonging to an exchange system are assumed to have equal 
access chances to every other actor in the s y s t e m .  ^ There­
fore little attention is paid to the constraints social norms, 
moral values, rules and laws place on economic action possibil­
ities and outcomes. Institutional factors are habitually 
classified as remaining unchanged over the time period a.nalysed
that economic behavior can and, is often moral behavior, that 
egalitarianism is an established fact which makes it im­
possible to build a utility theory on the basis of an in­
dividualistic rationality assumption.
O
Today, economic theoreticians use four methods to 
circumvent the problem of multi-dimensionality. (i) They 
continue to postulate that households and firms are purely 
economic constructs which are able to abstract from the 
interests they or their individual members may have in other 
spheres. (ii) They take refuge in the assumption that the 
economic actors are able to assign economic values to all 
events, outcomes, and goals in the non-economic spheres 
of social life. (iii) They recognize explicitly the existence 
of variables in other spheres but postulate that they can be 
treated like any economic variable. This is the approach of 
the New Political Economy. And (iv) they accept that case (ii) 
does not hold because of institutional limitations. The con­
cept of "externalities" is used to handle and explain ad hoc 
economic and non-economic outcomes not reflected in the economic 
calculus of those actors party to an economic activity which 
gives rise to an externality.
^The importance of limited information, transportation 
and transaction costs for the structuring of interaction 
possibilities have been recognized since the important work 
by Coase (1952, I960) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962). But 
despite these contributions, Rothschild (1975) could complain 
recently that the pure theory of international trade neglects 
these costs almost completely and this Respite the fact that 
such cost factors are probably more important in international 
trade than national one.
7or as not being significantly affected by the activities 
modelled.1  ^ These views have two general consequences for 
research specification. Firstly, actors are assumed to maxi­
mize action outcomes passively within the institutional limits 
in which they find themselves. Actors are not seen as being 
actively concerned with overcoming unsatisfactory constraints 
through direct action.^ However, corporate mergers, political
lobbying and bribing, and many research and development activi-
12ties could be seen as purposeful activities of this kind. 
Secondly, not much effort is undertaken to study I hose outcome 
dimensions of economic activity which strengthen or undermine 
a given institutional set. Economic theory is essentially 
based on linear action-outcome patterns; inputs are transformed 
into outputs and even such important economic variables like 
income and wealth distributions are not part of the output 
vector. Feedback which could affect the initial conditions of
The short-run nature of the analysis is justification 
for this procedure. However, the temporal limits of this short- 
run are never specified, nor do models of economic growth deal 
with such institutional considerations, although they are cer­
tainly concerned with the long-run (Britto, 1973:1360).
^However, see Perroux (1964:2).
12The largest MNC have to be seen as supra-national 
organizations "whose internal decisions have as much impact 
on patterns of trade and international relations as decisions 
taken by governments" (Child 1969:1).
8this type are rare except in the work of Myrdal (1958, 1968). 
However, the absence from economic models of feedback mecha­
nisms with respect to structural and institutional factors 
as well as of active actors who try to overcome the con­
straints facing them becomes more critical with the emergence 
of global corporations, increased world interdependence and 
the emergence of bottlenecks and limits facing all countries 
of the world.
(iv) Structural Inequality and Conflict. In general,
18actors in a system are structurally differentiated. For one,
actors differentially exercise control over and have access to
resources and valuables in the many spheres of social life.
This differentiation exists not only in terms of the quality
and quantity of resources controlled but also in the degree of
control exerted over them. Secondly, actors find themselves
in different positions within a historically determined structure
of relationships between and among the actors of a social system.
All these inequalities constrain action opportunities and action
14
outcomes and in turn are affected by them. Consequently,
13Point (i) referred to the need to differentiate more 
extensively between different categories of actors. The focus 
here is on the differentiation of actors of a given category. 
Both problems involve structural differentiation but at 
different levels.
14Price theory is including many of these elements im­
plicitly in its analysis insofar as revenues for example deter­
mine budget constraints or a firm is limited in its pricing 
actions depending on the number of competitors in the market. 
But the full significance of such differences becomes clear 
only in a dynamic analysis which includes inequality itself as 
a variable. (See also footnote 16).
9actors may engage in attempts at directly modifying these 
structural constraints.
Structural inequalities of the kind described here are 
pervasive and persistent elements in the different spheres 
of social life including the economic sphere. For Arthur 
Lewis, for, example, economic growth leads inescapably to 
inequalities of many kinds as growth, in-general, causes im­
poverishments of some professions, sectors, geographical re­
gions, and maybe even countries (Moynihan, 1 9 7 5 : ^ 2 ) . it seems 
natural, in this context, to suspect in initial inequalities the
leading causes for continued uneven growth and development pro- 
16cesses. Inequalities provide actors with differentiated powers
See also I. Adelman and Morris (1973)- However,
Kuznets (1955, 1966) adduces some evidence from Germany, Britain 
and the U.S. showing that economic growth and development in­
creased personal income inequalities only in the initial phases 
of industrialization. (See also following footnote.)
Both Friedmann (1972) and Kaldor (1970) develop models 
of regional development where initial imbalances lead to 
further uneven development. In this context, Kaldor argues 
that the existence of a central government with increasingly 
more important central taxation and expenditure powers limits 
regional intra-country inequality which, therefore, is not 
allowed to or cannot develop to the extent that inequality 
develops on the world level. Kuznets (1966:206-217) too seems 
to assign to the central government an important non-market 
role in reversing the development of income inequality in the 
later stages of economic growth in industrialized countries.
I. Adelman (1975) makes the same point.
Myrdal (1958, 1968) developed his principle of circular 
and cumulative causation in order to explain increasing in­
equality. Initial inequalities of a general kind are the cause 
for these vicious circles. The same holds for the marxian models 
of uneven development (Amin, 1971).
Bowles (1972) uses initial inequalities to explain the
10
and enable some actors to use their power to structure the 
system in their own favor (Wilber and Wisman, 1975:673).
But in the case where inequalities lead ultimately to the 
institutionalization of inequality, conflict between actors 
is much more likely to prevail than basic harmony. This does 
not mean that conflicting goals and relations are necessarily 
dominant and replacing harmonious ones as the basic foundation 
of social activity. However, models of world trade cannot a 
priori assume harmony of interests, and absence of conflict 
and dominance patterns, when income inequalities at the world 
level are two hundred times larger than at the time of Adam 
Smith (Kaldor, 1970).17
The model developed and illustrated in this treatise in­
corporates in a central way elements which reflect the critique
reproduction of inequality through the school system.
None of these approaches has been absorbed in the core 
theory. Even the concept of immiserizing growth remains a 
fringe concept in international economics despite the in­
creasing income inequality on the world level (Bhagwati, 1969a: 
325-338; Johnson, 1967b). This remains so despite the demon­
stration that immiserizing growth is not only the result of 
faulty policies but can occur with simultaneous growth in 
several countries and the absence of monopoly power in inter­
national trade (Bhagwati, 1969b; Melvin, 1969). Of course, the 
important point to explain in this context is the particular 
processes that produce the appropriate shifts in the offer 
curves (Balogh, 1973:8).
Benjamin Ward (1972) makes many of the points mentioned 
in the above discussion of the four aspects. If economists want 
to be able to contribute to the solution of social problems they 
will have to deal with three areas: (i) the growing importance 
of externalities; (ii) the increasing interrelationship of 
economic variables with non-economic factors; and (iii) the 
problem of distribution.
11
made above of some aspects of economic theory and, specifically, 
international trade theory. The chosen title —  The Political 
Economy of International Economic Exchange and Development. A 
Systems Approach to the Structuring of the International Economic 
System —  suggests three different levels of analysis: (i) the 
method used is systems analysis; (ii) the approach is one of 
political economy; and (iii) and the subject is the structuring 
of the international economic institutions and structures which 
mediate the economic exchange activities of actors belonging to 
different countries. Initial interests in questions and problems 
related to the changes in the terms of trade between UDC and DC 
led to the realization that these questions demanded a more 
general framework of analysis going beyond the pure treatment 
of economic trade theory.
The adoption of a larger perspective suggested in turn 
the use of a systems analysis. As the research proceeded on 
the bases of the individual cases reported in chapters 4, 5 and 
6, it became necessary to develop new systems concepts and 
elements in order to be able to describe the fundamentals of 
each situation. Of course, the availability of this language 
made the chosen political economy approach much richer and
1 fthelped to bring about a general view of the problems analysed.
The particular research results reported here have 
greatly benefited from and have also substantially influenced 
simultaneous research on other economic problems (Baumgartner 
and Burns, 1974; Baumgartner et. al_., 1975c), non-economic 
problems (Baumgartner et. al., 1975a), and general theoretical 
and methodological questions (Burns and Meeker, 1975; Baum­
gartner et_. al. , 1976b).
12
The scientific perspective governing the conceptuali­
zation and model of the IES is inspired by the particular ap­
proach to modern systems theory originally outlined by Buckley 
(1967).^ This perspective focuses on actors as social beings 
which act in a complex world. Their action possibilities are 
constrained by the distribution of resources of many kinds, by 
institutions in different spheres, and their positions in the 
structure of possible relationships to other actors and valuables. 
In general, actors are significantly differentiated in all three 
respects and, as a consequence, will experience systematically 
different outcomes as they act and interact within the social 
system. Existing inequalities will therefore most probably be 
maintained as basic inequalities become and are built into the 
institutions themselves. However, the system is complex. Actors 
are not only economic actors but to differing degrees also 
social, political, cultural beings. They therefore have often 
to reconcile conflicting goals and possibilities which often 
belong to different spheres. In general, actors are unable to 
model completely and accurately the world in which they act 
and interact. As a consequence, human action, including economic 
action, has unintended consequences which may affect the distri­
bution of valuables, the actors' positions in the structure of
19^Important further developments appear in Burns (1973), 
Burns and Buckley (197*0 and Buckley et_. al_. , 1974).
A different contribution to the development of a systems 
theory of development is by Tehranian (1974).
Parsons and Smelser (1956) present an early argument why 
the economy should be analysed as a subsystem of the larger social 
system.
13
interactions, and institutional effectiveness in ways which 
are undesirable from the viewpoint of dominant actors. The 
operation of the system may in this case lead to systems 
transformation possibly even in the direction of greater 
equality among the actors.
Actors will also often be unwilling to operate within 
the given constraints of the system and they will attempt to 
modify directly the constraining factors (like institutions) 
which limit them in their action capabilities. These activities, 
directed toxtfards the higher-level characteristics of the system 
(which are normally taken as given in economic analysis), the 
unintended consequences of human activity^ and several natural 
structuring factors as well as the differentiated outcomes from 
the normal operation of the system provide feedback links within 
the system (Baumgartner et. al_. , 1976a). Such links are central 
properties of the systems model of society (and therefore the 
IES) and their modelling and analysis are crucial to the under­
standing of societal development, and especially the links be­
tween international economic activities and national development 
and economic growth of DC and UDC.
20Unintended consequences are not synonymous with random 
events or effects. The former can be quite deterministic events 
which however were not foreseen by the actors when choosing the 
course of action producing them. They are the result of decision 
models which contain faulty or incomplete representations of 
reality (Rosen, 197^; Burns and Meeker, 1975; Baumgartner et. al., 
1975c).
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Such a systems approach and the model and its con­
stituent elements developed here have general applicability 
in the analysis of social systems., both on the macro and micro 
levels (Burns, 1974; Baumgartner et_. al. , 1975b). However, 
the focus in this instance is explicitly on the economic 
sphere of social life. But the analysis is and cannot be 
purely economic in the sense that only economic values in 
terms of utilities and profits determine the consumptive and 
productive activities of the households and firms while all 
the other values and goals, institutional constraints, and 
non-economic effects of economic activities are either absorbed
in an all-embracing ceteris paribus clause or simply excluded
P 1from the analysis. Here, institutions and non-economic values
and goals affect significantly and explicitly economic behavior.
Conversely, economic activity has non-economic results and its
effects on institutions are also explicitly included in the
analysis. Institutional, structural and power factors are
integrated with economic factors. It is in this sense that one
22can speak of a political economy analysis.
P 1See footnote 8 of this chapter for an elaboration on 
this statement.
? p
Only a few remarks about the use of the term 'political 
economy' can be made here.■ The term becomes today again in­
creasingly popular after its early use in the 18th and 19th 
century to describe economic analysis in general (especially 
in its classical form). Even Samuelson now claims this label 
for his kind of economic theory and analysis (Samuelson and Scott, 
1975:v). As already explained in footnote 6 of this chapter, 
the term of the 'New Political Economy' is claimed for an analysis 
which applies the theorems and propositions of neo-classical
15
The case studies which served as background for the 
development of the theoretical conceptualization of the systems 
approach to political economy problems, and which will be used 
in chapters 4, 5 and 6 to demonstrate and amplify this approach, 
are all taken from the area of international economics and eco­
nomic development. This area has been chosen for a detailed 
study not only because of its topicality. Economic development 
is a long run problem and furthermore can only succeed if it 
is accompanied by developments either in a parallell or possibly 
dialectic fashion in other spheres of social life. Economic 
development is only continuous if institutions develop con­
currently with the growth of productive powers. Development 
therefore includes all the elements which make up the character­
istic nature of the systems approach as outlined above.
Past economic developments of both DC and UDC can be
understood only in the context of the operation of the IES
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(Wallerstein, 1974; Amin, 1971). Most countries will continue
economic theory to the analysis of the behavior of governmental 
actors (Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972:1). The political 
economy of marxian analysis links the operation of the economic 
system to the non-economic superstructure, using at least on 
the more abstract levels of analysis a dialectic relationship 
between the two. Institutional and neo-institutional economics, 
or what Grucb / (1947:550) once called 'holistic economics', is 
insofar political economics as its focus is on the structure 
and functioning of human relations as determinants in the pro­
duction of goods and services. Technological change is seen 
as the driving force, moderated by individual and group goals, 
including non-economic ones —  determining the development path 
of the economic system and its institutions (Gruchy, 1972:293-298; 
336-337).
The dialectic links between continuous economic growth 
and development, structural and institutional transformations,
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to be linked very intensively to the IES independent of its 
future forms. It is therefore of continuing interest to in­
quire about the links which may exist between the structure 
of the IES, the types and nature of international economic 
exchange activities, and their developmental consequences 
for the national systems involved in these activities. As a 
corollary, it is of importance to model, analyze and under­
stand the relationship between exchange outcomes and the 
stability or transformation of the institutions and structures 
which make up the IES. These matters include the study of 
the active attempts by social actors to structure the IES 
in such a way that its operation generates outcomes which are 
supportive of their objectives, both economic and non-economic. 
It is this focus on the IES and the interaction of its struc­
tural and institutional forms with economic exchange and its 
outcome which characterizes this treatise as an economic one,
even though the analytical framework is concerned with the
ohsocial system and its operation as a whole.
and the changing nature of trade structures is admirably de­
monstrated in the model of development presented by Paauw and 
Fei (1973) where they differentiate between phases of import 
substitution, export promotion and export substitution. Okita 
(1970) presents a somewhat similar description (although con­
centrating on the last phase) of the Japanese 'virtuous circle 
of accelerated growth'.
2^Breton (197^:11-21) uses some of the same arguments 
to justify his type of New Political Economy analysis as valid 
economic analysis. However, the argument is not only one over 
the boundaries of economics and the economic process which 
Boulding (1969) and Galbraith (1973) would like to see extended 
in specific directions, and Georgescu-Roegen (1966:101-107) and
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Chapter II shows that much of the traditional theo­
retical discussions and empirical investigations of inter­
national trade problems use elements and concepts which are 
at the basis of the approach outlined here and elaborated 
and applied to specific historical cases in the later chapters. 
However, these elements and concepts are mostly treated as re­
finements or deviations from the structure of the classical 
market model underlying economic theory since Adam Smith. But 
when all these refinements and deviations are brought into the 
same theoretical framework, it becomes quite obvious that this 
system is qualitatively different from the one postulated in 
economic theory and underlying so much of our economic reason­
ing. Chapter III therefore will present in a relatively ab­
stract way the major elements and concepts necessary for the 
analysis of the economic aspects of such a system. Chapters 
IV, V and VI provide the application of this systems model to 
past and actual events in the IES. Chapter IV concentrates 
on the ramifications internal to a country due to events in 
the IES. Chapter V concentrates on the IES itself. Two in­
stances in the past are investigated where a country used an 
initial power advantage to try to structure parts or even the 
whole of the IES in an attempt to maintain this power advantage
Kolm (1975) in a more general way, the latter calling for a 
’science morale et politique'. One consequence of the accept­
ance and modelling of a world full of "interdependencies and 
complex causal sequences" is the need to abandon the positivist 
methodology (Kapp, 1970; see also the reply by Beckerman (1972) 
and the rebuttal by Kapp (1972) and indirectly by Showier (1974).)
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and possibly even to further it with the aim of assuring 
complete dominance. Chapter VI deals also with the struct­
uring of the IES. But the focus here is not so much on the 
basis of such structuring attempts and the processes of using 
power to structure the IES than on the problems and dilemmas 
that can be inherent in such structuring efforts. A first 
part illustrates the dilemma that can arise between the desire 
to structure a dominance system and the need to maintain a 
minimal economic performance of the collective system. A 
second part concentrates on the possibility of turning points 
in a system of dominance using the recent events of the oil 




THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND THE REAL SYSTEM 
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The theoretical framework in economics underlying
much of the analysis related to international trade is in
large measure based on or linked to the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-0)
model. This chapter therefore begins in Section 1 with a
brief description of the basic assumptions and propositions
P ^which make up the H-0 model. J A review and discussion of the 
effort by Leontief (195*0 to test the model by showing that 
U.S. trade was in fact H-0 trade concludes the section point­
ing out how Leontief’s effort started a process of, more im­
plicitly than explicitly, relaxing the H-0 assumptions.
Section 2 continues the review of different trade models and 
their tests but focusing more on alternative hypothesis and 
explanations. The purpose of this review is twofold. For 
one, it becomes clear that many tests which purported to verify 
the H-0 model were in fact using assumptions fundamentally dif­
ferent from those originally postulated in the model. Secondly, 
the modifications of the H-0 model as well as the alternative
25section 1 is not intended as a survey of trade theory. 
Reviews of the development and present state of the pure theory 
of international trade are'presented by Chipman (1965a, 1965b, 
1966), Bhagwati (1969a:3-122) and Chacholiades (1973) among 
others.
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hypothesis show clearly that they contain many of those 
assumptions and elements which were deemed to be essential 
elements of a systemic analysis of the IES. Section 3 then 
returns to the H-0 model, describing its policy implications 
and comparing them with recent developments in this area. 
Section 4 takes up the problem of trade intervention and 
controls by pointing out that the structure of trade controls 
in DC is quite specific. The same holds for the structure of 
exports and imports of DC and UDC which differ significantly 
for the two groups. These two findings combined suggest that 
they are the result of a purposeful will set to impose a cer­
tain structure on the IES. A summary section then relates the 
findings in Chapter 2 to the introductory remarks in Chapter 1 
thus setting the stage for the theoretical developments of 
systems elements in Chapter 3-
1. The Heckscher-Ohlin Model and the Leontief Test
The pure theory of international trade is centrally 
concerned with (i) the demonstration of the causes of trade; 
(ii) the determination of equilibrium prices and quantities 
traded; and (iii) the welfare implications of trade and trade 
controls. In this sense international trade theory is micro- 
economic price theory where countries replace households and 
firms as the basic units of analysis without however elimina­
ting the latter as the basic actors in the system. In order 
to be able to proceed with the analysis on this level of 
aggregation and to arrive at the conclusions of the H-0 theorem
21
that a country exports the goods which use intensively the
q s'
relatively abundant factor, production and welfare functions 
have to be constrained. The production function on the country 
level has to be homogenous of the first degree. This in turn 
implies that the economy on the country level has to exhibit 
the structure of an economy in perfect competition. If in 
addition the production functions exhibit diminishing marginal 
returns along isoquants, factor and commodity price ratios will 
be uniquely related to each other (Samuelson, 1948, 1949)- 
Social welfare functions can be constructed and not 
simply assumed only if individual households have identical 
and homothetic tastes, or instead of the latter condition, 
equal factor endowments (and therefore equal income and wealth 
positions) (Chacholiades, 1973.122-128).^ Samuelson (1948, 
19^9) has shown that if the production functions in the two
Factor abundance can be defined using either a quan­
tity or a price definition with implications for the determin­
ation of the exportables in case of factor intensity reversal 
(Chacholiades, 1973:202-204).
27The sufficient conditions for identical tastes on the 
country-level are restrictive. Chacholiades (1973:123) main­
tains that tastes are reasonably identical within a given 
country especially if it has a uniform culture. This argument 
however undermines the importance of consumer sovereignty as 
any planning agency could take over its role in a market 
economy and allocate the goods in the same pattern to consumers.
Samuelson (1956) has shown that an appropriate social 
indifference map can be constructed if one assumes a re­
distribution of income which maximizes social welfare. This 
naturally begs the question.
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countries are identical and without factor intensity reversal
P fiover the relevant range, and if the consumption patterns in 
the two countries are identical, trade will tend to equalize 
relative factor prices and take on the structure predicted by 
the H-0 theorem. x t  is in this sense that international 
trade is a substitute for international factor mobility in 
equalizing marginal rates of transformation and substitution
in the two countries.30
The significance of the H-0 theorem is contested.
This does not surprise in view of the restrictive assumptions 
that are necessary to arrive at the strong version of the 
theorem as stated by Samuelson (1948, 1949) and the large gap 
between these assumptions and reality. The formal correctness 
of the theorem is not in doubt but the meaning of it, or the 
value of the conclusions based on it with respect to the ex-
p O
The investigation by Minhas (1962) seemed to confirm 
the existence of widespread factor intensity reversals. Sub­
sequent research has produced contradictory evidence (Bhagwati, 
1969a:100-107)•
^Samuelson (1971) revises his strong statement of 1948/ 
49 that relative factor prices will be equalized through trade. 
He accepts now the original Ohlin version that the opening of 
trade will only narrow the difference between relative factor 
prices.
3^Additional conditions are incomplete production spe­
cialization and absence of transportation costs. Factor 
supplies have to be absolutely inelastic and while world 
commodity markets are perfectly competitive, factors of pro­
duction are absolutely immobile internationally.
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planation of the sources of trade, the determinants of the 
observed trade pattern, and the formulation of trade policies 
a r e .
Chipman (1965a:479) lauds the theorem as representing 
"probably the most complex and impressive theoretical struc­
ture that has yet been developed in economic thought." Clement 
e t . a l . (1967:96) see the theorem's value not only in its 
logical consistency but also in its superiority to the labor- 
cost theory of trade. But as Kornai (1971:9) argues in his 
general criticism of the foundations of neo-classical general 
equilibrium theory, a theorem should not simply be accepted 
because its assumptions and axioms are internally consistent 
and its derivation is logically unassailable. Rather assump­
tions and basic propositions should also describe the real
31 32world in sufficiently accurate terms.-1
'Sufficiently accurate' is the key expression. Un­
fortunately we do not have a developed concept capable of 
measuring the 'degree of proximity' between theoretical 
postulates and the structure of the real world (Kolm, 1975:131)
 ^Haberler (1961:20-21) and Harrod (1957:37), the latter 
on the basis of the presence of factor intensity reversals, 
question the scientific value of the theorem on similar grounds 
Cooper (1970:436) expressed recently his doubts about 
the relevancy of the pure theory of trade noting that Michaely 
(1968) seemed to be able to explain the pattern of trade with­
out making a passing reference to the H-0 theorem but stressing 
accidental historical developments as determinants of special­
ization in and export of manufactured products.
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Others see the value of the theorem in its setting 
of a benchmark. Chacholiades (1973:265) thinks that its 
value lies in the fact that it allows the identification of 
those variables which determine the impact of free trade on 
factor prices. Harry Johnson (1968a:88; 1970a:19) takes a 
similar position. The theorem is not a prediction about the 
real world but states the necessary conditions for factor 
price equalization and therefore for world welfare maxi­
m i z a t i o n . ^  T h g  theorem permits the identification of those 
real life conditions which prevent the factor price equaliza­
tion from coming about. One can then determine and design 
the appropriate corrective policies.
In this situation one could naturally fall back on the 
positive methodology of Friedman (1953:1-43) and accept the 
H-0 theorem and its underlying assumptions as a valid base 
for further analysis if the propositions derived from it co­
incide with reality. However, such tests are rather difficult 
to design as the so-called Leontief paradox clearly demonstra­
ted. Leontief (1954, 1956) tried to establish the link be­
tween factor availability, factor proportions and the trade 
structure of the U.S. in one of the most important tests of 
the H-0 model. His findings, unfortunately, were rather con-
33That is, the theory becomes "the 'grand parable' 
that is still defended against non-believers but is not taken 
too seriously as a scientific explanation of 'what is'." 
(Wilber and Wisman, 1975:672). See also Shubik (1970).
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trary to the expected r e s u l t . 34 He found, using the input- 
output table of 1947 for the U.S., that U.S. export industries 
as a whole were relatively more labor intensive than import re­
placing industries. This result was in contradiction to the 
predicted pattern based on the H-0 theorem and the widely ac­
cepted assumption of the U.S. as a relatively capital rich 
c o u n t r y . 35 Leontief's findings did not lead to the rejection 
of the H-0 model. For one, methodological and statistical ob­
jections led to doubts about the validity of'Leontief's test. 
Secondly, and more importantly, modifications in the basic H-0 
assumptions seemed to be able to resolve the paradox without 
somehow destroying the central idea of the t h e o r e m . 35 Leontief
3^It is difficult to understand why Leontief ever 
thought that his test could verify one of the H-0 predictions. 
Samuelson (1949:181) himself seemed to be much more cautious 
in this respect:
I cannot pretend to present a balanced appraisal 
of the bearing of (the H-0) analysis upon interpreting 
the actual world, ...: on the one hand, I think it would 
be folly to come to any startling conclusions on the 
basis of so simplified a model and such abstract reason­
ing; . . .
15Leontief did not show that the U.S. was capital abun­
dant. He simply assumed it. Naturally it is not permissable 
to conclude from the relative factor proportions of the ex- 
portables that the U.S. is relatively capital rich (Jones, 1956- 
57) .
Concise reviews of this debate are contained in 
Bhagwati (1969a: 28-34), Chipman (1966:44-57), Clement et_. al. 
(1967:98-104) and Travis (1964). Bhagwati (1969a:33) pro­
nounces himself an agnostic on the veracity of the H-0 theorem. 
Clement at. al. (1967:104) call essentially for a better data 
base to allow a fair test of the theorem. The data base is still 
a problem as Finger (1975a) points out.
26
(1956) himself introduced efficiency units of labor as the 
modifying additional element.37 This can be taken to mean 
either that different countries have different production 
functions, that factors of production are not homogenous, 
or that additional factors of production beyond capital and 
labor are important in the production process.38 jn general 
the model was expanded to encompass a multi-country, multi-
37Bhagwati (1969a:31) points out that the use of 
relative wages as efficiency weights already presupposes 
the correctness of the H-0 theorem. It also means that the 
wage rates are implicitly contained in the independent 
variable used to explain the relative factor price and there­
fore implicitly the (average) wage rate. This is obviously 
an improper procedure.
3 Caves (1960:93-101) discusses these definitional 
problems. The three explanations seem to be closely linked.
A non-homogenous factor implies that the units embody differ­
entially one or more characteristics. But it is rather 
arbitrary if one sees, for example, human capital as such a 
differentiating characteristic making labor non-homogenous 
or as an additional factor of production besides 'pure labor’.
Also, Haberler (1961:20), leaning on Samuelson (19^8: 
181-182), has pointed out that production functions in differ­
ent countries can always be made equal if enough variables are 
explicitly recognized. But in the latter case the concept of 
the production function becomes empty.
Posner (1961:326-328) rejects the multiplication of 
the number of explicitly recognized factors of production 
because analysis then becomes description.
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commodity and multi-factor world.39j40
The Leontief test raises, however, the much more 
general question to what extent the different conclusions 
of the H-0 theorem can be actually tested. The model, its 
theorems and all of the welfare theoretical conclusions 
based on it are derived from long-run, comparative static 
equilibrium analysis. The IES however is rarely static or 
in equilibrium and the observed trade patterns and price re­
lations do therefore not reflect equilibrium positions. The 
most one can hope for is that trade under these circumstances
■^The H-0 theorem becomes quite ambiguous in some of 
these cases and depends on the adoption of additional re­
strictive conventions or reinterpretation of concepts. For 
a discussion see Clement et_. al. (1967:56-60) and Baldwin 
(1971b:132).
For example, multi-factor models lead to definitional 
problems with respect to the concept of relative factor en­
dowments and factor intensities (Samuelson, 1953-54; Bhagwati, 
1969a:26). And Jones (1971), has to assume in his
three-factor model that only two factors enter into any one 
commodity. It also becomes impossible in the multi-factor 
case to reason a priori that the production functions in 
different countries are in fact the same (Chacholiades, 1973: 
225). Lacking this proof the H-0 theorem becomes even more 
a logical system with only tenuous links to the analysis of 
trade. If the production functions are really different, then 
the theory would have to include a theory of the production of 
the production function before it could be applied to the 
analysis of trade.
Ambiguities occur also in the multi-country case where 
one can adopt bilateral or multilateral definitions of relative 
factor abundance (Bhagwati, 1969a:26-27)• The simplest ex­
pansion of the traditional H-0 model seems to be possible in 
the multi-commodity case (Bhagwati, 1972b). But even this case 
demands reinterpretations (Chacholiades, 1973:216-224; Vanek, 
1968; Vanek and Bertrand, 1971).
^The multi-country case does not seem to have affected 
the Leontief test as the U.S. was clearly the leading country. 
Tatemoto and Ichimura (1959) however show that Japanese exports
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produces a tendency towards the purported trade pattern and 
factor price equalization (Chacholiades, 1973:264). The 
problem with a test of the H-0 model lies in the interpreta­
tion and specification of these tendencies . ^
The Leontief test of the factor content of U.S. trade 
was based on the U.S. input-output table and trade structure 
for 19^7- This period lies about halfway in between the end 
of the war and the beginning of European reconstruction.
The U.S. accumulated net exports of over $32 billions between 
1946 and 1949- 1947 alone contributed almost one third to
this trade surplus. West Germany at that time was still under 
allied control. Its economy was administered and controlled. 
Its currency reform took place only in 1948. The British de­
valuation of 30% in 1949 was a reflection of the serious dis­
equilibrium of the British economy in the immediate post-war 
years. Kindleberger (1962:78-80) mentions that the trade 
structure of West Germany and other European countries during 
these years did actually remain the same as in the prewar 
years. The trade structures did not adjust to the drastically 
changed factor availabilities. Instead reconstruction was 
directed towards the reestablishment of the prewar factor
to more developed countries are relatively labor intensive, 
those to less developed countries relatively capital intensive.
^1This is one of the fundamental points of criticism of 
positivist (neo-classical) economic theory. See e.g. Hollis 
and Nell (1975), Kaldor (1972), Kornai (1971), Mini (1974),
Solo (1975) and Wilber and Wisman (1975).
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proportions through massive capital formation financed with 
Marshall aid. And finally, as Travis (1964) has pointed out, 
most countries had actually at that time a sophisticated 
tariff system in place and had had so for many years.^ It is 
therefore not very clear what the Leontief test could have 
possibly proven. This problem seems also to hold for alter­
native trade theories which will be discussed in the next 
section. A testable model, it seems, would have to include 
not only a positive theory about the trade determining effects 
of the elaborate tariff systems (Travis, 1964) including the 
even more complex systems of non-tariff barriers (Baldwin,
1970) which actually exist, but also some notion of reaction 
or adjustment speeds of the IES to various c h a n g e s . 3^ That 
alternative trade models seem to be often superficial and 
journalistic might only reflect this lack of a general theoret­
ical model capable of handling the complexity of the IES 
(Bardhan, 1970:5).
^Baldwin (1971b:130;139) points out that tariffs can 
shift trade away from the postulated H-0 structure without, 
however, generating the paradoxical structure found by Leontief.
^Time is essentially a logical element in the models 
of growth and trade (Soedersten, 1964; Bardhan, 1970) as 
Robinson (1962:22-29) points out. They lend themselves only 
with difficulty to the analysis of these problems. Also, Stern 
(1973:865) mentions that these models do not incorporate the 
dynamic effects of tariffs and other trade control measures.
Ohlin (1970:331) himself seems to be little 
perturbed by this variety of competing approaches:
In the last few years I have become more
30
The next section will provide a review of such al­
ternative formulations of the determinants of trade. They 
all relax in one way or another the stringent assumptions of 
Samuelson's formulation of the H-0 model.
2. Multi-Factor Models of Trade
As mentioned in the preceding section, Leontief's 
paradoxical findings stimulated a renewed and not yet term­
inated search for additional factors of production which when 
incorporated in the model could explain the observed structure 
of trade and still preserve the idea that relative factor pro­
portions determine trade structures. These so-called neofactor 
proportion accounts of the determination of trade patterns - as 
opposed to the neotechnology accounts - have taken different 
factors of production as the missing explanatory factor al­
though, basically, they are all concerned with the complete 
specification of capital and labor (Harry Johnson, 1 9 7 0 a ) . 5^
sceptical about the fruitfulness of the application 
of so much scientific energy to a refined and de­
tailed analysis of models based on violent abstrac­
tions. It is perhaps more fruitful to use several 
new models, and to admit that they all, taken together, 
can do little more than.increase our understanding of 
the problem.
^Baldwin (1971b:141-143) concludes at the end of his 
extensive review and testing of alternative trade models that 
a two-factor model will never be sufficient to explain trade 
patterns. He agrees with Hufbauer (1970) and Kenen (1970) that 
more elaborate models are necessary which include not only mul­
tiple factors but also barriers to factor mobility and to trade.
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Land and natural resources, the latter possibly con­
ceived as a differentiating factor of land, were introduced 
early on as the missing explanatory factors. The relative 
abundance of land and resources would provide countries with 
a comparative advantage in the production and export of re­
source-intensive products, i.e. raw materials, agricultural 
products and their processed derivatives (Vanek, 1963; Linder, 
196l:8l). On the other hand, many studies used human capital 
as the missing third factor of production.^ The controversy 
about Leontief's use of efficiency units of labor as an ex­
planation for his paradoxical findings showed, as already 
pointed out, that it is rather difficult to distinguish addi­
tional factors of production from different production func­
tions (Samuelson, 1948:182). For example, managerial know-how 
is often said to differentiate production functions rather 
than make labor non-homogeneous (Clement et. al., 1967:102).
Of course, once the idea of non-homogeneity of labor was ac­
cepted, it became clear that capital was similarly differenti­
ated and was made up of the basic unit "pure waiting" and 
specific technological characteristics embodied in physical 
units of capital which thus gained a historical time dimension
-------ITZ-----------
Bharadwaj and Bhagwati (1967) for India, Roskamp and
McMeekin (1968) for East Germany, and Kenen (1970) in a theo­
retical analysis have provided early investigations of this 
type.
Keesing (1965) uses a measure of labor skills as the 
only trade determining factor of production.
(Kenen, 1965a, 1965b). It was also argued that these dif­
ferent factors were complements rather than substitutes in 
the production process (Vanek, 1963). This means that the 
production functions are restricted to certain factor pro­
portions, thus breaking the link between relative factor 
prices and factor proportions. This line of thought leads to 
the view of technological knowledge and its actual application 
as a source of differentiated production functions. In this 
case the analysis expands quickly to the study of the pro­
duction of technological change, its diffusion and thus to the 
wider socio-political circumstances which affect these two 
processes (Hufbauer, 1970).
Technology as a trade determinant factor can also be 
conceptualized in different ways. For Jones (1970) technology 
makes for different production functions while Lowinger (1975) 
for example uses technology as equivalent to human capital in 
determining trade. Kenen (1965a, 1965b) on the other hand, 
treats technical characteristics of capital equipment as differ­
entiating elements of pure capital understood as waiting. And 
Samuelson (19^8) implies that technology, human capital, and 
organizational know-how are complementary elements in the pro­
cess of production.
Technological factors, or their proxy, expenditures on 
research and development (R&D), become the explanatory variable 
in the neotechnology account of the determination of trade 
patterns. The core of this explanation centers around the
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product cycle theory of trade (Vernon, 1966).^? This view 
is actually based on the dynamic application of monopolistic 
competition theory to international trade. It is very em­
pirical but suffers from a lack of formal elegance compared 
to the Samuelson version of the H-0 theory (Harry Johnson, 
1970a). In this explanation, countries and their producers 
achieve temporary monopolistic comparative advantage positions 
which are the result of technological leadership, product 
differentiation and the early exploitation of economies of 
scale. The maintenance of this comparative advantage depends 
on the continuous creation of new products or product varia-
i i «  it q
tions through R&D. 5 7 Large firms in large and high-mcome 
countries will be better able to create and maintain such 
temporary monopoly positions because of three aspects of the 
R&D process. For one, large firms with large and high-income 
home markets will be able to minimize the risks inherent in
Ip7
Vernon (1970) and Wells (1972) contain further theo­
retical and empirical contributions and relevant bibliographies.
Finger (1975b) presents a new version of the product 
cycle hypothesis where the rate of product turnover becomes an 
additional explanatory variable besides technology and labor 
skills. Finger also argues that the 'technology gap' trade 
model of Posner (1961) is indistinct from the product cycle model.
^Bhagwati (1969a:35-36;108) interprets the 'availability' 
trade theory of Kravis (1956) in this way.
^This explanation is product oriented. Keesing (1967) 
and Grubel et. al. (1967) include technological process in­
novation as an additional explanatory factor (see next note).
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R&D. They are, therefore, able to continue to create new 
products and new technologies and to exploit economies of 
scale in the production of these new products. Secondly, 
these large firms are frequently part of oligopolistic 
markets in their home country, have production facilities 
in many countries, and are able to protect their technolog­
ical findings through patents. In short, they are already 
in a position to exploit oligopoly positions even without the 
dynamics of technological change (Hymer, 1972). And thirdly, 
the diffusion of technological innovations even if they are 
legally unprotected, requires resources and time. Temporary 
protection is therefore assured simply because the Innova­
tions will not spread instantaneously to other countries (Mans 
field, 1975:373-375)- The product cycle occurs because a new 
product will be first produced in the country of its creation 
and exports will start as other markets accept the new product 
As these markets grow and as local competitors might start up 
their own production, local production will begin either on a 
licensed basis or in production facilities owned by the orig­
inal producer. This production Is initially restricted to the 
assembly of imported parts, but in the end, production will 
be independent of parts shipped by the original producer. The 
product might ultimately even be exported back to the country 
of origin. This shift takes place as competing products ap­
pear and the initial monopoly position is eroded. Cost calcu­
lations begin to favor low-wage countries as the center of
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p r o d u c t i o n .50 in this sense, trade based on a technological 
monopoly gives way to trade based on traditional factor pro­
portions (Kindleberger, 1974:4l)•^ 5
Linder (1961:87-88) offers a related explanation for 
trade in manufactures. Demand conditions in the home market 
determine the range of manufactures that are produced in a 
country. Only these goods will be exportable because only 
under these circumstances are the risks and costs of export 
marketing acceptable. Trade in manufactures will therefore 
take place primarily between countries with similar tastes
50stobaugh (1971) argues 'that a secondary product cycle 
based on process innovations is superimposed on the first 
cycle based on product innovation and thus prolongs the mo­
nopolistic advantage of the originating country. See also 
the analysis by Seev Hirsch (1967).
51Harry Johnson (1970a:l4) points out that R&D can be 
included in the concept of capital. This suggests that in 
fact both the neofactor and neotechnology accounts of trade 
determination are basically based on the same set of factors. 
In fact, the use of an index of value-added per employee as 
the explanatory factor of trade (Lary, 1968) points to the 
same conclusion. Harry Johnson (1970a:16-17) argues that this 
index picks up the effects of labor-capital ratios, human cap­
ital, as well as neotechnology factors like scale economies, 
product age and differentiation.
However, in the end the fact remains that the neo­
technology account is concerned with developments over time, 
market structure, and, as will be discussed later on, inter­
national mobility of the factors of production.
c  p
J A country can occupy a bridging position where it 
finds itself as recipient in product cycles originating 
recently in DC and as a second generation originator of prod­
uct cycles with even less developed countries (Hufbauer, 1966; 
Seev Hirsch, 1971)-
Akamatsu (1961:205-209), Higgins (1968:623-624) and 
Kojima (1975:84-85) explain such a trade pattern with the 
"catching-up product cycle" where a country's industries 
find themselves in different phases of product cycles.
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and income levels.53 T^g demand conditions in most UDC are 
sufficiently different from those in DC, according to Linder, 
that the former will be hard put to find exportable manu­
factures to DC among their home market oriented products 
(Linder, 1967)-'^ More recently Linder (1971:504) argued that 
home market demand determines also the search for technologi­
cal c h a n g e . 55 Declining home market demand will therefore in 
general lead to increasing uncompetitiveness on world markets.
53I.e., these countries come close to satisfying the 
H-0 assumption of identical consumption patterns. On the 
other hand, the Linder hypothesis clearly differs from the 
H-0 model in assuming positive information, marketing and 
transportation costs (Linder, 1961:87-90). It is therefore 
not clear to what extent trade between UDC or between DC 
could be close to H-0 trade.
Linneman (1966:180-196) and Kindleberger (1962:8-25) 
provide some indication for the importance of transportation 
costs as a determinant of trade structure. Kindleberger 
especially uses such costs to explain trade overlap which is 
one facet of reality which cannot be explained with a pure 
H-0 model. But see on this point Finger (1975a).
54The Linder model assumes producer initiated exports. 
However, MNC and possibly large DC-based retail organizations may 
well initiate UDC based production and exports according to 
DC demand patterns.
^^Schmookler (1966) presents the model of the demand 
determination of technological change. Linder suggests that 
this means that UDC and DC will follow different paths of tech­
nological development.
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Exports will decline together with production for the home 
m a r k e t .56 Exports are therefore demand determined, either 
directly or indirectly, both in the short and long run.
Both the dynamic model of Linder (1971) and the prod­
uct cycle theory introduce technological know-how and tech­
nological change as explicit trade determining factors. This 
means that the H-0 assumption of identical production functions 
has been dropped. Or if one considers technological know-how 
as a separate factor of production or as a capital differen­
tiating characteristic, international factor mobility has been 
introduced into the model thus relaxing another H-0 assumption. 
Most technological know-how today is produced in the highly 
industrialized countries and then either consciously trans­
ferred or indirectly diffused to other countries. If one 
considers technology as one of the trade determining factors, 
then one introduces an imperfectly mobile factor into trade 
models. ^  Of course, it has been recognized for some time that 
the absolute dichotomy between perfect intra-country factor 
mobility and absolute intercountry immobility is far from
-^Temin (1966) and Kindleberger (1962:59) provide ex­
amples with the experience of the British steel and textile 
and the U.S. textile and car industries.
Hsu (1972) presents the formal Linder model.
5?If on the other hand the differences are accounted 
for by different production functions, one would have to model 
the process whereby the production functions become transformed 
under foreign influences.
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realized (Kaldor, 1970). Mundell (1957) showed that inter­
national factor migration in response to factor price differ­
entials can reestablish factor price equalization. Harry 
Johnson (1958:84-92) and Meade (1955), on the other hand, 
analysed the effects of factor movements upon income dis­
tribution and shifts in production and demand patterns and
58the terms of trade.-'
However, the total impact of factor movements are likely 
to be much more complex, especially in terms of their dynamic 
and long-term ramifications. For one, it is selected sets of 
a given factor which tend to move between countries. Secondly, 
factors are often moved by a special category of actors, the 
MNC. Not only are these factor transfers made on the basis of 
firm internal decisions, but they frequently involve the si­
multaneous transfer of complementary factors, labor with mana­
gerial know-how and other specialized skills, technology, and 
either finance capital or capital equipment with specific em­
bodied technological characteristics (Yudin, 1968). And 
thirdly, the effects of such factor migrations depend very much 
on the particular socio-political conditions in and possible 
cultural differences between the sender and receiver countries.
The complexity of these conditions and of the ramifica­
tions to which they can give rise, and the different weight
^ S u b s e q u e n t  research has built on this line of investi­
gation. See, e.g., the analysis of capital mobility by Chipman
(1971) and Wan (1971) and of labor mobility by Kenen (1971).
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given to them in the evaluation of factor movements, underly 
the conflicting evaluations accorded to labor migrations.
Harry Johnson (1968b), taking an internationalist position 
using a comparative static model, is unreservedly for such 
movements. They maximize world income although rarely giving 
rise to compensatory payments. Patinkin (1968), taking the 
nationalist position and being aware of this lack of redis­
tribution of income gains, stresses the negative growth effects 
in the emigration country due to the loss of highly skilled 
labor, the 'brain drain1. Myint (1968:238-252) on the other 
hand takes a middle position. Labor migration, or in his case, 
migration of highly skilled and educated labor out of UDC, is 
the result of structural disequilibria which cannot be over­
come within the near future. Emigration is therefore a safety 
valve which prevents the eruption of sociopolitical tensions 
and conflicts which could easily affect the growth rate by more 
than the uncompensated export of human capital.59 The same can 
be said about capital and technology movements. The contradic­
tory evaluation, e.g., of the effects of foreign direct in­
vestments of MNC is based on similar differences.*^
5^The immigration of large pools of relatively unskilled 
labor into the industrialized countries of Northern and Western 
Europe generates also social and political problems which in 
turn can feed back to the economic sphere.
^See the study by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1972) 
which is unreservedly positive, the more reserved report by the 
U.S. Tariff Commission (1973)5 and the papers in Kujawa (1973) 
reflecting the negative viewpoint of organized labor.
•'10
The product cycle hypothesis and related trade models 
discussed at the beginning of this section have implicitly 
introduced into trade theory large producer organizations 
with world wide interests which are far different from the 
firm of neo-classical price theory. It has already been men­
tioned that these organizations have reduced the barriers to 
international factor mobility, or have at least changed the 
character of this mobility. In this context it has been 
suggested that the effects of their activities, both in the 
home and host countries, are not very clear and certainly 
complex, especially when the latter are UDC.^l But of special 
interest in the present context are those aspects of MNC which
C *1
Kindleberger (1972) suggests that these effects 
changed with time and growth of MNC.
General reviews of the issues raised by MNC are pre­
sented by Barnet and Mueller (197*0 and Wilkins (1974)- The 
preceding footnote listed studies evaluating the effects of 
MNC in DC. With respect to UDC, May (1974) finds MNC to be 
extremely beneficial. Pearson (1969:99-123) finds foreign 
direct investment in such countries to be overall beneficial 
for them. Hirschman (1969) concurs but counsels nonetheless 
gradual desinvestment, mostly for political reasons. A re­
cent study by the United Nations (1974) is overall critical 
of the benefits that will accrue to UDC. (See also Evans
(1972) and Barnet and Mueller (1974:148-184).) The net 
benefits depend crucially on the conditions under which MNC 
are allowed to invest. At one time, Seers (1963) suggested 
a UN organization to strengthen the bargaining power of host 
UDC. Mueller (1973) was once sceptical about the ability of 
these countries to reassert their control over the MNC but now 
thinks it is possible (Barnet and Mueller, 1974:185-210). Berg- 
sten (1974b) concurs with the latter view but fears that the 
home countries of the MNC could try to retaliate and thus start 
an investment war unless a generally accepted code of conduct 
is drawn up. D. Wallace (1973) deals exhaustively with the 
problem of the international control of MNC investments.
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differenclate them from the classical price taking firm of 
the H-0 model insofar as they relate to the four aspects of 
the IES discussed in the first chapter. 2^
For one, MNC are their own very best international 
customers. Trade, finance and investment activities are 
therefore not arms' length transactions, i.e., do not neces­
sarily reflect market conditions (Vernon, 1973:98-99) • ^
One aspect of this situation is the use of manipulated intra­
corporate transfer prices for goods and services in order to 
minimize tax liabilities and to circumvent exchange controls
rT [ I
and limits on profit repatriation. Secondly, MNC frequently 
engage in foreign direct investments only if they can exploit 
or have to preserve some kind of oligopolistic or even
The emergence of the MNC duplicates in many ways the 
development of the large integrated oligopolistic firm in the 
U.S. at the turn of the century. The effects on the world 
level could well be equivalent to those on the national level 
(Hymer, 1972 ).
^ G r a y  (1972) provides many examples of the consequences 
this can have in his analysis of the Canadian experience with 
foreign MNC.
See Barnet and Mueller (1974:151-162). Zenoff and 
Zwick (1969:428) argue that "intracompany sales are the single 
most important method of effecting a movement of capital be­
tween countries in which companies have operations." On the 
other hand, Arpan (1971:71-72) found a rapidly declining use 
of transfer-pricing for tax minimization by MNC.
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monopolistic a d v a n t a g e . ^5 Thirdly, MNC are often worldwide 
multi-plant organizations with similar production facilities 
in several countries. This not only provides them with the 
possibility of closing down one facility in the face of un­
pleasant host government decisions without endangering the 
operation of other dependent o p e r a t i o n s .66 It is also pos­
sible that in these cases decisions with respect to local 
operations are made on the basis of the global interests of 
the MNC and not on the basis of the conditions existing in the 
host country (Hymer, 1970).
But even more important is that many MNC are more than 
economic actors limiting their actions to the market place.
They are in fact economic and political entities (Hymer, 1970), 
and by using their resources, they are even able to keep 
"sovereignty at bay" (Vernon (1971)- Recent history clearly 
shows that MNC are important political actors which intervene 
in the politics of their host countries or are at least able 
to induce the governments of their home countries to do so on 
their behalf (Sampson, 1973)* Often, these political activities
65This point is stressed by many authors, see e.g. Caves 
(1971, 1974), Kindleberger (1969) and Weigel (1974).
Kindleberger (1969:201-207) proposes international har­
monization of investment conditions to prevent MNC from ex­
ploiting UDC competing against each other for their investments.
c c
Moran (1973) describes recent financing strategies by 
MNC exploiting natural resources to limit the danger of na­
tionalization through increasing artificially the costs of 
nationalization (especially the political costs).
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preempt foreign policy decision^ of their home governments 
(Model, 1967) or they become active agents in behalf of the 
foreign policy of their home governments (Gray, 1972:253-290). 
Or, as the events during the Arab oil boycott in 1973 and 1974 
revealed, they fill the policy vacuum left by their governments 
if these are unable to reach necessary foreign policy decisions 
(Mikdashi, 1975:6).^7 It is no wonder that Kindleberger (1969) 
and Ball (1970) predicted at one time the actual or at least 
imminent demise of the nation-state in favor of the transna­
tional enterprise as the basic organizational unit of the world 
system.
While this political aspect of MNC may yet be kept 
under control, the socio-cultural effects of the activities of 
the MNC may prove to be more significant. These effects arise 
not only because the export or local manufacturing of products 
which issue from the rich, consumer-oriented economies of the 
industrialized world propagate and reproduce the lifestyles 
predominant in these countries. The effects of investment 
activities of MNC on work attitudes and organization, and the 
cultural and socio-political structure of host societies 
through the introduction of modern western technologies are 
probably even more important.^ Hymer (1972) warned that the
^Barnet and Mueller (1974:72-104) give a compendium of 
these different political activities by MNC. Vernon (1972) 
contains several papers discussing the political as well as 
military implications of MNC activities. See also the case 
studies on the activities of oil companies by Pinelo (1973) 
and Penrose (1968).
^chapter 3, Section 2, will take up this point.
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MNC would reproduce its hierarchical organization (Chandler 
and Redlich, 1961) at the world level. The strata of the 
least developed countries would contain the manufacturing 
activities supervised by regional headquarters located in 
the middle-income strata of countries. The richest coun­
tries would become the seats of the MNC where all the stra­
tegic decisions would be taken and where much of the research 
activities would be concentrated.^ 9
All in all it is clear that the MNC are unlike the 
traditional economic actors of classical economic theory.
They have not only economic but also socio-cultural, military 
and political effects and capabilities. These capabilities —  
not just the economic ones —  are actually used in attempts to 
shape actively their environment for their own benefits.
The extensions of the original H-0 model as well as 
those trade models which deny any overt link with the H-0 
model have raised the question of the proper conceptualization 
of the model elements and the proper theory formulation. 
Practically, this meant the gradual relaxation of the strict 
assumptions underlying the Samuelson formulation of the H-0 
theorem. In other words, the models have attempted to re­
flect more fully the complexities of the real world. The 
proliferation of explanatory variables and models is a re­
flection of the problematic of trying to construct simple
^^Brown (1970:260-265) describes a plan by ITT to tie 
all its subsidiaries into one central, real-time computer, 
located of course near its headquarters in the United States.
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models for a complex world. One aspect of this is the ac­
ceptance of elements of oligopolistic competition in the 
IES. The product cycle hypothesis and related conceptu­
alizations have gone furthest in this direction although any 
model that includes technological change as a variable comes 
close to accepting such a market structure.
Neo-classical price theory has always argued that 
oligopolistic market structures were non-optimal from a wel­
fare standpoint. The opposite, however, may hold in a world 
of factor mobility, technological change, growth and develop­
ment.^1 Harry Johnson (1968d, 1969:60, 1970a) now thinks that 
such competition —  especially in the form of MNC —  is not 
"a socially undesirable imperfection of market structure" but 
a dynamic and rational mechanism to create knowledge, generate 
and spread new technologies, and to bring about modern patterns 
of consumption appropriate for developing economies. One con­
sequence of this view is that government intervention to con­
trol and correct oligopolistic behavior is once more considered
7°Hymer and Rowthorn (1970) argue that the emergence of 
the U.S. MNC has lessened competition in world markets, in part 
because they induced a concentration in European and Japanese 
industries. Harry Johnson (1970c) on the other hand thinks 
that competition has increased because the entrance of MNC into 
hitherto isolated national markets has lessened monopolistic 
control of these markets by national firms. Caves (1974), after 
surveying many empirical studies, thinks that MNC are unlikely 
to increase competition if they participate in markets for dif­
ferentiated consumer products.
^1Any text in Industrial Organization contains evidence 
for this. Galbraith (1968) presents this conviction most force­
fully .
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unwarranted (Harry Johnson, 1971).7^ Yet, despite all the 
welfare arguments against government Intervention, or at 
least certain forms of intervention, in the past and today, 
we find that governments have always intervened into the 
working of the IES. The combined effect of these interven­
tions has had very specific results raising the question of 
the proper model construction again although from a different 
angle. The next section will deal with these issues.
3. Trade and Trade Controls in an Imperfect and 
Dynamic Social System
Government intervention to control trade flows and the 
impact of events in the IES upon the national system generally 
are pervasive and of long standing. The arguments in favor of 
such interventions have changed over time (Harry Johnson, 1974). 
Welfare analysis based on the H-0 model has consistently sug­
gested that free trade or at most a limited range of control 
measures is best. If market imperfections exist, the best pol­
icy is always to remove directly the imperfection or end the 
condition which makes the real situation diverge from the H-0 
assumption.73 When the imperfections are country internal and
7 2' This shift in theoretical argumentation to rule out 
government interference has its root in the change from mer- 
cantilistic to classical, and then from classical to neo­
classical economics (Mini, 1974; Solo, 1975).
72'-'That is, as long as only one imperfection exists or 
all imperfections are removed at the same time. Otherwise the 
ranking of policies has to occur with the help of the theory 
of second-best. The results become much more ambiguous in this 
case.
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their removal is not feasible or impossible, first-best 
policy is to use a tax combined with either a production 
or consumption subsidy to reestablish equality between rates 
of transformation and consumption and the relative commodity 
prices (Bhagwati, 1971) • ?45^ 5 This ranking of policies ap­
plies even in the only ’true’ infant industry case where the 
public goods nature of knowledge acquisition may lead to an 
otherwise sub-optimal production of such knowledge (Harry 
Johnson, 1970b).^ Trade is in general preferable to no trade
 ^Stern (1973) and especially Corden (1971, 1974) pro­
vide a complete review of the issue and contain extensive 
bibiographies.
^Domestic distortions can be endogenous, i.e. they 
arise out of the laissez-fair operation of the perfect system. 
Or they can be the result of unintended consequences of past 
governmental action (autonomous policy-imposed distortions) 
or of instrumental policies through which the government wants 
to achieve objectives which demand such distortions (Bhagwati, 
1971:73-74).
Harry Johnson (1970b) shows that all other arguments 
normally used to justify the protection of infant industries 
refer actually to forms of market imperfection::. In all of 
these cases the optimal first-best policy is a tax and sub­
sidy scheme. (See also the analysis by Grubel (1966) and 
Baldwin (1969)-)
Harry Johnson (1970a:19-20) himself seems, however, to 
entertain at times more differentiated views so when he wonders 
if the complex problems of modern industrial competition can 
still be handled adequately with the existing theory of tariffs.
Another problem is that the infant industry argument 
refers to a truly dynamic event which entails probably more 
than the traditional externality argument (Bhagwati, 1969a:80). 
Also, List's argument for infant industry protection was very 
much concerned with what might be called today nation-building, 
i.e. non-economic effects (List, 1971:151-158; Senghaas, 1975).
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except in the case of increasing returns to scale (Bhagwati, 
1969a:83-85). Tariffs are always less optimal than a scheme 
of taxes and subsidies except in the following cases: (i)
when domestic demand is smaller than the optimal scale of pro­
duction. A temporary tariff or quota may in this case be 
sufficient to allow producers to attain lower production costs 
and even become internationally competitive (Pomfret, 1975)-
(ii) A tariff is the first-best solution when the imperfection 
lies in monopoly elements in world markets which cannot be 
affected by domestic policies (Bhagwati, 1971:79) 7^ And
(iii) a tariff may be useful in increasing the welfare of an 
individual country although such an optimal tariff itself will, 
in this case, introduce a distortion into the world system 
(Harry Johnson, 1951-52; Chacholiades, 1973:435-440).^®
This ranking of trade intervention policies can be 
used to determine optimal intervention policies for the
^This welfare analysis is based on the case of complete 
monopoly and perfect competition. It does therefore not nec­
essarily arrive at conclusions which are valid for inter­
national markets where MNC introduce intermediary structures 
of oligopoly and monopolistic competition discussed in the 
previous section (Balogh, 1973:89 (Note 1)).
^®These gains from an optimum tariff reduce the welfare 
of the international system. Also, they do not only depend 
on objective conditions but are predicated on certain retalia­
tion patterns (Harry Johnson, 1953-54; 1968c).
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achievement of 'non-economic' objectives.79 a tariff is 
an optimal trade intervention policy if the goal is increased
O p
self-sufficiency, i.e. reduced dependency on imports.ou a 
tax and subsidy scheme is first-best policy if domestic pro­
duction has to be maintained at a high level in order, e.g., 
to maintain sufficient production capacity for military emer­
gencies. Tax and subsidy schemes are also best for the main­
tenance of factor employment at a given level or for the 
limitation of domestic consumption (Harry Johnson, 1964; 
Bhagwati, 1971:78). Real domestic product will be decreased 
in all of these cases although real income - defined to in­
clude the welfare gained from achieving the non-economic ob-
On O Q
jectives - will be maximized (Harry Johnson, 1965a:259- 5
^^This is the 'instrumental policy case' referred to by 
Bhagwati (1971) (See note 75)-
'Non-economic' means in this context that the goal 
achievement necessitates a loss of real product, not that the 
goal does not belong to or not affect directly the economic 
sphere (Harry Johnson, 1964:7, 1965a).
A tariff which achieves a given objective with minimal 
loss of real product is called a "scientific tariff" by Harry 
Johnson (I960) and a "made-to-measure tariff" by Corden (1974: 
203) •
^Kindleberger (1972:388) points out that the difference 
between real product and real income is not a neat one. Many 
nationalistic policy cases provide also some kind of consumer 
or producer goods. They can spur people on to more savings, 
greater productivity, or make them accept an unfavorable income 
distribution.
^2Harry Johnson (1965a : 268-269) explains within this 
framework a country's changing preference for free trade and
m50
Tariffs can be preferable to tax and subsidy schemes 
even in the absence of non-economic objectives or external 
monopoly elements because of the lower direct economic costs 
which are incurred in the administration of such trade control 
schemes (Corden, 197^:59-67)- Harry Johnson (1965a:259) gives 
three reasons for the political preference for tariffs which 
are related to the administrative cost argument: (i) It is 
more difficult to collect the taxes necessary to finance sub­
sidies than to levy an appropriate tariff: (ii) those who bene­
fit from import protection for example do not wish its real 
cost to be readily ascertained or to depend on annual budgetary 
approvals as would be normally the case with tax and subsidy 
schemes: and (iii) industries must make believe —  both nation­
ally and internationally —  that they are internationally com­
petitive without government support. This is easier with im­
port protection.
The acceptance of such arguments or of the validity of 
non-economic objectives as in the case of the scientific tariff 
is an important and fundamental step outside the boundaries of
protection. A country which is already a net-exporter will 
have a relatively low marginal preference for additional home 
production. In this case real product and real income (in­
cluding the non-economic objective) is almost the same and 
free trade will maximize both. The marginal preference for 
home production will increase if a deteriorating international 
competitive position reduces home employment. Real income 
maximization will lead to protection at the price of a less 
than optimal product. (It seems that this model is based on 
Keynesian and not classical assumptions.)
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the H-0 f r a m e w o r k . Goals other than pure product max­
imization are Included In the social welfare function and 
this opens the possibility to include goals as legitimate
O h
variables for analysis which belong to non-economic spheres.04 
Furthermore, Harry Johnson’s reflections reported above on the 
preference for tariffs over tax and subsidy schemes point to 
the fact that trade and trade controls take place in a dynamic 
social system with conflicts and that trade analysis and poli­
cy prescription cannot abstract from these fundamentals.
This means that any trade policy —  scientific and op­
timal or not —  which is supposed to correct existing market 
imperfections or to benefit some groups but not others, acti­
vates conflicts. Although these conflicts may remain political 
conflicts, they can easily become social, military and economic 
conflicts (or affect already existing conflicts of this type). 
These conflicts imply not only direct economic costs (in the 
for?. of a once and for all downward shift in the growth path)
It already led to a reevaluation of the whole cus­
toms union argument (Cooper and Massell, 1965a, 1965b; Krauss,
1972).
84Economists have always arbitrarily limited the number 
and character of variables to be included in the preference 
function of 'rational economic man' (Hollis and Nell, 1975)- 
This made it rather difficult to explain irrational govern­
mental policies (Penrose, 1971:232) without taking recourse 
to the concept of political market failure (Goeran Ohlin, 1969: 
174) .
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due to the related resource use. They affect the character
and stability of social relationships which in turn are im-
85portant determinants of capital and labor productivities.
This means that optimal situations and policies (if measured 
in traditional economic terms with a strong ceteris paribus 
clause) may become non-optimal measured on the same basis if 
the dynamics of the social system and its economic reper­
cussions are included in the analysis. A non-optimal policy or 
situation if traditionally evaluated may become economically 
optimal because of benign or relatively weak negative reper­
cussions.®^ This point will be illustrated in more detail in 
chapter 4 when the adjustment paths of various European coun­
tries in the case of the drastic fall in the wheat price after 
1870 are discussed.
A second aspect of the fact that trade and trade controls 
exist in a dynamic social system with conflicts relates to the 
distributional problem. A move from a non-optimal to a more
^The direct resource costs of conflict as well as the 
costs of controlling worsened social relationship can in­
crease conflicts because they divert resources from private 
and social consumption (Baumgartner ejt. al. , 1976a; DeVille 
and Burns, 1976; see also O ’Connor, 1973TT
®®Balogh (1963, 1973) makes the same argument pointing 
out that in real life the comparative static end situation of 
the economic system will not be reached because of the social 
processes. These theoretical positions can therefore not be 
used to rank policies.
Kindleberger (1968a:503-504) makes the same point with 
respect to devaluations.
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welfare optimal trade system Implies In general a different 
income distribution with some individuals, groups or coun­
tries being worse off than in the original situation. The 
usual argument is that in such situations the gaining actors 
are able to compensate the loosing ones and still realize an 
improvement in their own situation. Such compensation strat­
egies are however rather rare in real life and normally not 
institutionalized. However, distributional conflicts lie at 
the heart of many social conflicts and it seems that relative 
income positions are often more important than absolute ones. 
In these situations individuals, groups and countries probably 
prefer to rely on the existing situation or to use their power 
in clear-cut situations to increase their income share rather 
than rely on a questionable political process.Furthermore, 
such redistributional processes are not costless and the ex­
isting non-optimal situation may well provide a larger real 
product than attempts to bring about a more optimal allocative 
system that necessitates difficult redistributional policies 
(Cooper, 1975:21, 26-27).^9 finally Cooper (1968) pointed
'The U.S. has recently improved its system of adjust­
ment assistance. See the three papers by Metzger, Fooks and 
the Department of Commerce in the report by the Commission on 
International Trade and Investment (1971).
O O
Baldwin (1970:7-8) notes that governmental decision­
makers are rather reluctant to discuss and decide distribution­
al questions.
^Both Chipman (1972:209) and Stern (1973:879) point out 
that such redistributional decisions have to be based on the 
distributional consequences of trade liberalization policies. 
These, however, are rather difficult to determine.
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out that institutionalized redistribution mechanisms on the 
international level are even less frequent than on the na­
tional level. Agreed upon international redistribution 
policies —  although rare —  are also more easily broken 
without any consequences (at least for certain countries) 
than on the national level where periodic national elections 
provide at least some automatic checks.
All in all, it is not surprising that in situations 
where activities in the IES have complex repercussions in the 
national and international systems and where the social pro­
cesses related to economic adjustments in the wake of events 
in the IES or to changes in the trade control measures may 
have significant feedback effects on the economic sphere it­
self, governments continue to intervene to control the links 
between their economies and the IES. It is furthermore not 
surprising that, despite the welfare implications of the H-0 
model to the contrary, tariffs and other non-optimal trade 
control measures are used very liberally.^0 It is therefore
^Curiously enough, GATT allows tariffs but not tax and 
subsidy schemes for manufactures.
Overall protection and trade intervention has hardly 
diminished despite several rounds of tariff reductions since 
1945- Non-tariff barriers (NTB) —  see Stern (1973:867—873) > 
Baldwin (1970, 1971a), Harry Johnson (1967a:104-106), Walter 
(1969) and the papers in Chapter 5 of the report by the Com­
mission on International Trade and Investment Policies (1971) 
—  and country internal industrial policy measures —  see 
Goeran Ohlin (1 9 6 9 , 1975) —  have taken the place of reduced 
tariffs in controlling trade. Goeran Ohlin (1969) suggests 
that tariff reductions forced governments to use these other 
trade control forms to maintain overall control. Harry John­
son (1975:45) thinks that the realization by governments that 
the latter were superior to tariffs made them asquiesce in the 
tariff reductions in the first place. The superiority of many
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of interest in this context to inquire about the structure 
of these trade control measures and the trade flows gener­
ated in part by them. This may give us some clue to possi­
ble additional motivations behind the use of trade control 
measures. The next section will therefore present a summary 
of the relevant findings.
4. The Structure of Trade Controls and Trade Plows
In general, the structures of tariffs and NTB applied by 
DC have very specific forms. Nominal and the higher effective 
tariff rates increase as products become more highly processed. 
That is, DC tend to encourage the import of unprocessed primary 
products or of manufactures in early stages of processing. Sim­
ilarly, both nominal and effective tariff rates are lower for 
technologically sophisticated manufactures predominantly traded 
among industrialized countries than for manufactures like shoes 
and textiles for which UDC possess a comparative a d v a n t a g e .91 
Consequently, it is not surprising to find that manufactures
industrial policy measures —  especially many subsidy programs - 
derives from the possibility to protect and expand export mar­
kets. This, instead of domestic market protection through 
tariffs, becomes important due to the need to minimize unit 
costs despite large scale production'and high R&D expenditures 
(Harry Johnson, 1974:13-15)•
 ^ Zandano (1969) shows that nominal and effective tariff 
rates in industrial countries are positively related with labor 
intensity. However, Zandano sees in this result a positive 
verification of the H-0 model which suggests that import barri­
ers will increase the relative income share of the relatively 
scarce factor. This implies that the relatively unskilled 
workers must be a politically powerful group in the industrial­
ized countries (Harry Johnson, 1965b).
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imported by DC from UDC face tariff rates above the average 
rate on all the manufactures imported by DC.92
There exist strong indications that NTB are also biased 
against the exports of UDC. This is as much the result of 
conditions specific to UDC as due to the specific forms of the 
NTB of the DC. Walter (1971:197) argues that producers in UDC 
are in general less able to surmount a given barrier than those 
in DC. This is so because most of these producers have a low 
capability to deal with the complicated issues raised by most 
NTB because of their lack of commercial e x p e r i e n c e .93 They are 
also less able to switch production to products which face low­
er or no NTB due to general structural limitations present in 
the economies of UDC (which are in part of the Linder-type).
And they are frequently without appropriate informations about 
the NTB and therefore incur unanticipated selling costs. But 
maybe even more important is that the exports of UDC are often 
subject to especially tough health and quality standards which 
introduce a direct cost .bias against them. Walter (1971:202) 
also shows that the incidence of NTB in DC against imports from
9 These propositions are based on detailed calculations 
by Balassa (1965, 1967a, 1967b, 1968). Additional evidence 
can be found in Basevi (1966), Harry Johnson (1967a:90-91; 
96-104) and Streeten and Elson (1971:62-63)- Little et_.aU. 
(1970:273) show that the tariff reductions in the Kennedy 
Round did not reduce this bias.
^However, subsidiaries of MNC should not be affected 
by this. One would also expect sales organizations in DC to 
provide the necessary expertise if the products are really low 
priced ones.
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UDC is higher than against imports in general.9^j95
The structure of trade f l o w s 96 exhibits a pattern 
which leaves the same impression as the structure of trade 
controls, namely of being intentionally structured. Partner 
concentration of exports and imports are in general higher 
for UDC than DC.97 Galtung (1971:102) correlated per capita 
GNP and the percentage of employment in the non-primary sec­
tors —  both measures of degree of development —  with an index
 ^Harry Johnson (1967a:85) points out that those primary 
products exported by UDC to DC in competition with the latter’s 
own products "are subject to the most complex and generally 
severe restrictions involving quantitative control over imports 
... as well as tariffs or equivalent price-raising charges." 
Although other primary products face lesser import barriers, 
they are nonetheless often subject to heavy excise taxes (as 
in the case of oil and tropical agricultural products).
95This structure of NTB and the shift from tariffs to 
NTB (see note 9 0) raise some questions about the value of 
tariff preferences recently granted by most DC to UDC (Little 
et. al., 1970:27^; International Labor Organization, 1970:337; 
Cooper, 1972b) .
 ^Three indices to measure trade structures are used: 
(i) Geographic or partner concentration, i.e. the extent to 
which a country's exports go to or its imports come from one 
or a small number of countries; (ii) commodity concentration, 
i.e. the extent to which a country’s exports or imports con­
sist of different commodities (irrespective of destination or 
origin): and (ill) trade composition which is an index for 
the degree of processing which differentiates a country's ex­
ports from its imports.
For the exact specification of these indices and a 
discussion of their advantages and disadvantages see Michaely 
(1962), Coppock (1962), Galtung (1971), and also Hirschman 
(19*15), Kojima (1971) and Theil (1967).
9 ^ I m p o r t s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  l e s s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  t h a n  e x p o r t s  
( M i c h a e l y ,  1962:19-20).
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of partner concentration for a large number of countries.
The coefficients were -.52 and -.72 respectively.98 The 
study of Hirschman (19^5) of the trade structures during the 
1930's especially for Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom 
suggests that such a pattern of trade concentration is a 
consciously designed result used by large and developed and 
therefore dominant countries to make small and less developed 
countries economically and politically dependent on them.99 
The commodity concentration measures indicate a simi­
lar structure for the composition of trade as for the direction 
of trade. Galtung (1971:102) again finds relatively high cor­
relations of -.89 and -.87 respectively for per capita GNP 
and the percentage of employment in non-primary sectors when 
regressed against commodity concentration of e x p o r t s . -*-90 The 
data of Michaely (1962:16) suggests that, among DC, smaller 
countries have a higher export commodity composition ratio 
than larger ones while the concentration ratios among UDC is
 ^Coppock (1962) and Michaely (1962) support Galtung's 
findings for the trade structure of the late 1950's.
99;Linneman (1969:121-123) shows that both in the late 
1950's and early 1960's the neighborhood effect —  i.e. the 
effect of having contiguous borders with other countries on 
trade between them —  was not larger than the cousin effect.
The latter measures the influence of past commercial, economic, 
political and social ties on trade flows. It is therefore 
essentially an indication of the strength of colonial and post­
colonial ties. This influence becomes even more pronounced 
when controlling for distance and not just neighborhood (Linne- 
man, 1966). See also J. A. Pincus (1968).
■^Ogee a -^so Lloyd (1968:27) and Coppock (1962).
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slightly higher for the larger ones. This suggests that 
underdevelopment and position in a structure of dependency 
relationships are the determining variables and not smallness 
of the country and factors singled out in the Linder hypothe­
sis per se. This view is reenforced by the particular re­
lationship between the commodity concentration ratios for ex­
ports and imports. DC have generally low export and also low 
and relatively equal import concentration ratios. Countries 
with high export concentration ratios have generally lower im­
port commodity concentration ratios (Michaely, 1962:14). This 
structure is obviously the result of a lack of industrializa­
tion as it is generally UDC which have high ratios for their 
exports.
Both Michaely (1962:22) and Galtung (1971:102) find a 
positive correlation between partner and commodity concentra­
tion although Hirschman (1945:140-151) had originally hypothe­
sized a negative one. According to Hirschman a country with 
only a few commodities to export had to sell them necessarily 
to a relatively large number of countries. However the ab­
sorptive capacities of DC compared to concentrated production 
capacities of UDC are so large that it is quite possible for 
commodity and partner concentrations to go hand in hand.11^  
This does not mean that major DC do not use their arsenal of 
trade control measures to reenforce this pattern with the
Both situations minimize marketing costs which does 
not mean that the UDC benefit in the form of higher net prices. 
The oligopolistic character of international trade implied by 
these trade structures suggest that the DC are the major bene­
ficiaries .
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intent to make sure that the UDC are as much dependent on 
them as possible.
The point, that lack of industrialization is in part 
the determinant (as well as the result) of such a trade con­
centration, is reenforced by Galtung’s data on the trade com­
position and its correlation with the variables of underdevel­
opment and concentration (Galtung, 1971:102). In general, 
trade of UDC is made up predominantly of the export of raw 
materials and food and the import of manufactured goods while 
the opposite is true for DC.-*-^  ^ The implications and conse­
quences of such a trade structure of high partner and commodity 
concentration and of an extractor status for UDC is clear for 
Galtung (1971) and Hirschman (1945).103 This structure implies
-*-^2Galtung labels them extractor and processor states.
His sample contains one UDC —  Jamaica -- with processor status. 
The 12 DC in the sample which are weak extractors —  their 
average trade composition index is half as high as the average 
index for 37 UDC —  include such industrialized countries like 
Australia and New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland. Obviously the consequences of being an 
extractor country is different if one possesses an indigenous 
industrial base.
1(-*3gorrie attempts have been made to verify the link be­
tween trade structure, export stability and development.
Coppock (1962) and MacBean (1966) show that UDC do not have a 
higher export earning instability than DC. Maddison (1970: 
103-106), Erb and Schiavo-Campo (1969)3 and Massell (1970) 
disagree using different methodologies and time periods.
Askari and Weil (197*0 have recently suggested that manufactures’ 
exports experience a greater instability than exports of non­
manufactures (see also Naya (1973))* Michaely (1962:66-101) 
and Massell (1964) found, however, a correlation between 
commodity concentration and export volume and earnings fluc­
tuations. This, however, is in part due to the fact that 
small countries or countries with small export sectors ex­
perience greater fluctuations in their exports and that these
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the presence of an imperialistically structured IES and 
provides the conditions where trade between UDC and DC will 
maintain if not reenforce this structure. The processes of 
such a structuring of the IES or parts of it will be des­
cribed in more detail in Chapter 5 while Chapter 6 will focus 
on the problems and dilemmas associated with such structuring 
efforts.
The analyses of Galtung (1971) and Hirschman (19^5) 
differ in many aspects from the analysis based on the H-0 model 
although they frequently use the same elements. For one the 
models now are totally non-normative but try to explain what 
exists in all its complexities in the IES. The basic premise 
is, of course, the existence of international conflict among 
countries and the desire of these countries to assure their 
domination and to structure the IES to their own benefit, eco­
nomically and otherwis^^J§^B|fctt^so it becomes important to 
see what the l o n g s p e c i f i c  trade patterns 
are and how they^HHMB^H H | | ^ ^ HMM^kowth and development 
paths of the c O i ^ B B H ^ M B ffl^ B M BHHBestion now is no 
longer what the are of a given com­
modity produced is rather to find out
if it facilitates t in the longer run.
Growth can be seen as a’^ ^BBiPffonomic although dynamic pro­
cess . Development however is dynamic and systemic, i.e., it
countries have higher than average concentration ratios.
Khalaf (197*0 has argued that there is no correlation 
between export concentration and economic development, but 
Glezakos (1973) finds that export instability affects growth 
negatively but only for UDC.
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the presence of an imperialistically structured IES and 
provides the conditions where trade between UDC and DC will 
maintain if not reenforce this structure. The processes of 
such a structuring of the IES or parts of it will be des­
cribed in more detail in Chapter 5 while Chapter 6 will focus 
on the problems and dilemmas associated with such structuring 
efforts.
The analyses of Galtung (1971) and Hirschman (1945) 
differ in many aspects from the analysis based on the H-0 model 
although they frequently use the same elements. For one the 
models now are totally non-normative but try to explain what 
exists in all its complexities in the IES. The basic premise 
iSj of course, the existence of international conflict among 
countries and the desire of these countries to assure their 
domination and to structure the IES to their own benefit, eco­
nomically and otherwise. In doing so it becomes important to 
see what the long-term implications of specific trade patterns 
are and how they affect the long-term growth and development 
paths of the competing countries. The question now is no 
longer what the static welfare implications are of a given com­
modity produced and traded. The problem is rather to find out 
if it facilitates growth and development in the longer run. 
Growth can be seen as a purely economic although dynamic pro­
cess. Development however is dynamic and systemic, i.e., it
countries have higher than average concentration ratios.
Khalaf (1974) has argued that there is no correlation 
between export concentration and economic development, but 
Glezakos (1973) finds that export instability affects growth 
negatively but only for UDC.
62
involves all the spheres of a social system and implies the 
transformations of the institutions and structures which 
regulate social life. One consequence is that traded goods 
and services have now to be evaluated with respect to their 
influences on such developmental transformations and the con­
ditions under which their production, exchange and consumption 
generates specific repercussions in the system. These are 
points which have already been touched upon in Sections 2 and 
3. It was especially in Section 3 that I pointed out that 
economic policies which are non-optimal according to the H-0 
model can become quite optimal once their systemic effects are 
accounted for. I also suggested there that this might explain 
the persistence of non-optimal trade control measures. This 
section now has reviewed some evidence on the structure of 
trade flows which suggests that it is more than the result of 
actual resource distribution and cost-minimizing commercial 
relations. The suspicion is high that there is a purpose 
behind these trade structures insofar as they are clearly 
identified with the different levels of development reached by 
the countries of the world.
5. Summary
The first chapter suggested a need for a broader anal­
ysis to deal with the complexities of the economic system in 
general and the IES specifically by paying closer attention to 
and developing more fully four aspects of economic systems:
The complex hierarchy of actors with their goals and action
capabilities; the multidimensional character of economic 
valuables; the relationship and feedback mechanisms between 
institutional and structural constraints and economic ac­
tivity; and the nature of structural, including economic, 
inequalities, and their effect on the operation of an econ­
omic system in the presence of conflict and competition. 
Underlying both of the latter two points was the concept that 
actors in an economic system will actively try to structure 
the system in their favor by trying to build institutions and 
structures which facilitate and beneficially influence their 
own economic activities.
The present chapter started out with a review of the 
assumptions underlying the strict formulation of the H-0 model 
and then discussed the modifications, alternative definitions 
of variables and concepts which were introduced in the course 
of its testing subsequent to Leontief's paradoxical findings. 
The combined effect of all this effort is raising questions 
with regard to the preservation of the fundamental traits of 
the H-0 model. The third section discussed some alternative 
trade determination models and hypothesis. Although they rep­
resent themselves as alternatives, the differences between 
them and the more complex H-0 based propositions are rather 
minimal. It seems that the alternatives eliminate the use of 
certain concepts, like for example the production function, 
which had become a fuzzy concept anyway in the course of the 
testing of the H-0 model.
The section on trade controls indicated a parallel to 
the expansion of the H-0 model. The original normative
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concern with the development of precise rankings of differ­
ent policies with respect to their welfare optimality broad­
ened to include the concept of a scientific tariff and the 
acceptance of non-economic objectives as valid data for deter­
mination of positive optimal policies. The discussion of the 
structures of trade controls and trade flows indicated, how­
ever, that, in this area, the acceptance of what is has not 
yet been fully completed.
Yet, it is quite clear that trade related theoretical 
work has in fact recognized the importance of many of the 
elements and aspects singled out as important in the first 
chapter. The recognition of non-economic objectives in the 
determination of welfare optimal trade policies suggests the 
importance of governments and the national power structures 
supporting them. The focus on technology as a trade determin­
ing factor, especially in the product cycle theory, has led 
to special consideration of the role and possibilities of MNC, 
a category of economic actors certainly different from the 
classical firm of economic theory. Technology and its impact 
on the social system in the course of its diffusion to other 
countries implies the multi-dimensionality of capital goods. 
Technology diffusion and the related phenomenon of limited 
international mobility of factors of production, the issue of 
appropriate controls over the worldwide activities of MNC, and 
the very specific structure of trade controls all raise the 
issue of the role of institutions in the determination of trade 
and especially the consequences of trade. The pervasiveness
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of trade controls suggests that conflicts over the distri­
bution of the economic product both on the national and 
international level are a basic feature of the IES. The 
present discussions in several international forums over the 
future shape of the institutions of the IES bear this out. 
The economists who use the H-0 model as the basis for their 
analysis have recognized this situation, e.g., in their de­
velopment of the concepts of scientific and optimal tariffs. 
This, as well as the structure of trade controls and trade 
flows, contains implicitly the idea that countries and their 
governments structure external and internal relationships. 
The following chapter will now develop the central elements 




ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
AND STRUCTURING
This chapter will take up the many implicit suggestions 
made in the course of the presentation of the H-0 model, its 
testing, and alternative explanations of trade and interna­
tional economic exchange. The purpose here is to develop in 
a relatively abstract and explicit manner the elements which 
appear to be embedded in so much of international trade theory, 
analysis and description, and which I judge to be central to 
the formulation of a systems model of the IES. These elements 
have been selected and are developed for the purpose of explain­
ing and modelling the structuring and restructuring of the IES, 
a topic that will be taken up in more detail in the chapters 
following this one.
Section 1 develops the concept of a complex hierarchy 
of actors where the actors on different levels of the hier­
archy possess different sets of goals and different capabili­
ties to structure the system. Section 2 deals with the multi­
dimensional nature of valuables and the consequences this has 
for the decision-making by actors. Section 3 develops the 
concept of systemic ramifications of exchanged economic valu­
ables, that is, the processes through which the multi-dimen­
sional nature of exchanged valuables is realized in a social 
system. Special attention will thereby be given to those
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ramifications which have implications for the power positions 
of the actors involved and therefore will have consequences 
for their ability to structure and restructure the system of 
which they are part and the interaction conditions linking 
their system to others. Section 4 develops the concept of 
unequal exchange, that is, the unequal distribution of power 
resources through the systemic ramifications of economic ex­
change and the implications this has for the maintenance or 
transformation of a structured unequal exchange system. Sec­
tion 5 deals with the concept of structuring, i.e., the de­
termination of the institutions and structures of the IES by 
powerful actors so that the system operates in their favor.
1. Actors and their Goals
Actors in a system are individuals, organized collec­
tivities of individuals, and collectivities of such collec­
tivities. The latter two classes of actors can be called 
organizations. Actors are able to make decisions with re­
spect to the use or disposition of valuables over which they 
exert control.-^4 In doing so, actors interact with each 
other or at a minimum impinge on other actors' future action 
possibilities. The nature and amount of valuables that actors 
control, the degree of control over these valuables, the his­
tory of their decisions and interactions, and the general
It is always individuals that make decisions and ex­
ecute actions even in the case of organizations. Economic 
theory assigned this role to the enterpreneur but the modern 
business organization is certainly more complex than that.
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framework of rules, regulations and laws, which are an im­
plicit and explicit part of any system to which such actors 
belong, constrain differentially the actors’ ability to make 
decisions and to engage in actions. Actors are also con­
strained by their position in the structure of relationships
1 nc:
among the actors in the system.
The desires, needs, goals and interests of actors are 
generally complex. One and the same actor may simultaneously 
possess goals and interests of an economic as well as of a 
social, cultural, political, and military nature (Galtung,
1971). it is of course possible that a given actor, for
example a firm, may emphasize primarily economic goals and in­
terests in deciding about a future course of action. In this 
case the decision-making members of the firm suspend or dis­
regard goals and interests they might have in different roles 
or as members of other organizations. Similarly a member of 
a military unit may choose an action based solely on the mili­
tary objective of destroying a given objective. And politicians
•'-^structure refers to the form of the totality of links 
among the elements which make up a system (Kornai, 1971:52; see 
also Machlup, 1967:81). The concept 'structure' is restricted 
here to the description of the set of links and relations among 
actors and between actors and valuables. Actors, valuables and 
structure are three characteristics of a system in difference, 
for example, to the use of 'structure' by van Nieuwenhuijze 
(1969:146) where actors, valuables, relations and values are 
all part of the structure of the system.
lO^Economic theory uses the heuristic device of the firm 
and the household in order to circumvent the problem that the 
same individuals are both producers and consumers at the same 
time. How far the absolute separation of identities as postu­
lated by economic theory is really maintained is an empirical 
question.
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may in fact attempt to choose a course of action which maxi­
mizes their votes in a future election as some political econ­
omy models of political behavior postulate (Goodhart and 
Bhansali, 1970).
Organizations are always made up of individuals and 
these are members of a society and as such have goals and in­
terests belonging to many if not all of the spheres of social 
life. They will generally remain conscious of them even if 
they have to act within a single sphere or have to act as a 
representative of a collective actor with well defined inter­
ests limited to one sphere. Furthermore, the actions of 
large-scale organizations —  large with respect to the system 
in which they operate —  often do have sizable impacts on 
values and interests belonging to spheres other than the one 
in which the action was primarily taken. Feedback mechanisms 
can then affect directly the organizations’ primary interests.1^  
Or, other actors, especially governmental units (belonging to 
the political sphere), may react to these effects in control­
ling future operations of the organizations in their primary 
spheres of interest. -*-0^ in both cases, the organizations can 
do better in the long-run by considering all possible effects 
even if they occur outside their spheres of prime interest.
107por example, compliance of U.S. enterprises with dis­
criminatory policies of Arab governments could reduce sales in 
their home market because of boycotts by offended customers.
108iphe sale of weapons to countries in conflict with 
other countries might induce the government of the exporter's 
country to introduce a licensing system for future exports.
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In addition, large organizations have the necessary means 
to intervene directly with actors belonging to other spheres 
in order to influence their decisions and actions when they 
could hinder or facilitate the organizations' activities in 
their spheres of prime interest. 1(-|9 in this case, as in the 
others, actors will try to satisfy multiple goals belonging 
to two or more of the spheres of social life.-^^
In some cases, it may be possible to determine a pre­
dominant sphere of interests for a given category of actors; 
in other instances, actors will have a wider spectrum. The 
range of interests for a given type of actor may vary with 
the nature of the system in which it operates. Interests may 
change as an actor grows or transforms itself. The firm is an 
illustration of the latter occurrence. Some of them became 
oligopolists in national markets and thereby were forced to 
include political goals in their decision matrix. MNC are 
frequently aware, e.g., of the military and cultural implica­
tions of their investment decisions.
Achievement of the goals in one sphere may contribute 
towards the realization of goals in other spheres. Economic
^^poiitical lobbying by companies affected by or po­
tentially affected by laws and regulations is often cheaper 
than compliance with existing or proposed laws and regulations.
H^Eels (1972:108), using the framework developed by 
Parsons and Smelser (1956), arrives at a similar view: "The 
Multinational Corporation, as a concrete collectivity, is not 
a sub-subsystem of the economy. Like all concrete collec­
tivities, it is multi-functional, and its goals are accord­
ingly assignable to each of the four functional subsystems 
of the society."
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production capacities provide military capabilities (Knorr,
1973). Schools produce not only human capital but they also 
socialize students (Bowles, 1972). Government financed hos­
pitals provide health services as well as votes for the re­
sponsible politician. On the other hand, goals may conflict 
and trade-offs have to be sought or accepted. Price in­
creases raise profitability but may also produce a political 
backlash with negative effects on future government contracts. 
The assembly line can increase productivity but creates 
workers' alienation which depresses productivity (Terkel,
197^) and ultimately may lead to a different political system. 
Or on the level of the world system, free trade may maximize 
economic output and related welfare. But if this system cre­
ates increased inequality, resultant conflict and warfare may 
well lead to drastic reductions of world welfare in the long 
run.
There is a multi-level hierarchical structure associ­
ated with the total population of actors in a system. At the 
base are individuals followed by smaller collectivities (fam­
ilies, local firms). There are increasingly larger collec­
tivities (corporations that operate in national markets, 
parties) and the state government (and its agencies) making 
up a national system. Some of these actors together with in­
ternational intergovernmental and non-governmental organi­
zations have interests in more than one national system (Feld, 
1972:11-13). They have therefore a direct interest in events 
related to the international system and in the rules under­
lying its organization. Each actor with such an international
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orientation is in principle strongly oriented towards a 
particular national system, or in the case of intergovern­
mental international organizations, towards the national 
systems which are represented in the higher-level organiza­
tion. However, international organizations which do not have 
such a dominant orientation are already beginning to emerge 
parallel to the increasing integration of the world system.-1-1-1- 
Exchange between actors belonging to the same system 
is intra-system exchange; exchange across a system boundary 
is inter-system exchange. International exchange is there­
fore exchange between actors belonging to different national 
systems. However, it is possible that the exchanging actors 
are part of the same higher-level actor as in the case of 
intra-MNC transactions. In general, actors engaged in inter­
national (external) exchange are also participating in nation­
al (internal) exchange. Both internal and external inter­
actions can take place between actors which belong to the same 
level or to different levels in the multi-level hierarchy of 
actors.
^ H mnc of this type are called "international corpora­
tions" by Kindleberger (1969:182), "transnational corporations 
or enterprises" by Kirchner (1964) and Hochmuth (1974:3)3"poly- 
and geocentric MNC" by Perlmutter (1969)s and "cosmocorp" by 
Ball (1970). Essential in all these cases is that these firms 
have worldwide production and marketing interests without how­
ever being centered organizationally or in spirit in a national 
system.
^^Higher-level actors operate in more extended systems 
(Tinbergen, 1965). It has already been pointed out that Harry 
Johnson (1965a), for example, enlarged the governmental pref­
erence function by ’non-economic' objectives (see Chapter 2,
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Although corporations acting In the International 
system may concentrate on the satisfaction of their economic 
interests and goals, state governments will generally try to 
realize interests which belong to several spheres. These 
goals and interests are complex because governments represent 
many different actors with widely different demands. The 
pattern of goals and interests represented by a government in 
turn depends very much on the socio-political structures ex­
isting within the national system. These structures and the 
struggles for political domination within a society affect a 
state's action and outcome preferences.^-*-3 Therefore a gov­
ernment will normally not simply try to maximize the national 
economic product through its interventions in the national 
and international system, but will intervene in and try to 
structure the IES so that economic and non-economic goals of 
its actors are realized.
Section 3). Another important consequence is that higher-level 
actors set the rules and laws which regulate the behavior and 
activities of the lower-level actors. In this sense MNC are 
subordinate to national governments (Wilkins, 1974:439) • How­
ever, as the geographic extent of the reach of MNC is larger 
than the one of national governments, true transnational cor­
porations may well be able to reverse their clear hierarchical 
subordination (Coleman, 1974).
^chapter 4 on internal restructuring of systems will 
take up this point with respect to the different European 
reactions to the agricultural crisis after 1873-
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2. Multi-Dimensional Valuables
It was suggested at the beginning of the previous 
section that actors possess, control or desire valuables 
which are used by them to engage in actions and interactions. 
Valuables are any symbols, attributes, conditions, resources 
and commodities which allow actors to satisfy their interests 
and reach their goals. Any entity of this kind that is useful 
to an actor in his attempts at goal fulfillment is a valuable 
within the system to which the actor belongs. Valuables are 
in general characterized by a vector of attributes which be­
long to the different spheres of social life, i.e. the eco­
nomic, cultural, social, political and military spheres.
This multi-dimensionality of valuables is an objective feature 
of valuables.
Economic commodities, for example, may entail much more 
than the creation of new productive capacities, or the possi­
bility of producing valued outputs through their use as inputs 
into a firm's production process, or the provision of satis­
faction through consumption. Trucks do not only provide trans­
portation services but project also military capabilities and 
preparedness. Truck factories can be converted into assembly 
lines for armored vehicles (Knorr, 1973). Electronic compo­
nents and their use in cheap, mass-produced means of communica­
tion provide the basis for cultural, social and political trans­
formations .414 Consumer goods, if they are imported or produced
MacLuhan (1964) provides a provocative formulation 
of this idea. There exists a large political science literature
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locally under license or as a competitive copy of importable 
goods, together with their advertised virtues and qualities, 
transmit the values of the particular society in which they 
originate. This is also true for investment goods. These 
embody technologies which reflect the cultural, social and 
political aspects of societal organization in the origina­
ting society in the most general sense. ^-*-5 On a more con­
crete level, technologies imply specific patterns of work 
organization, work rules, worker-management relations, and
-J1 /T
also management techniques. It is exactly the diffusion
of these patterns, rules and relationships which some authors 
see as the most (if not only) positive aspect of foreign di­
rect investments under the control of MNC (Steuer and Gennard, 
1971; Streeten, 1 9 7 2 : 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ) . These enterprise or factory
which links communication with modernization (Lerner, 1958;
Pye, 1963; McCrone and Cnudde, 1967; Rogers, 1969; Frey, 1973)* 
Pool (1973) discusses military and political implications of 
communication systems.
^^^Technology itself is value-ladden and assumes and 
subsumes cultural values (Ill.ich, 1971)- Navarro (197^:10) 
argues that it is therefore impossible to strictly separate 
technological and cultural diffusion processes.
11 C
Dubin (1958) discusses the links between technology 
and worker-management interaction patterns. Woodward (1965) 
outlines a model in which technology determines the organiza­
tional structure of enterprises. Aldrich (1972) confirms the 
existence of such links.
^^The argument here is not about the positive or nega­
tive nature of these effects but simply about their existence 
and therefore the need to arrive at a multi-dimensional con­
ceptualization of valuables.
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internal patterns in turn have an impact in the larger so­
ciety (Udy, 1970) and ultimately affect even the social and 
political basis of the host society .-^8 ,119 On the other 
hand, even the transfer of finance capital can have differ­
ent psychological implications depending on their form as 
aid payments, portfolio investments, or direct foreign in­
vestments (Bergsten, 1973:103-104; Gergen and Gergen, 1974). 
Their political implications are different not only because 
different categories of finance accrue to different actors 
in the social hierarchy. Direct foreign investments lead to 
the acquisition of property rights. In most countries, these 
give the right, or at least the moral right, to influence 
political processes in the host countries. -*-26
llfiorow (1975) for example shows that those industrial 
sectors in China which had been built up with Soviet tech­
nology where also those which had adopted most completely 
Soviet organizational methods. Desai (1972) shows that both 
the Soviet Union and the U.S. were quite aware of these link­
ages when they were considering the financing of the Bokaro 
Steel Plant in India.
The existence of this mutual interaction between tech­
nology, enterprise organization, and social and political 
societal structures was at the heart of the Chinese break 
with the Soviet Union, the Cultural Revolution and the current 
discussions in China (Wheelwright and McFarlane, 1970; Dean, 
1972).
1:L9lt is effects like those described here which lie at 
the heart of the controversy over the beneficiality of MNC and 
their direct foreign investments. For additional references 
see Chapter 2, Section 2.
12 6The fears about Arab investments in the U.S. after 
the massive oil price increases were in part based on such con­
siderations (see Chapter 6, Section 2).
However, multi-dimensionality is not the same as the 
simultaneity of economic and power effects as in the model of
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The multi-dimensional vector of characteristics is
an objective attribute of a valuable in the sense that its
use by actors in actions and interactions in a social system
has effects in several (but not necessarily all) spheres of
social life. Actors, however, will consider in general only
a subset of these characteristics when evaluating valuables
which they control, desire or need. For one, the goals and
interests of actors are limited as pointed out in the first
section of this chapter. (But they do not have to be limited
1 P 1to one sphere alone.) In addition, actors in general are
not able to include all possible systemic effects of their 
activities in their evaluation and decision making, nor do 
they necessarily follow the 'rational' maximizing decision 
strategies of economic theory. The actors' situation and the 
consequences of their actions are too c o m p l e x P ^ 2  Insofar as 
actors make decisions and take actions on a limited basis, 
evaluated effects will reflect only a limited spectrum of the
Hirschman (19^5:14, 78-79)- Power derives from control over 
valuables and is not simply another dimension of a valuable. 
See the next section on this point.
^lqoals and interests of actors are in part a social 
product themselves. They reflect knowledge, socialization, 
and legal constraints present in the systems to which actors 
belong (Buckley et. al., 197^; Baumgartner et. al., 1975c).
IP? Actors may also be unable to collapse the evaluations 
of several dimensions into a suitable uni-dimensional index 
like price, utility or votes. This can introduce inconsist­
encies, intransitivities and indecision into decision making 
(Burns and Meeker, 1975)*
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totality of systemic effects. This means that in the case 
of economic transactions, even if economic actors decide and 
act in a perfect economic world without imperfections and 
market failures, prices reflect only a limited range of all 
systemic effects occurring in the process of production, ex­
change and use of commodities. The corollary to this propo­
sition is that actors with different bases of evaluation and 
decision making, and who are in a position to regulate the 
behavior of lower level actors, may want to intervene and 
structure the system so that the actions and interactions 
taken by these lower level actors on the basis of their evalu­
ations and decisions will reflect the interests of the higher 
level a c t o r s .  g>he next two sections will develop more ful­
ly the concept of these systemic effects while Section 5 will 
take up the structuring of systems by higher-level actors.
3. Systemic Ramifications of Economic Exchange
Price in economic exchange and therefore international 
trade theory reflects the economic aspects of production and 
consumption processes -- measured in terms of costs and 
benefits —  as evaluated by the marginal sellers and buyers 
participating in a market. Social and private evaluations co­
incide as long as markets are perfect and property rights are
122-’Optimal and scientific tariffs or the inclusion of 
non-economic objectives into the economic governmental pref­
erence function are examples of such behavior. See Section 3 
of the preceding chapter.
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completely specif led. -'-^4 Externalities, a divergence of 
private and social costs and benefits, result when these 
optimal market conditions are not fulfilled. The preceding 
section has defined the concept of multi-dimensionality of 
valuables, including economic commodities. It has been 
suggested that, as a consequence, of multi-dimensionality 
production, exchange, and consumption of economic valuables 
entail a wide array of effects and processes in the differ­
ent spheres of a social system.-^5 It has been argued that, 
for various reasons, actors will include in their evaluation 
and decision making with respect to their economic actions 
only a lr-.nited number of these effects and processes. It 
follows that a multiple of these effects, actions, and proc­
esses prior to, simultaneous with, and subsequent to the 
action considered will not be reflected in the valuation of 
the economic valuable exchanged. The totality of these effects,
12^Market failures (Bator, 1958) result when property 
rights are impossible or non-feasible to specify, or are not 
completely specified and enforced for political reasons. In­
terdependence of preference functions (Arrow, 1971) and differ­
ential lengths of time horizons can also produce divergences 
between social and private evaluations.
The existence of such divergences has led —  especially 
in the context of development planning —  to the development 
of cost-benefit analysis and the use of shadow pricing and in­
vestment criteria. (On the latter point see Kahn (1951), 
Chenery (1953), Galenson and Leibenstein (1955), Eckstein 
(1957) and the review of this debate by Chenery (1961).)
125The same can be said for any action in any other 
sphere of a system. That is, a political scientist may ana­
lyze political activities as involving multi-dimensional 
valuables.
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actions, and processes excluded from the private decision 
calculus of the actors are summarized under the concept of 
systemic ramifications. The systemic ramifications in the 
case of economic exchange can be separated analytically into 
the categories of spin-off and spill-over effects (Galtung, 
1971:98). Spin-off effects are those systemic ramifications 
which occur within the sphere to which the exchange action 
and exchanged valuable belongs. Spill-over effects in con­
trast are all those ramifications which have a bearing on one 
or more of the spheres other than the one in which the action 
responsible for the ramifications takes place.-*-^6
It is through the systemic ramifications, the spin-off 
and spill-over effects of exchanged economic valuables, that
■- - —
The idea of ramifications of economic exchange and 
international trade is not new. Singer (1950:476) for example 
argued that the most important element in the economic life of 
a country is "the mechanism by which 'one thing leads to an­
other', and the most important contribution of an industry is 
not its immediate product ... but ... its effects on the gen­
eral level of education, skill, way of life, inventiveness, 
habits, store of technology, creation of new demand, etc."
(See also Bauer, 1968:49).
Hirschman (1958:98-119) seemed to take up this theme 
with his concept of forward and backward linkages. Originally 
Hirschman and, today for example Panchamukhi (1975)3 give a 
very narrow economic meaning to these linkages. Hirschman 
(1967), however, goes clearly beyond the narrow demand/supply 
imbalance conceptualization in his analysis of the successes 
and failures of development projects. Using terms like in­
direct benefits, side effects, spillovers, linkages, reper­
cussions, he describes spin-off effects like the acquisition 
of new skills through learning-by-doing, the learning of co­
operation and discipline by entrepreneurs, etc. Spill-over 
effects are the acceptance of the idea of family planning, 
heightened social and economic tensions, the spreading of cor­
ruption, and shifts in political power towards particular pro­
fessions (Hirschman, 1967:160; see also Streeten and Elson, 
1971:54-59)* Raj (1975) has recently given such an expanded 
interpretation of the concept of linkages. Ng (1975) uses the 
concept of 'indirect externalities' in a way similar to the 
concept of systemic ramifications.
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their multi-dimensionality is realized in the different 
spheres of the social system. Their nature and extent de­
pend on the nature of the valuable exchanged, the specific 
terms of exchange, the exchanging actor and his internal 
structure (for example in the case of MNC), the position of 
the actor in the structure of relationships with other actors, 
and the institutional and structural properties of the system 
to which the actor b e l o n g s .  ^ 7  of course, these ramifications 
can be positive or negative with respect to a given standard 
which is in general some measure of economic growth and social
^Important structural categories are: (i) The action 
and interaction possibilities of the actor in the system. The 
denser and the more extended interaction networks are, the 
easier it is for the actors to react to a given exchange. This 
is true for cities with their agglomeration effects (Werner 
Hirsch, 1973:22; Hoselitz, 1953; Mills, 1972:16-17), national 
market systems (Bauer, 1968) and especially international mar­
ket systems as the development of the capitalist world economy 
since the 15th century demonstrates (Cipolla, 1966, 1970; Rod­
ney, 1972; Wallerstein, 197*0. The structure of production 
has similar importance. For example, Kindleberger (1956:229) 
argues that countries at higher stages of economic development 
benefit more from free trade than those at lower stages be­
cause the former are more differentiated and therefore factors 
of production have it easier to exit from and enter a given 
industrial sector. Baldwin (1963) thinks that agriculture in­
tegrates people more than mining. Rosenberg (1964) argues that . 
industrial sectors experience different feedbacks than agri­
culture. (ii) The relative interaction pay-offs. Burns and 
Meeker (1975), for example, discuss the influence of pay-off 
structures on the behavior of game participants. (i3\) The 
orientation of actors towards society. Included here are such 
factors as n-achievement (McClelland, 1961), behavior according 
to tradition and norms (Ohmae, 1975), class and ethnic con­
flicts which can produce isolation and distrust (Meade 1961), etc.
It is therefore not a question of exports of raw materi­
als and agricultural products versus manufactures but of the 
conditions under which they are produced (Myint, 1954:153). It 
is structural differences of the kind suggested here which make 
Australia experience possibly more positive ramifications than, 
e.g., the Philippines or Thailand although their trade compo­
sitions are about the same (Galtung, 1971:102).
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development. ^ 8
The exchanged valuables and the systemic ramifications 
of exchange may entail commodities and services as in economic 
theory, but also rights and action opportunities, structural 
adjustments, behavioral modifications, processes, symbols and 
attributes. Of special importance for the analysis of the 
structure of the IES and its evolvement over time are those 
valuables and systemic ramifications which are power resources 
and which affect the power positions of the actors in the sys­
tem. A power resource is any valuable which allows an actor 
controlling the resource to exercise control over his environ­
ment (Burns, 1975) .-*-2 9 Three types of power can be defined:
(i) The power of actors within a system to take advantage of 
action opportunities in a system in order to realize positive 
gains and to control, minimize or prevent negative effects.
(ii) The meta-power to structure the system to which the actor 
belongs so that the actions of and interaction between actors 
of the system generate productive gains and positive systemic 
ramifications while losses and negative ramifications are pre­
vented, or at least minimized and possibly overcome. And (iii)
Myrdal (1958:27-33) calls the negative effects "back­
wash effects", the positive ones "spread effects".
^Power, or the capability of getting things done, is 
clearly a potentiality. The existence of power and the exer­
cise of power, e.g., in an attempt at control of other actors, 
are not the same thing. The actual exercise of power may not 
entail the full use of power (Burns, 1975). In this sense power 
is "a partly unobservable counter-factual property of a complex 
system" (Alker, 1973:371).
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the meta-power to structure the external social environment 
of the system to which the actor belongs by regulating and 
influencing the relationships between the actors of the sys­
tem and actors belonging to other systems. The purpose of 
this use of meta-power is again to increase the gains and 
advantages accruing to the system (and minimize those of the 
other systems) in the process of exchanging and interacting 
with the other systems. •'•30
Spin-off and spill-over effects of exchange activity 
defined in terms of these three types of powers contribute to 
a process of social differentiation and social structuring 
whereby some actors (e.g., states or corporations) develop or 
maintain comparatively greater capabilities or powers relevant 
to the particular environment in which they find themselves. 
That is, actors acquire or develop through exchange trans­
actions differential capabilities or powers to act in their 
environment, to take advantage of productive or exchange op­
portunities, to prevent or control negative spin-off and spill­
over effects, or to restructure themselves or their environment
130power is exercised by actors to control directly the 
outcomes of their actions and interactions. Meta-power is the 
power of higher-level actors (see Section 1 of this chapter) 
to control the structure and institutions of a system and thus 
influence and regulate indirectly the relationships and inter­
actions between actors, either higher-level or lower-level ones.
To structure a system means also to restructure it as 
social systems have always a history. The use of the term ’re­
structuring' emphasis the structural dynamics of a system and 
the conflicts between present and desired structures.
The use of meta-power to restructure the IES will be 
taken up in Section 5 of this chapter and illustrated on hand 
of historical examples in Chapters 4,5 and 6.
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to their advantage. Of special interest are the cumulative 
or self-reinforcing feedback patterns, Myrdal's "benign" and 
"vicious circles", whereby differences in systemic capabil­
ities are amplified and developed over time.
4. Unequal Exchange
Unequal exchange is exchange whose systemic ramifi­
cations, i.e., the spin-off and spill-over effects, result in 
a differential allocation or unequal distribution of power re­
sources among the actors and subsystems involved in the ex-
131 132change. J 3 The unequal allocation of power resources is
the output of an unequal exchange system. The differential 
allocation of power resources through such exchange may either 
maintain or modify the distribution of control over power re­
sources and the action capabilities and positions of actors in 
the structure of social relations. This provides the conditions 
necessary for the occurrence of unequal exchange in the future. 
That is, such conditions make up the institutional-structural 
input into the unequal exchange system. Unequal exchanges may
 ^Emmanuel (1972) defines unequal exchange as a purely 
economic phenomenon using a marxian scheme of accumulation. 
Non-economic factors define the structure of the IES which pro­
duces unequal economic exchange and reproduces the system of 
uneven development (Amin, 1971* 1973)* The necessary con­
dition for unequal exchange to occur is the ability of the DC 
to set and maintain low wages in the UDC. Wolff (1974) and 
Barnett (1975) provide historical evidence for such struc­
turing of low wage labor.
132Q0untr;i_es are subsystems of the IES. Actors here are 
mainly corporations and governmental organizations which par­
ticipate in international exchange activities.
85
have at least three types of soclo-structural outcomes, de­
pending on the beneficiaries of the differential allocation 
of power resources: (i) The outcomes of exchange maintain
the original distribution of power resources. The social 
structure is maintained and reproduced. However, the ex­
change could be equal, in that an initial structure of equal­
ity in terms of the distribution of relative power is main­
tained. (ii) Exchange outcomes may be unequal and modify the 
original distribution of power resources (including position 
in the structure of relations), developing or solidifying such 
a structure, i.e., leading to increased inequality. In this 
case, the inequality of exchange favors those actors (or sys­
tems) already occupying positions of power advantage. (iii) 
Although inequality is typically reproduced and possibly de­
veloped further through exchange, important changes in re­
source distributions and transformations of the structure of 
relationships may take place under certain conditions, in some 
instances in the direction of increased power equality. In 
this case, unequal exchange favors the relatively powerless. 
Social structures based on a particular distribution of control 
over certain strategic resources and action capabilities may 
undergo such a significant transformation due to a shift in the 
relative importance of power resources, thereby altering the
1 o o
basis of social structure. Its transformation may also come
^The importance of one power resource or set of power 
resources will vary from social environment to another depending 
on their critical or strategic significance in the particular 
context. This context is naturally subject to alteration by 
natural and social forces.
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about because actors previously in a more or less disadvan­
tageous position unexpectedly gain resources or develop capa­
bilities which enhance their position of relative power com­
pared to those actors who have been in the dominant position. 
Such changes occur typically when an actor exogenous to the 
system provides the relatively powerless actors in the system 
with additional power resources or opportunities for new re­
lationships with power advantages (Baumgartner et. al., 1975b, 
1976a). Also, new valuables or sources of such valuables may 
emerge, be discovered or created within the system or new so­
cial relationships may emerge, particularly in connection with 
such changes, and transform power relations in favor of dis­
advantaged actors.1^
Unequal exchange is investigated through the compara­
tive study of actors in an exchange system. One may examine 
a class of buyers (or sellers). The members of the class will 
gain or accumulate action opportunities and power resources at 
differential rates even in the case where they are producing, 
exchanging or consuming the same valuable. Or one may look at 
the parties engaged in an exchange relationship. Unequal ex­
change in this case can occur on three different levels: (i)
the participants directly involved are affected differentially 
in their relationship; (ii) the exchange between two traders 
affects in unequal ways the capabilities and powers of the 
respective systems to which they belong; (iii) meta-level
Chapter 6, Section 2, deals more extensively with 
power reversals.
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exchanges between two systems, negotiated between the systems' 
representatives or leaders, have spin-off and spill-over ef­
fects which change the relationships of the two systems and 
of their actors with each other.
In the case of international exchange, the investiga­
tion may focus on two different aspects of unequal exchange
and its effects on the system capabilities of societies with 
different internal socio-economic structures and positions in 
the international structure of relationships. First, the sys­
temic outcomes of the same productive and exchange activities 
may differ between two or more classes of countries in that 
those countries engaged in the same trade activity, paying 
the same price for the same valuable in world markets, may 
experience markedly unequal ramifications from this activity; 
in this sense, they would be engaged in unequal exchange.
Second, one may investigate the processes whereby ex­
change between two or more countries is structured in such a
way that the powers of the relatively powerful country or 
countries are enhanced further, or in the limit maintained, 
while the development of such powers in the other country or 
countries are affected either positively but to a lesser de­
gree, or negatively. This meta-process of the structuring and 
institutionalization of an unequal exchange system is the topic 
of the next section.
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5. The Structuring of the International Economic
System
Systemic ramifications of international economic ex­
change and the related power implications provide two reasons 
why state governments orient a considerable degree of their 
activities towards the structuring of the IES. First, coun­
tries will try to facilitate and develop those exchange ac­
tivities of their lower-level actors which produce positive 
ramifications within the system in addition to the private 
benefits directly accruing to the exchanging actors. This 
means that they try to prevent or at least limit those ex­
change activities which would have negative or possibly only 
weak positive ramifications . -*-35 Secondly, governments will 
attempt to favor those exchange activities which increase the 
power position of the country and weaken the powers of the 
other countries, at least relatively speaking.-*-36 That is, 
governments will try to shape the institutional and structur­
al context within which international economic exchange at the 
world market level takes place so that the resultant systemic
-’-'Positive and negative ramifications or positive ram­
ifications with negative power implications for dominant groups 
may occur simultaneously creating dilemmas for the structuring 
activities of the government. This point will be illustrated 
in Chapter 6 with the case of the Comecon.
■ ^ ^ G o v e r n m e n t s  and their supporting groups might be more 
interested in protecting their own power position within their 
own country than the power position of their country in the 
IES. The analysis of the European adaption to the fall in the 
price of wheat in the late 19th century in Chapter 5 illus­
trates this point.
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ramifications and power implications are biased in favor of 
their own country.^37 The structuring of such an unequal 
exchange system on the international level includes inter­
ventions into country internal structures and institutions in 
order to maximize beneficial systemic ramifications of a given 
international economic exchange activity.
The ability to structure the IES so as to create, main­
tain, and institutionalize an unequal exchange system to one's 
own benefit and the benefit of the lower-level actors belonging 
to the system is a meta-power, a higher order power. States 
exercising meta-power exercise relational and structural con­
trol, i.e., they influence the structures and relationships 
among the actors of the system and of the supra-system. -*-38 
The exercise by governments of asymmetrical control over val­
uables in the different spheres —  economic, political, mili­
tary, social and cultural —  and therefore their ability to
^Keohane and Nye (1973:117) call this meta-level proc­
ess "structure-level exchange", determining "the long-term 
political and economic incentives and constraints within which 
actors operate." Exchanges where the institutions are taken as 
given, the ceteris paribus case of international trade theory, 
are "process-level exchanges".
138por this purpose, higher-level actors engage in 
multiplex exchange relationships where valuables in one sphere 
are exchanged against valuables in other spheres. For example 
a country might grant another one most-favored-nation treat­
ment in exchange for a liberal emigration policy for persecuted 
groups which has significant cultural, social and political 
repercussions in the first country.
Whereas multi-dimensionality is a property of valuables, 
multiplexity is a property of the relationships among actors.
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use meta-power to structure the IES, is in part the result 
of differential natural resource endowments, climatological 
conditions, geographic location, etc. But it is also in part 
the result of historical developments, of earlier uses of 
meta-power and structuring attempts. Today's inequalities 
are in particular the result of a long history of colonial 
and imperialistic domination of a few countries over others.
This domination has left behind a legacy of uneven accumula­
tion of productive capacities and brought forth healthy and 
well-educated, cohesive, disciplined and well-motivated labor 
forces in a few countries while preventing their development 
in others. It has permitted the development of cultural traits, 
socio-political structures, and behavior patterns flexible e- 
nough to let some societies adapt positively to changing cir­
cumstances while others fail to do s o .  ^ 9  A n ( j  j_-j- brought cer­
tain countries into possession of recognized ideological, spir­
itual, cultural and political leadership while others are sup­
posed to follow the f o r m e r . p p  certainly has allowed the 
dominant nations to gain favorable access opportunities to im­
portant and profitable markets for their exports; their imports
pqg
However, Kindleberger (1974) raises some questions 
about the ability of the U.S. to continue to do so. It should 
be pointed out that Kindleberger makes the comparison not be­
tween the U.S. or Great Britain and UDC, but between them and 
Germany and Japan.
■^^The present challenge by UDC turns exactly around 
this point. Decolonialization, and now the quest for a NIEPO, 
are attempts to break this dependency relationship and insti­
tute self-determination and equality. In this sense, today's 
world struggle has some similarities with the early history of 
labor movements.
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are procured from relatively secure and cheap sources; and 
their financial and direct investments are profitable and 
protected from losses.
Today we have a structured IES where economic exchange 
between the industrialized, high-income countries of the 
’North’ and the less developed, low-income countries of the 
'South' generates differential systemic ramifications which 
maintains uneven development on the world level. A move to­
wards free trade, i.e., a dismanteling of the extensive sys­
tems of trade controls, will not necessarily change this bias 
of the IES, although over time it may be weakened. It shiml1 
not be forgotten that historical attempts at free trade origi­
nated always in the most highly developed countries, Great 
Britain in the 19th century (List, 1971) and the U.S. in the 
20th (Gardner, 1969). As Wiles (1968:555) put it, free trade 
"is the mercantilism of the strongest power and it leads to 
imperialism almost as surely as thought-out commercial policy."
The IES will always possess certain structures and in­
stitutions. Until recently at least, these were the result of 
relational and structural control activities by dominant DC 
which used their power to structure an unequal exchange sys­
tem in their favor. It seems like the world has arrived at a 
turning point. Recent shifts in relative power have created 
the possibility for UDC to demand a new definition of the laws 
and rules which determine the distribution of the world product. 
We will therefore experience a period where the main efforts of 
international politics and actions by the countries of the 
world are directed towards the determination of what constitutes
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a fair distribution of the world product, equitable prices 
and fair values for the worlds' resources (Schmidt, 1974:442).
The next three chapters will expand on this topic of 
the structuring of an unequal IES to illustrate in more detail 
the processes of such structuring attempts as well as the in­
teraction between the elements described in the earler sec­
tions of this chapter. The next chapter concentrates on the 
capacity of countries to structure and restructure internally 
in response to an external event in the IES, in this case the 
fall in the wheat price on European markets after 1870 in the 
wake of the opening up of new lands in North America and Russia. 
Chapter 5, on the other hand, takes up the process of the struc­
turing of the IES itself. The first example traces the develop­
ment of the relationship between England and Portugal in the 
17th century, while the second one looks at the emergence and 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods institutions. The first example 
concentrates more on the bilateral structuring of a trade re­
lationship. Special consideration is given to the role of the 
power structure internal to Portugal in this structuring proc­
ess. The second example of the Bretton Woods institutions fo­
cuses more on the attempt by one dominant world power, in this 
case the U.S., to structure a so-called free world market sys­
tem. A subsidiary topic in this example is the relationships 
between the power distribution implied in a given structural 
and institutional framework and the power implications of the 
operation of the system. Chapter 6 in turn amplifies this topic 
by looking, on one hand, at the dilemma that a dominant power 
may face between structuring activities which assure its
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continued dominance but which may have only limited systemic 
ramifications in terms of economic growth. Section 2 of this 
chapter illustrates how an unequal exchange system, in fact 
the present IES, may be experiencing a turning point related 
to a historical shift of power towards the countries control­
ling oil and other raw materials. Recent events involving 
the countries grouped in OPEC and OECD are analysed in the 
terms of the framework presented here, and a possible scenario 
of the restructuring of todays’ IES is developed.
The examples chosen might imply a change in the char­
acter of these structuring attempts as the world economy be­
comes more integrated and interdependent. This implication is 
in part the result of methodological limitations of the present 
analysis insofar as the analysis concentrates on the activities 
of a selected number of countries. England did not only struc­
ture its relationship with Portugal but this development was 
part of a larger process not analysed here. The difference 
between the single-handed structuring attempt of the U.S. at 
the end of World War II and the multilateral free for all of 
the present situation is not necessarily the consequence of in­
creased world interdependence but of a change in the power dis­
tribution on the world level. Power is today more diffused 




The welfare analysis of International trade is based on 
a strictly economic analysis as outlined in Section 3 of Chap­
ter 2. Changes in comparative advantage due to economic events 
in the IES or changes in trade policies induce only a reallo­
cation of resources in response to changing relative prices. 
Non-economic considerations or processes are absent from these 
reallocation processes. Institutions remain constant and un­
affected by them. On this basis, free trade, or as second- 
best, certain trade control policies, are suggested as welfare 
optimal policies for any country to follow. In Chapter 3, in 
contrast, I developed elements of a systems analysis of events 
and processes in the IES based on the inclusion of non-economic 
dimensions and spheres of social life, and a multi-level model 
structure.
In this view, events in the IES have systemic ramifica­
tions and effects on the relative power positions of interest 
groups. Therefore, the economic adjustment path will be af­
fected by non-economic processes and power considerations.
This leads to three propositions. Firstly, the economic end 
situation will most probably not be what is suggested by a com­
parative static, and even dynamic, economic analysis. Secondly, 
the classical free market adjustment and the optimal trade con­
trol policies may not produce the best economic outcome. And
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thirdly, government intervention into the adjustment proc­
ess is likely but dependent in its occurrence and form on 
the interests of the dominant groups in society and, es­
pecially, their and the government's interest in the pres­
ervation of their positions of relative power.
This means that the capacity of a social system to 
structure and restructure its economic system in response to 
a basic shift in the structure of the IES is limited by its 
internal organization. Below I explore the proposition that 
the distribution of meta-power among the social groups of a 
society and the interests and objectives of those with a dis­
proportionate share of such power significantly affect the 
capacity of a country to respond to external events and to 
reorganize its internal structure, in particular, to change 
the system of economic activity, and therefore, its develop­
ment tendencies and potentialities. Section 1 describes the 
institutional and structural changes in five European coun­
tries following the fall in the wheat price in European mar­
kets after 1873. Section 2 develops the proposition mentioned 
above about the distribution of meta-power and interests among 
social groups as important determinants of these different ad­
justment paths.
1. The Fall in the Wheat Price, 1873-1896, 
and European Adjustments
Wheat and other grain prices fell on all European mar­
kets by about 50 to 60% beginning in 1873 until about 1896 in 
response to the arrival of large quantities of cheap grains
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from the newly opened up plains of Russia and North America. -^2 
The agricultural sectors and economic systems of Great Britain, 
Denmark, Germany, Prance and Italy underwent quite different 
adjustments. France and Germany chose an essentially nation­
alistic approach protecting existing structures, while England 
and Denmark restructured their agricultural sectors along lines 
suggested by the changed comparative advantages. Italy fol­
lowed first the latter policy and switched only later to a 
nationalistic response with, however, altogether different con­
sequences .
In Great Britain, the agricultural sector shrank dra­
matically, releasing large quantities of labor to the rapidly 
expanding industrial centers of the country. The farmers re­
acted to the falling grain prices and incomes in an individual­
istic manner with at most some local and regional attempts to 
collectively adjust land prices and rental payments. This 
apolitical and individualistic response of the British farmers 
was in part due to the fact that the real source of their trou­
ble was masked by the general depression. Drought conditions 
lowered yields and thus incomes all over Europe. Recurrent
^^See Kindleberger (1951:31-32) whose study "Group Be­
havior and International Trade" provided the initial impetus 
and basis for the present analysis.
This compares with a fall of the wholesale price index 
(in the case of Denmark) of only 36$. The general fall in 
prices was the result of the severe depression in Europe from 
1873 to 1896, the downswing of the long-term cycle (Kondratieff, 
1935; Hansen, 1964:53-76). Bad weather conditions in Europe 
reduced yields and prevented even larger price falls. This 
tended to mask the real source of the fall in farm incomes 
(Kindleberger, 1951:31-32).
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waves of animal disease in Britain were also seen as re- 
sponsible for the falling incomes (Kindleberger, 1964:243)- 
The preceding twenty years, on the other hand, had been ex­
tremely prosperous years for the farmers and the accumulation 
of reserves during that time now delayed the full impact of the 
financial losses after 1873 (Kindleberger, 1951:32; Murphy,
1 9 7 3 : 6 0 0 ) . The restructuring of the agricultural sector 
remained rather narrow and failed to take advantage of the 
rapidly increasing demand for dairy products and meat (which 
was instead satisfied by Denmark) as well as fruits and vege­
tables (Kindleberger, 1964:240-242). ^ 5  However, some of the 
remaining farmers converted to livestock and dairy farming, a
^The real crisis was however largely a crisis of 
wheat farming (Kindleberger, 1964:241) and this probably 
contributed to the lack of an organized response of British 
agriculture.
-L^These internal events together with the fact that 
the repeal of the corn laws in 1846 had not led to a fall in 
the grain prices slowed down the perception of the problem as 
a foreign one and thus may have contributed to the lack of a 
political response.
-^5gome natural barriers like rainfall patterns and soil 
conditions would have made such a restructuring difficult. But 
the existing laissez-fair individualism prevented the emergence 
of cooperatives and led to the neglect of agricultural education 
(in the face of a general unwillingness to learn new things) 
which could have overcome these barriers. The land tenure sys­
tem with its specification of crops to be planted and its dis­
couragement of capital investments increased the structural 
rigidity. British farms were generally land-intensive and based 
on wage labor. The alternatives demanded labor- and capital- 
intensive family-sized farms which would have demanded exten­
sive changes in ownership patterns and heavy investments of 
capital. But a laissez-fair system made these institutional, 
higher-level changes difficult.
conversion which had already started in the 1850's in re­
sponse to low priced foreign feed grains (Schlote, 1952: 
139-141)• Others turned to horticulture and market garden­
ing (Kindleberger, 1951:32). At no time did British farmers 
consider demanding the reimposition of tariffs; the repeal 
of the Corn Laws in 1846 had convincingly demonstrated that 
the commercial and manufacturing interests were dominant 
(Perry, 1974). The release of labor from the agricultural 
sector helped in keeping wage costs low in the industrial 
sector which obviously helped in its rapid expansion. The 
falling food prices, on the other hand, made low wages possi­
ble without creating labor unrest and thus social and politi­
cal difficulties.
Denmark and its agricultural sector reacted to the same 
economic stimulus of falling grain prices by doing what Britain 
could have done if the political and social situation had been 
different. Instead of reallocating the resources away from 
agriculture to industry, Denmark restructured its agriculture 
in order to be able to remain internationally competitive. It 
switched almost totally from grain farming to animal husbandry 
and the production of eggs, bacon, milk, butter, and cheese 
for the growing export markets in the industrial areas of Ger­
many and Britain. The cheap foreign grains were used as feed­
stuff for the large animal herds. However, the conversion was 
not left to individual farmers but took place on the basis of 
a large cooperative movement that provided the necessary scale 
economies for technical information, technological Innovations,
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and the necessary infrastructural investments. Excellent 
rural schools and specialized facilities for continuing ed­
ucation of the farm population helped to rapidly spread the 
necessary new knowledge. An extensive network of credit in­
stitutions helped to finance the conversion effort. A cohe­
sive population and a suitable farm structure of family-owned, 
medium-sized farms helped in bringing about this market re­
sponse resembling so closely the classical comparative advan­
tage paradigm (Kindleberger, 1951:35)
Both Germany and France took what Kindleberger (1951: 
37) calls a nationalistic response compared to the interna- 
tionalistic responses of Britain and Denmark. They instituted 
protective tariffs on wheat and other grain imports in order 
to preserve the size and prosperity of their agricultural sec­
tors, or at least their most important and powerful parts. 
Germany enacted a nominal tariff only in 1879 after 14 years
Of course, Denmark as a small country, compared to 
its grain production capacity, had to restructure its agri­
culture one way or another. Denmark was subject to export 
market competition and not home market competition as was the 
case for Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Only an export 
subsidization program could have saved Danish exports but then 
the pressure for structural adaptation would have come in­
directly from the financial burden unless the costs could have 
been shifted to other countries through an OPEC like cartel or 
an arrangement similar to the EEC agricultural policy.
This means that a small country —  small compared to its 
major economic sector and its exports -- is almost forced to 
be structurally flexible if it wants to protect its standard 
of living in a changing world (Wright, 1939:3-27, 2H3-2HH). 
Kindleberger (197*0 provides additional evidence on this point.
The task then becomes to explain why some countries are 
structurally flexible and others not, and secondly, why Denmark 
chose its particular adjustment path and not the British one, 
or why Britain permitted the elimination of its agricultural 
sector but France and Germany did not.
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of free trade. Sharply higher rates were introduced in 1885 
and I887. This agricultural protection, which included a 
tariff on rye, a dominant product of the agriculture of east­
ern Germany, was coupled with protective tariffs for indus­
trial raw materials, manufactures, as well as live animal s. ^ 7  
This provided a protected inland market for all the major sec­
tors of the German economy (Kindleberger, 1951:33).
The French government imposed markedly higher tariffs 
on grain and live animal imports in 1885 and 1887 after an 
initial small tariff had been levied since 1881. The politi­
cal pressure for such action came from the agricultural syn­
dicates. They in turn had earlier evolved into producer co­
operatives from simple associations to further the technical 
advancement of agriculture after the law against associations 
based on economic interests had been fully repealed in 1884. 
Grain farming was important all over France. Grain crops oc­
cupied more than half the tilled land in 77 out of the 88 de­
partments in 1882.li|8 Wheat and other grain interests com­
bined with other agricultural interest groups for wine and 
cattle to agitiate for a generally high price level for their 
products. The tariffs on grain and live animals were the
■^^The protection afforded to the different products 
was quite unequal. The tariffs on wheat, rye and oats, the 
products of eastern Germany, were twice as high as on corn 
and barley, the products of the western parts (Clapham, 1921: 
24) .
148Even Corsica with the smallest acreage devoted to 
grain used still 40% of the tilled land for it. Also, wheat 
was grown on almost every farm in the country (Kindleberger, 
1964:27).
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result of a compromise between the conflicting interests of 
industry and agriculture. Industry wanted low food and raw 
material prices but gave up on the former in order to pre­
serve the free import of some agricultural raw materials 
(Kindleberger, 1951:33).
The Italian government vacillated between a policy of 
free trade and protection. An early laissez-faire attitude 
with strong exploitative tendencies towards the peasantry, 
especially that of southern Italy, was followed by a policy 
of protective tariffs on wheat but only after France and Ger­
many had already taken similar steps. Italy had levied a small 
tariff on wheat since the l860's mainly for revenue purposes. 
But wheat was the only agricultural product enjoying this mod­
est level of protection and the rate was below those on manu­
factured goods. In 1869 an excise tax on milling of wheat was 
reintroduced to increase state revenues. This tax fell heavily 
upon the poor urban and rural classes and was kept in force un­
til its final demise in 1884 despite vigorous opposition and 
protests (Clough, 1964:46-47). This political resistance may 
have contributed to the government's reluctance to impose high­
er tariffs once massive imports started. The relatively low 
tariff rate of 1878 was finally increased in 1887 and 1888 to 
a level comparable with that in France and Germany. This step 
was combined with a move towards increased protection for man­
ufactures and thus did not improve the terms of trade of the 
agricultural sector and especially the southern peasantry.
These measures did therefore not succeed in stopping the
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emigration of the peasants which had begun earlier in re­
sponse to the low wheat prices and farm i n c o m e s . 1^9 Con­
tinued emigration overseas was about the only solution left 
to the southern peasant. Internal migration to emergent 
centers of industrial production was impossible. The uni­
fication of the Italian territory had destroyed the small in­
dustrial sector around Naples which could have provided the 
core for an accelerated industrialization. A restructuring 
of the agricultural sector along the lines of the Danish mod­
el was impossible. The apathy of the central government and 
the local ruling elites would have necessitated the capability 
of the peasantry to self-financing a strategy of conversion. 
But the socio-political make-up of the South and the economic 
policies of previous decades had prevented the accumulation 
of capital by the peasants or other groups connected with the 
agricultural sector.
In summary, the five European countries reacted quite 
differently to the challenge of falling wheat prices. Britain 
permitted the wholesale liquidation of its wheat sector and 
absorbed the released agricultural labor in its expanding in­
dustrial labor force. Denmark maintained the size and pros­
perity of its agriculture but converted to products which were 
to have rapidly growing markets and in which Denmark could 
maintain its International competitiveness. France and Ger­
many opted basically for the status quo in their economic and
in9See Kindleberger (1951:34-35), Clough (1964:107, 115) 
and Smith (1969:157-162). The income squeeze was increased due 
to the loss of the important French wine market.
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social structures (Kindleberger, 1964:195). The resultant 
distribution of the gains of protection was however markedly 
more unequal in Germany than in Prance. Italy moved too late 
to protect its agriculture and therefore did not realize any 
benefits. While in Britain the released labor fed the ex­
panding industrial sector, Italian migration was international
migration with completely different long-term consequences for
150economic growth and soci-political structural transformation.
2. Power and Group Interests as Determinants of Economic
Systems Adaptation
Kindleberger (1951:45-46) explains the different pat­
terns of national adjustment described in the preceding section 
with variations in the social cohesion of the five countries.' 
Social cohesion is an expression of the societal flexibility 
in restructuring institutions in order to maintain productive 
capacities under changing circumstances. Determining factors 
of social cohesion are the internal mobility of the factors of 
production, the quality of the system of communication, and 
the strength with which a set of common national values is 
held. High social cohesion will make it easier for a society 
to find a set of adjustment policies in the event of external
15 0J The same structural deficiencies seem to exist today. 
Southern labor moves north, but Italy as a whole is still ex­
porting capital and labor. Factor emigration is therefore not 
the result of factor supply imbalances but of structural bot­
tlenecks. The government is still not able to overcome them 
with a set of coherent reforms based on a social compact and 
effort. In the meantime, Italy has to import ever increasing 
amounts of foodstuffs (Hofmann, 1974).
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change which is acceptable to the various groups and which 
can be realized with minimal social conflict.
In this conceptualization, social cohesion can obvious­
ly only explain the speed with which the adjustment policies 
are chosen and implemented and the degree to which conflicts 
and disruptions will hamper this implementation. It cannot, 
however, explain why a country chooses one adjustment path 
and not another. Such an explanation has to build on socie­
tal groups and their interests and the distribution of meta­
power among them.-^ 51 The former factor determines a group's 
interest in an adjustment and in the form of such an adjust­
ment. The latter factor determines the differential abilities 
of these diverse groups to actually participate in the deter­
mination and implementation of the adjustment policies and to 
make sure that the restructured societal structure and institu­
tions remain supportive of their interests and especially of 
their positions of meta-power. The comparative analysis of the 
reaction patterns of the five countries points to two basic 
patterns.
Germany and France were characterized by the existence 
of several groups of cohesion and relatively equal positions 
of meta-power with which to defend their interest. The 
French and German solutions therefore consisted, not surpris­
ingly, in a compromise in which each group realized its
151j.J. Pincus (1975) shows that the ideal industrial 
pressure group for tariffs in the U.S. had members all over 
the country and that the factors which determine organized 
collective action according to the analysis by Olson (1965) 
were less important.
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strongest objectives by giving In on less Important ones.-*-52 
The other pattern, represented by the cases of Great Britain, 
Denmark and Italy, consists of the presence of groups which 
have different degrees of cohesiveness and which have clearly 
unequal positions of meta-power in the relationships among 
themselves and to the governmental bureaucracy.
In Britain, the industrial-urban revolution had already 
progressed far at the onset of the agricultural crisis. The 
dominance of the industrial and urban interests had been clear­
ly demonstrated decades earlier with the repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1846. Both the capitalist and the working classes had 
essentially the same interest in low food prices, although the 
former desired to keep wage costs low and the labor supply high 
and the latter wished to ensure their survival at the prevail­
ing wage rates. This interest situation explains the mainte­
nance of free trade in agricultural products. The farmers and 
landowners faced their crisis essentially as individuals and 
had therefore only limited means available to express their de­
mands. The ideology of laissez-faire, the belief in the sanc­
tity of private property rights, the poor quality of the rural 
education system, and the general unwillingness of the farmers 
to learn new ways and methods led to the particular adjustment 
pattern described in the first section of this chapter. ^ 53
152This solution obviously requires that the preference 
orderings of the different groups have at least some concord­
ance embedded in them and are not totally opposite to each 
other (Burns and Buckley, 1974; Buckley et. al., 1974; Burns 
and Meeker, 1975).
153The government was reluctant to intervene in the
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Denmark, on the other hand, comes closest to Kindle- 
berger's case of a country with high social cohesion. The 
agricultural sector was an important part of the economy and 
yet was closely integrated with the industrial and urban sec­
tor. Agriculture and industry were based on small-scale, 
owner-operated units. Cities and towns were small and evenly 
dispersed over the country, thus assuring a close interaction 
between the populations of the two sectors and their close 
mutual identification with the other's interests (The Econo­
mist, 1969) . The defeat in the war against Prussia in 
1866 and the loss of part of the territory had increased the 
feeling of national unity. As already pointed out in the first 
section, Danish agriculture had to convert as the two options 
of export market protection and shrinkage and, consequently, 
large-scale release of labor were impossible. The importance 
of agriculture for the national well-being and the close in­
tegration of agriculture with the industrial and urban milieu
agricultural sector and violate the property rights of the 
landowners which were seen by them as the basis of individual­
ism and personal freedoms (Kindleberger, 1964:197-198). On 
the other hand, the government interfered continuously with 
the operation of the economic system despite the official ide­
ology of laissez-faire. But the interventions were never in 
favor of the agricultural workers and peasant proprietors 
(Kindleberger, 1964:191-192, 244). The explanation is there­
fore more likely to be found in the positions of meta-power.
154gqUaq inheritance rights on the farm were the rule 
but the efficient rural credit system enabled farmers to pay 
off their siblings. This facilitated the emergence of a large 
middle class both in the rural and urban areas and assured a 
relatively equal distribution of wealth. Close family ties 
linked the two areas and the excellent rural education system 
helped prevent the emergence of differences on this dimension 
(Kindleberger, 1951:45).
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provided the former with a position of meta-power. The 
smoothness and efficiency of the radical reorientation was 
the result of the identity between the different sectoral as 
well as national interests and the absence of any seriously 
differentiated interests within the agricultural sector it­
self (in contrast to Britain, for example). -*-55
Italy seemed to possess the worst characteristics of 
the Danish and British case. Agriculture was economically im­
portant all over Italy and predominantly so in the southern 
part.^56 National unification had been achieved just prior 
to the beginning of the crisis. Yet the country remained deep­
ly divided. The North was rapidly industrializing on the basis 
of reasonably modern institutions and a fair network of com­
munication. The South still possessed a semi-feudal structure. 
The peasants were legally emancipated but were laboring under 
high taxes which had replaced their former feudal duties.
This forced the peasant cultivators into cash-crop production. 
But they could ill withstand the market price fluctuations 
during the 1870’s and 1880's because they lacked capital. This 
capital shortage was in part the result of the policies of the
^ K i n d l e b e r g e r  (1951:45) argues that the large degree 
of equality and absence of other differences enabled the farmers 
to build and successfully utilize the cooperative institutions 
which were so important for the conversion of agriculture.
156Agricuiture in the North was dominated by large-scale 
wheat growers producing for the market. Southern peasants were 
producing high-cost wheat and did not profit even from the high 
tariff rates of 1888. As growers of olives and grapes, they 
were net-buyers of grain and thus stood to loose from a pro­
tected inland market while the northern producers gained (Smith, 
1969:158-l60).
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government which turned the internal terms of trade against 
the South and also led to a net-outflow of government funds 
(Lopreato, 1967:23-24). The Southern peasant suffered from 
the worst of both the feudal and capitalist system (D. M.
Smith, 1969:40).
The Italian central government was dominated by a north­
ern bureaucracy and interests. The electoral franchise favored 
the urban population and excluded the peasants from political 
representation.^57 The local governments in the South were 
dominated by local elites who used their power to enrich them­
selves (Smith, 1969:36-39). The land-owning elites regarded 
with contempt any practical pursuits and left the operation of 
their estates to managers who in turn tried to delegate this 
task still further (D. M. Smith, 1969:38). The peasantry it­
self was deeply split as the result of a long process of ac­
culturation .158
Thus the society of southern Italy had characteristics 
exactly opposite to those that allowed Denmark to stage such 
an efficient and successful conversion of its agricultural
^57only 2% of the population had the franchise in i860 
and this increased to only S% in 1872. Only .7% of the popu­
lation voted in the parliamentary elections of 1870 (D. M. 
Smith, 1969:35, 39, 134).
158The peasants had copied the socio-cultural views and 
habits of a strictly structured hierarchical elite. See 
Lopreato (1967:15) for examples.
The organization of agricultural workers and peasants 
started in the l880Ts on a local basis and led too late, only 
in 1901, to the formation of a national organization (Clough, 
1964:395).
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base. The South possessed an extremely fragmented social 
structure, was politically powerless at the national level, 
lacked capital with which a restructuring could have been fi­
nanced on a private basis (as in the case of Britain), had a 
seriously deficient infrastructure, an illiterate and under­
nourished population, and a century-old habit of traditional 
and inefficient farming techniques. -^ 59 These factors all com­
bined to leave emigration as the only option to the peasant 
when the agricultural crisis hit. The lack of political power 
on the national level led to tariff policies clearly damaging 
to the South and favorable to the politically powerful north­
ern agricultural and industrial interests. The social struc­
ture of the South explains why the agricultural sector could 
not count on a unified regional support or the development of 
cooperative efforts. But even if the central government had 
intervened and pushed for an agricultural conversion, the out­
come would have been hardly different. The preceding centuries 
of despotic and exploitative rules had nutured in the peasants 
a distrust of and hatred toward state officials. Any state 
intervention would have been perceived not as helpful but as 
a new attempt at even more effective exploitation (Lopreato, 
1967:26; Moss, 1974:153).
In contrast to Britain and Denmark, France and Germany 
were made up of a number of cohesive groups with well-defined
159'rhe Church had been a major landholder in the South 
for a long time and had discouraged all but the most traditional 
and inefficient farming methods. The resistance to fresh ap­
proaches and new methods naturally became a deeply ingrained 
behavioral trait of the peasantry (Lopreato, 1967:12).
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but different economic and socio-political Interests and 
which were In positions of relatively equal meta-power. No 
single group was capable of imposing its preferred solution 
if it violated the major interests of other groups. A com­
promise had to be sought on the basis of the partially con­
cordant interests embedded in the general preference order­
ings over the different strategies and outcomes envisaged by 
the various groups (Buckley et. al., 197*0. The compromise 
itself was in each case strongly supported and furthered by a 
powerful bureaucracy and central government. These two actors 
had some goals of their own, especially a desire for national 
strength and unity. They enforced therefore a compromise 
which realized the major interests of the dominant groups at 
relatively low costs to them and which at the same time pre­
served social and political stability, and therefore economic 
productivity, within the two countries.1^0
This mediation by the state apparatus between almost 
equally strong groups with very specific and conflictive inter­
ests was especially important in the case of Germany where the 
coinciding group boundaries of economic, cultural, socio-polit­
ical, and regional interests provided for a strong secessionist
This assumes that the state bureaucracy and central 
government can have goals and interests which are not in com­
plete accordance with those of the dominant socio-political 
groups. In this case, these two actors become interest groups 
themselves. They can often pursue their objectives especially 
effectively because they control the means of communication 
and the forces of coercion. Elias (1969) stresses the posi­
tions of meta-power and the action capabilities of these two 
actors in his analysis of the emergence of the absolutist mon­
archy .
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potential. Both the agricultural and industrial sectors were 
divided into subgroups with some differences of interest. The 
agricultural sector consisted, on the one hand, of the large- 
scale, owner-operated Junker estates in the East producing 
wheat (and rye) with wage labor. These estates were export 
oriented with markets in western Germany as well as other coun­
tries. On the other hand, there existed a large sector of 
smaller, family-operated farms, mainly in the western parts of 
Germany, which concentrated on animal husbandry, and which, as 
net-buyers of feed-grain, were mainly interested in low grain 
prices. The industrial sector was similarly split between 
large- and small- scale industry. Industry as a whole was dom­
inated by the regionally concentrated heavy industry which was 
interested in exports in order to achieve cost reductions 
through economies-of-scale in their capital-intensive plants. 
The fabricating sector on the other hand was dispersed all over 
western Germany and was made up of plants and firms of various 
sizes which used mostly labor-intensive production methods.
They were very much concerned with wage costs and therefore 
favored low food prices, while the capital-intensive steel and 
coal industries did not care about this problem to the same 
extent. The labor movement itself was split in its views, re­
flecting the different positions of relative power it possessed 
in its relationships to the two groups of employers.
This configuration of interests and power relationships 
could have easily produced a power stalemate between the domi­
nant groups in which case the Junkers would have faced disas­
trous consequences. A secession in order to protect their
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Interests was not really viable for two reasons. Their well­
being depended on access to export-markets, which a secession 
could not produce. A Danish solution with a complete reorien­
tation of the production structure was very unlikely because 
the switch out of grain production into animal husbandry 
would have threatened the social and political foundation of 
Junker power. However, at that time the German state reflected 
very much the alliance between the Junkers and the industrial 
barons as a consequence of their combined contributions to the 
military successes in the wars against Denmark, Austria, and 
France. The two groups arrived at an understanding because 
the solution imposed the costs of protection on the weaker sub­
groups on each side as well as on the working class as a whole. 
The solution reflected the interests of the Junkers and heavy 
industry because their groups were the most powerful due to 
their cohesion based on very narrow and uniform interests. 
Furthermore there was never any threat of a collective rebel­
lion of the loosers. The farmers of western Germany received 
some protection for their products. This made them reluctant 
to reject the compromise and possibly prevented them from per­
ceiving the overall deterioration in their situation. -^1 But 
probably more important was the acceptance by the other groups 
of the leadership of the Junkers and industrial barons whose 
’able' performance had been clearly demonstrated by the German 
military triumphs. A third and often neglected factor also
1°1Kindleberger (1951:33) following the argument of 
Gerschenkron.
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helped to prevent the emergence of a rebellious coalition of 
loosers. The ideological differences between the land-owning 
and independent farmers of the West, the small-scale capital­
ists with their urban orientation, and the propertyless and 
socialistic minded workers was too great to be transcended 
over the relatively minor question of grain prices.
In Prance the cohesion within the industrial and agri­
cultural groups was greater than in the German case and this 
in turn made their differing economic interests much more pro­
nounced. However, this opposition became muted as a conse­
quence of the military defeat and national humiliation in the 
war against Germany in 1871* The need to discharge the sub­
stantial obligation of the war reparations helped to create a 
sense of patriotism and national unity (Kindleberger, 1968b: 
326-328). Under these conditions the state could play once 
more its traditional role as an equitable arbiter of competing 
economic claims (Kindleberger, 1964:195)- The state-sponsored 
compromise satisfied again the major interests of the strongest 
groups and preserved the socio-economic and political institu­
tions and s t r u c t u r e s . T h e  French policy of tariff protection
Kindleberger (1964:28) points out that the protective 
solution was facilitated by the absence of significant export 
interests which would have pleaded for free trade in order to 
avoid foreign trade retaliation. The loss of the Alsace had 
eliminated the textile export interest, pylloxera those of the 
wine producers. French society abhorred change of any kind 
and one task of the state was the preservation of social sta­
bility by freezing the economic and socio-political structures. 
This necessarily led to the protection of agriculture when its 
viability became threatened, and this in turn led to the pro­
tection of the mining and industrial sectors (Kindleberger, 
1964:286).
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preserved the backward structure of the agricultural sector. 
Industrial growth slowed down due to higher Input cost and 
almost stagnant home markets. The German solution, although 
very much like the French one, did not have the same result 
because the German social and economic structures were differ­
ent from the French ones. As in the case of Britain and Italy, 
the same policy response to the same external event led to 
different long-run outcomes.
The preceding analysis has shown that the economic pol­
icy choice in response to an external event can be explained —  
within the limits given by general economic constraints —  by 
the economic and socio-political interests of the different 
groups and their relative positions of meta-power.^63 The 
different groups try to activitate their positions of meta­
power in order to assure that the necessary restructuring in 
the face of external influences will not affect them negatively 
in terms of economic well-being and will not reduce their po­
sitions of meta-power. It is this concern with the position 
in the distribution of income and wealth and with respect to 
other sources of power and meta-power that individuals and 
groups will not accept passively the Pareto optimal solution 
to the new economic situation suggested by trade theory based
^^Lindbeck (1973) explains the reactions of the five 
European countries using the concept of "endogenous politicians". 
The politicians in the different countries had differing prefer­
ences with respect to the exogenously induced shifts in national 
resource allocations and the various protectionist counter-moves 
possible. This, of course, does not explain why the politicians 
had the preferences revealed by the chosen adjustment policies. 
Group interests and meta-power seem to explain this choice.
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on the H-0 model. This concern with power and meta-power, 
and therefore the ability to control future restructuring to 
their benefit, prevents also the compensation of those groups 
which would loose in terms of income and wealth under the 
Pareto optimal outcome by those who would gain if the loosers 
are weaker in terms of meta-power. The examples of the five 
countries indicated that compensatory institutional benefits 
were accorded to potential loosers only in those circumstances 
where they themselves were in positions of substantial meta­
power. The analysis finally suggested that essentially the 
same economic adjustment policies had different long-run eco­
nomic consequences in terms of growth and development because 
of differences in the social, cultural and political make-up 
of the countries. This is why the optimal internal economic 
policy choice and recommendation cannot be made, by economists 
for example, without taking into account what the most likely 
effect of such an economic adjustment path will be on the oth­
er spheres of the social system. Nor can one neglect to ask 
what the most likely economic ramifications of these non-eco- 
nomic developments might be. These may turn out to be much more 
costly in terms of newly generated economic inefficiencies and 
squandered economic resources as the Economist (1969:67) put it 
so aptly in discussing agricultural modernization today in UDC:
There are thus decisions to be taken over and 
above the decision to modernize the farms (or to pro­
tect their present state). Even if, on strict economic 
analysis, East Prussia’s agricultural growth rate may 
have had the edge over Denmark’s —  which is doubtful —  
the social costs in terms of Junker domination, lack of 
social diversification, big-city migration, and the ex­
ploitation of Slav newcomers added up to a burden of 
which two world wars may have been part of the price.
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What has been said in this chapter with respect to 
the internal restructuring has also general applicability to 
the structuring and restructuring of external relationships 
among countries. The next chapter will deal with this subject.
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CHAPTER V
THE STRUCTURING.OP EXTERNAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGE RELATIONS
Chapter 3 presented the argument that the development 
of countries participating in the IES is dependent on their 
ability to structure and restructure in an appropriate way 
both their internal social system and their external rela­
tionships with the larger IES. The preceding chapter elabo­
rated on the first point. It was suggested that the distri­
bution of meta-power within a social system is a crucial vari­
able —  in conjunction with the interests of those having 
relative meta-power —  in the choice of internal economic 
adjustment policies in the case of events originating in the 
larger IES. The present chapter takes up the second point.
Two historical examples illustrate how meta-power is used to 
structure the IES itself through the structuring and re­
structuring of the institutions which determine in large part 
the scope for economic exchange between countries.
In the first example, the establishment of a special 
international economic and political relationship between 
Portugal and England in the 17th century, the focus is on the 
effect the internal structure of Portugal had on this struc­
turing process. it will become clear that as in the case
t" g h
Methodological complexities, space limitations, and 
data availability are responsible for this concentration on the 
internal factors in Portugal and the bilateral relationship
118
of Internal restructuring analysed in the preceding chapter, 
the internal distribution of meta-power and the interests of 
those possessing dominant meta-power determined in large part 
the process by which Portugal became economically and politi­
cally dependent on England. This structured relationship of 
inequality and dependence had negative long-run developmental 
consequences for Portugal because it reproduced itself through 
the institutionalized unequal exchange pattern. It also pre­
served the internal position of power of the dominant groups 
in Portugal and assured them at the same time of a substan­
tial part of the economic product of Portugal and its colonies. 
On the other hand, England's industrial development was favor­
ably affected by the positive economic ramifications of this 
unequal exchange system at the same time that England was en­
abled to maintain this system of dominance and exploitation.
The second case study, the negotiations leading to the 
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and the grad­
ual change of the character of these institutions in response 
to changed power relationships, abstracts from country internal 
power processes. The focus here is on the effect of power 
differentials on the higher level of the IES. Of interest is 
the way countries use their positions of meta-power to institu­
tionalize and structure the IES, not only to help in the reali­
zation of their economic and political goals but also to assure
between Portugal and England. A complete investigation would 
have to deal with the internal structure of England at that 
time and the interaction of England and Portugal with other 
countries.
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them of the continued preservation of their position of inter­
national meta-power. The difference between this case and the 
Anglo-Portuguese one is that the power relationships implied 
in the structure of the Bretton Woods system as conceptualized 
at the end of the second World War did not coincide with the 
actual power relationships. The system functioned therefore
in ways which were different from those envisaged by the domi­
nant power, the U.S. The Bretton Woods institutions and es­
pecially the IMF operated as originally planned only for a
short interval after 1958 when the actual power relationships 
had become more like those originally built into these insti­
tutions. However, the unequal exchange system formed by them 
continued to equalize power on the world level and ultimately 
made it necessary to abandon parts of the international mone­
tary system in favor of a system which reflected a more bal­
anced power situation. The Bretton Woods case is therefore 
presenting a counter point to the relationship between England 
and Portugal discussed in Section 1.
1. Internal Structure as a Factor in External Structuring:
The Establishment of an Unequal Exchange Relation­
ship between England and Portugal
Adam Smith (1910:643-648) set forth his view of correct 
international trade behavior by critizing the mercantilistic 
Methuen Treaty of 1703 between England and Portugal. Ricardo, 
on the other hand, used a hypothetical construct of the trade 
relationship between these two countries to expound his trade 
theory which ultimately became the basis for the modern theory
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of comparative advantage (Ricardo, 1962:133-13^):
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country 
naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employ­
ment as are most beneficial to each. The pursuit of 
individual advantage is admirably connected with the 
universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry, 
by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously 
the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes 
labor most effectively and most economically: while by 
increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses 
general benefit, and binds together by one common tie 
of interest and intercourse, the universal society of 
nations throughout the civilized world. It Is this 
principle which determines that wine shall be made in 
Prance and Portugal, that corn shall be grown in America 
and Poland, and that hardware and other goods shall be 
manufactured in England.
Since Ricardo, the exchange between the manufactures of 
an abstract country England and the wine of an equally abstract 
country Portugal has served as the textbook example illustra­
ting the virtues of free trade. ^ 5  it is therefore appropri­
ate to use the actual relationship between England and Portugal 
to demonstrate how the actual trade pattern and country special­
ization came about which has influenced the imagination of so 
many students of international trade. The exchange of manu­
factures against wine had a history of structuring. Portugal 
was not originally a producer and exporter of wine just because 
it was blessed with a sunny and warm climate. Nor did it be­
come automatically an underdeveloped country which was unable
^Portugal and England are replaced by the hypothetical 
countries I and II in more sophisticated textbooks. However, 
economists take the inspiration for their models and proposi­
tions from observing the real world. In this sense, the Eng­
land/Portugal example of international trade theory cannot com­
pletely deny its parentage, nor, does it seem, are neo-classi­
cal economists above obfuscating the differences between their 
models drawn from reality and the real situation (Solo, 1975)-
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to satisfy even its own basic food requirements despite fa­
vorable conditions for the production of agricultural goods.
In fact, Portugal was pushed and shoved in the direction of 
becoming an important wine producer and exporter at the ex­
pense of its own manufacturing development. Free trade con­
ditions took over only after this pattern had been firmly es­
tablished, but then reenforced and maintained it.
The Anglo-Portuguese relationship dates back to the 
14th century. At that time, Portugal, based on her control 
over the oceans, was clearly the superior power. However, due 
to various internal conditions as well as the emergence of ex­
ternal rivals, Portugal had already begun to fall behind when 
she was annexed by Spain in 1580. (This period saw the as­
cendancy of the Dutch and their dominance over Southeast Asia 
(Sideri, 1970:19).) Spanish domination reinforced these ten­
dencies. When Portugal regained her independence in 1640, the 
politically precarious relation with Spain was compounded by 
her weak economic position in her own overseas t e r r i t o r i e s . 166
The new king of Portugal tried to gain recognition of 
his throne and to stablize Portugal's international position 
by signing treaties with opponents as well as traditional 
friends of Portugal. Portugal, meaning predominantly her roy­
al house and its domestic allies, in serious need of political 
and military support, turned to England, her most obvious hope.
l66This is clearly not the two-country world of the 
simplest H-0 model. The present example, however, intimates 
also how limited the expansion of the two-country model to 
the three- or n- country model In trade theory really is.
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England —  then quite friendly with Spain, Portugal’s princi­
pal enemy —  was under no threat from the Portuguese. She 
had in general a number of options in her foreign policy, en­
abling her to maintain and even advance her position in Euro­
pean power politics through astute policies of alliance. Eng­
land was therefore in a position to use Portugal as a pawn in 
her own power politics. Since Portuguese cooperation was not 
necessary for a successful defense of English interest, England 
could drive a hard bargain in economic matters, in return for 
lending her political and military support and protection to 
Portugal. The latter achieved her overriding (short-term) goal 
of protecting the rule of her dynasty at home and in the colo­
nies at the price of granting England substantial economic con­
cessions . The first treaty of 1642, shortly after Portugal
seceded from Spain and the Braganzas claimed the Portuguese 
throne, established the pattern for future Anglo-Portuguese re­
lations: Portugal conceded significant economic advantages to 
England in exchange for political and military support.1 ®^
Portuguese economic concessions did not generally dam­
age the immediate economic interests of the ruling dynasty and 
its supporting class. The costs of the concessions fell heavily 
upon the non-land-owning classes, thus stifling the emergence
(1966) describes how Switzerland avoided a simi­
lar fate when relying on the protection of Britain. Portugal's 
situation might have been better if she had tried to develop 
simultaneous relationships with other countries.
1 f i RHelleiner (1973) describes a similar exchange between 
Britain and the Austrian Empire in 1865-
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of a strong merchant and capitalist c l a s s . j t  also in­
directly affected wage-earning workers in agriculture, manu­
facturing, and services. Consequently, the growth of these 
sectors and classes was retarded if not altogether prevented. 
This, in turn, inhibited the development of new political, 
social, and cultural interests that could have vigorously 
pressured for a structural change of the socio-political fab­
ric. Portugal's economic base stagnated or even atrophied 
while competing countries were developing rapidly. Portugal 
lost her opportunities for establishing an independent eco­
nomic base which would have provided the underpinning for her 
political and military power and for the control and develop­
ment of the empire. The circle was thus complete: future
threats from hostile internal or external forces would drive 
Portugal to seek renewal and reinforcement of the special re­
lationship to E n g l a n d . T h e  basically weak position of Por­
tugal and her rulers, which had been the reason for the initial 
request for outside support, would lead again and again to the 
exchange of additional economic concessions for the renewal of 
political and military support.
I69stein and Stein (1970:26), however, argue that the 
merchants profited too insofar as they were able to preserve 
intact within the status of dependence the life-style to which 
they had become accustomed.
^f^In fact, England had an interest in the continuation 
of political problems in Portugal. This would assure the con­
tinued dependence of her ruling class on English support. The 
political instability, however, was itself in part the result 
of the peculiar Anglo-Portuguese relationship where England ex­
ercised control without political responsibility (Maxwell, 1973 
4-5) •
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The treaty of 1642 set in motion such a vicious circle.
In exchange for British recognition of the newly won independ­
ence, Portugal opened her ports as well as those in its African 
and Indian possessions to English ships, granted English mer­
chants special privileges in Portugal (essentially allowing 
them their own police and judicial system), and promised to 
purchase all the ships needed for the Portuguese fleets in Eng­
land (Sideri, 1970:20). The first concession made the Portu­
guese merchants vulnerable to foreign competition. The second 
introduced a foreign administrative body into Portuguese terri­
tory at a time when the ruling dynasty was inexperienced and 
weak. This provided opportunities for collecting accurate in­
formation about the health of Portugal, and created the poten­
tial for conflicts between the foreign group and the Portuguese 
which then in turn could be taken by the superior power as 
grounds to intervene in Portuguese internal political affairs.
The elevation of England to supplier of ships to Portugal 
illustrates well the vicious circle of political weakness and 
economic stagnation. At a time when European powers controlled 
the oceans and maintained their tenuous footholds on other con­
tinents only because of their possession of superior ships,
sailing techniques, and naval guns, Portugal permitted her own
171shipbuilding capacity to atrophy and even to die. Portugal
-'-'^ English ships were conspicuous in the trade even be­
tween the Portuguese mainland and its islands and possessions 
in the Atlantic, Mediterrenean and North Africa (Fisher, 1971". 
130-131). Cipolla (1966) gives a vivid description of the im­
portance of ships for the European ability to maintain and ex­
pand its dominance on other continents.
Although at that time both Portugal and Spain had already
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became locked Into an exclusive supply contract for a stra­
tegic resource with a country that competed worldwide with 
Portugal for superiority In trade and colonization on the 
basis of possession of that resource.
Soon a second treaty had to be concluded between Portu­
gal and England. In 165^, Portugal was at war with Spain, and 
therefore in urgent need of external support. The treaty terms 
however were so onerous —  reaffirming and strengthening the 
English position in Portugal -- that Portugal ratified the
treaty only after English warships appeared in Lisbon. England
17 2received permission to trade directly with Brazil. Although
Portugal retained some trading monopolies, she lost those over 
the most lucrative products of her colonies, i.e., slaves and 
sugar. The treaty also limited the import duties Portugal
lost their technological leadership in ocean-going ship con­
struction to the Dutch and English shipyards, the value of a 
shipbuilding capacity and of some kind of know-how should not 
be underrated (Cipolla, 1966). The importance of a productive 
capability (even for inferior products and with inferior tech­
nology) can be seen in the Spanish attempts at producing mod­
ern large guns. Spain attempted several times to reduce its 
dependence on gun supplies from rival countries by hiring for­
eign experts in gun casting. The efforts at establishing pro­
duction facilities and training skilled manpower proved time- 
consuming and costly. Such undertakings were therefore aban­
doned as soon as the immediate military threat had subsided. 
The next military crisis, however, would see Spain again un­
prepared, dependent on its rivals (and potential enemies) and 
engaged in a fruitless crash program which did not produce re­
sults when needed (Cipolla, 1966). The optimal short-run eco­
nomic policy thus produced a military and political disaster 
which forced Spain to pay economic concessions in return for 
political and military considerations.
^^Portuguese settlers had already expelled the Dutch 
from the occupied Brazilian sugar zone. The English merchants 
gained therefore for awhile the possibility of supplying the 
lucrative Dutch market with Brazilian sugar.
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could levy on English Imports. On most types of cloth, the 
import duty was set in absolute value terms, thus reducing 
the effective tariff rate in times of inflationary price in­
creases. Further more, English merchants residing in Portugal 
received partial tax exemptions, thus giving them a competi­
tive advantage over Portuguese merchants . -*-73
The treaty of 1661 had stipulations along the same 
lines: Portugal received guarantees of English friendship and 
protection while England received preferential access to Por­
tuguese colonies and colonial trade. -*-74 Bombay became English 
and a certain number of English families were allowed to set­
tle in each one of the Brazilian capitaincies. English mer­
chants received extraterritorial rights in Portugal whereas 
the Portuguese never succeeded in gaining reciprocal commercial 
advantages in England or her p o s s e s s i o n s . 1 ^  Portuguese ship­
ping interests suffered from the same discriminatory treatment
^^See Maxwell (1973’-4) quoting contemporary evaluations 
of this and an earlier treaty.
-'-'^ Political an  ^military guarantees by England seemed 
to be very important from the viewpoint of the Portuguese 
rulers. Spain had not yet recognized Portuguese independence 
and the peace negotiations with the Dutch were in progress 
while the Dutch maintained their occupation in Brazil and har­
assed Portuguese shipping. The secret English guarantee to 
protect all Portuguese colonies from attacks was obviously all 
important (Furtado, 1963=33-35).
■^^Maxwell (1973:7) writes that the treaty privileges 
provided "a favorable environment for the creation of a state 
of semi-colonial dependency."
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In English ports as the ships of other foreigners. The re­
sult was that the small Portuguese merchant marine was almost 
completely shut out from the England-Portugal trade (Sideri,
1970:22-23) •
Indeed, England generally discriminated against all the 
Portuguese products in favor of her own colonial production, 
the friendship treaties with Portugal notwithstanding. In 
1661, the same year she signed a treaty with Portugal, she al­
so instituted a high preferential tariff in favor of sugar im­
ports from her own colonies in the West Indies. Not only did 
England close her market to Brazilian sugar but proceeded to 
undersell the Brazilian product in third markets all over Eu­
rope. This weakened the sugar industry in Brazil, forcing it 
to reduce production substantially in subsequent years (Furtado, 
1963:67-69)- Similarly, Brazilian tobacco was forced from Brit­
ish markets in favor of Virginia tobacco. Thus, Portugal saw 
the European markets for her two most important colonial pro­
ducts preempted before the end of the 17th century through Eng­
lish mercantile tactics despite the commercial treaties with 
England. Obviously, the special relationship did not protect 
Portuguese economic interests. The sharp reduction of Portu­
guese exports without a simultaneous reduction in her imports 
of English manufactures produced, not surprisingly, severe prob­
lems in the balance of payments.
This period saw the rapid expansion of wine production 
and wine exports to England. At the time, England searched for 
alternative wine suppliers because, the traditional French sup-
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plies were severly curtailed as a consequence of the hostil­
ities between England and France in the last decades of the 
17th century. Therefore, Portuguese wine imports were given 
preferential duty treatment. ^-76 The expansion of wine pro­
duction improved of course the economic situation of the 
landed aristocracy and the church. These groups would have a 
strong interest in maintaining a guaranteed access for their 
products to the English market and their political dominance 
would assure appropriate policies.
Partly spurred by a worsened economic situation in the 
later decades of the 17th century (as pointed up by the nega­
tive Portuguese balance of payments), but also by recognizing 
the harmful effects of the treaties with England which created 
a privileged and prominent expatriate English class, the Por­
tuguese government made an effort from 1670 on to modernize 
and industrialize Portugal by introducing protectionist legis­
lation. Since the treaties with England prevented Portugal 
from imposing import duties or quotas, the import of English 
cloth had to be reduced indirectly by prohibiting the wearing 
of foreign cloth. Portuguese cloth manufacturing increased 
dramatically (helped in part by new laws of incorporation).
-L76f|owever, English tastes preferred French to Portuguese 
wines and, for a long time, Portuguese wines were marketable in 
England only because the consumption of French wines was pro­
hibited or because exhorbitant tariffs priced them out of the 
market. Nonetheless, the actual or potential French competition 
and the heavy English duties kept wine prices in Portugal very 
low. The commercial side of the wine trade in Portugal was con­
trolled by English merchants and the Portuguese economy did 
therefore profit only insubstantially from this expansion of 
export opportunities (Sideri, 1970:24-26).
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It managed to be competitive even with English cloth at re­
duced prices. Initially the balance of payments Improved, 
although subsequently, increased export proceeds were closely 
matched by increased imports. English cloth imports fell sub­
stantially, particularly because the Portuguese-Spanish sub­
stitutes succeeded in those categories in which England seemed 
to be heavily specialized (Sideri, 1970:26-28).
In spite of these initial gains, the necessary rapid 
transformation of the Portuguese economy and class structure 
was prevented by (i) the political opposition of the landed 
gentry and the Church who wanted to protect their extensive 
agricultural interests; (ii) the lack of administrative skills 
to follow through on initially successfull new policies; and 
(iii) the lack of a strong indigenous merchant class, thus deny­
ing the government a substantial base of political support for 
the new policies. This last condition was itself the conse­
quence of earlier Anglo-Portuguese treaties with their privi­
leges for English competitors. The feudal interests were able 
to reassert themselves quickly under these circumstances once 
the main proponent of the reforms committed suicide.
The desire of the reactionary interests to expand the 
wine trade and to keep the volume of manufactured imports up 
(to provide customs revenue) coincided with the English deter­
mination to reestablish her dominant economic, political, and 
military position.^ -77 The discovery of gold in Brazil could
Portuguese treaty in 1701 with France and Spain 
threatened English military interest. At this moment Portugal
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finance any future trade deficit of Portugal, and at the same 
time alleviate the English shortage of bullion. -^8 This con­
sideration only Intensified the English determination to con­
clude a new treaty (Sideri, 1970:40-41).
The Methuen Treaty of 1703 was the result of this con­
vergence of internal and external Interests. On the one hand, 
It helped to preserve the existing social and economic struc­
tures of Portugal, assuring non-development, and on the other 
hand, it reinforced Portugal's dependence on England; these 
structural conditions reinforced each other in such a way as 
to stabilize and maintain both the internal and external struc­
tural arrangements.^ 9
Although seen by many as the beginning of Portuguese de­
pendence on England, Sideri (1970:42) views the Treaty, as
tried to broaden its options along the lines suggested in note 
167. But her dependency on England had already become too 
great to let her persist in the face of English resistance.
*1 7  ft
The inflow of Brazilian gold via Portugal was crucial 
for English industrialization (Blaug, 1968:17; Supple, 1964:13- 
14). This is not to say that Portuguese industrialization 
would have been forthcoming in case the gold had increased the 
Portuguese money stock. The analysis of internal structuring 
in response to an external economic event in Chapter 4 indicated 
that a given development depends very much on the structure of 
the country itself.
179stein and Stein (1970:86) argue that the Methuen treaty 
solved the Portuguese crisis in the wake of the breakdown of its 
economic and administrative controls over Brazil. Portugal 
acknowledged her dependence on England in exchange for the se­
curity of her political control over the empire.
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suggested above, as its conclusive reaffirmation:
 its significance has been over-estimated by
making it the source of English economic and po­
litical predominance in Portugal. Considered in 
a wider perspective, the Methuen Treaty proves to 
be no less the result of the situation created by 
1642-61 treaties than it was the ’origin’ of Por­
tuguese dependence on England. In line with the 
policy outlined in the previous treaties, England 
exchanged political support and promises of ter­
ritorial increases (the Alliance Treaties) for 
economic concessions and benefits (the commercial 
treaty). 'The unequal advantages of the alliance 
....were sadly paid for with the economic and po­
litical subjection’ (Cortesao).
The commercial treaty reopened the markets in Portugal and her 
colonies to English products, especially woolens. Portugal 
gained the concession that her wine exports would be charged 
a tariff two-thirds of the rate on French wine. This was es­
sentially a codification of previous practice. It was a pseu­
do-benefit as it did not specify an absolute limit, nor did it 
prevent the giving of equal preference to non-French wine im­
ported into England. (In fact, as soon as England reestab­
lished its control over Portuguese and Brazilian markets, she 
increased the absolute level of the tariff on wine substan­
tially and admitted competing Spanish wine under the same terms 
as the Portuguese ones (Sideri, 1970:43))-
For such minimal and uncertain advantages more or less 
enjoyed previously Portugal sacrificed her infant cloth indus­
try. That is, she permitted the destruction of her manufactur­
ing sector which in many countries later on developed into a 
leading sector of industrialization (Rostow, i960). This 
stopped short a technological learning process which perpetuated
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a technological gap still existing today. The agricultural 
specialization in wine necessitated the import of large quan­
tities of foodstuffs (Fisher, 1971:127-128). The resultant 
payments deficit led to the outflow of Brazilian gold to Eng­
land preventing Portuguese capital accumulation. This in turn 
was partly the reason for Portugal's inability to develop the 
colonies for her own benefit. At the same time, the expansion 
of the English textile industry was reinforced, contributing 
to cost reductions, further technological advance, and greater 
ability to penetrate old markets and to create new ones. This 
set the stage for further expansion, in a spiral of develop­
ment, leaving a stagnant Portugal further and further behind.
The treaty and its outcome locked a weak Portugal into 
a bilateral relationship with a strong England which had multi­
lateral contracts with the entire world. Portugal specialized 
in wine, England in the production of "hardware and other goods", 
fitting neatly the model of comparative advantage of interna­
tional trade theory. Portugal's actual situation corresponded 
to a trade structure that maximizes the power of the trading 
partner (Hirschman, 19^5)* The outcome resulted from a long 
process in which England used an initial power advantage to 
structure her exchange relations with Portugal in such a way 
that the resultant unequal exchange system continued to in­
crease her power advantage and ultimate economic gains. Sideri's 
analysis shows that the sixty year period of Anglo-Portuguese 
history reviewed here was to repeat itself again and again for 
the next 250 years.
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2. World Power and External Restructuring:
The Bretton Woods Agreements
In 19^0 and 19^1, before the U.S. entry into the war, 
Britain reached the limit of her ability to pay for the large 
quantities of imported armaments, raw materials, foodstuffs, 
and consumption goods necessary to sustain the war effort. In 
the spring of 19^1, her foreign exchange reserves reached a 
low of $12 million (Gardner, 1969=55; Brian Johnson, 1970:105- 
106). The U.S. Congress had passed legislation prohibiting 
credit sales of military armaments and supplies to any bellig­
erent nation. The answer to the problem this created was lend- 
lease, providing help without violating the letter of the law.
A post-war reconstitution of these deliveries was unthinkable, 
and a conversion into normal debt was similarly undesirable 
(due to the experience with war debts after 1918). Therefore, 
the idea emerged that Britain should discharge her obligation 
from lend-lease "by cooperating with the Americans in certain 
lines of policies favored by them" (Harrod, 1972:10).
Leading officials in the U.S. were concerned at the 
time about the shape of the post-war international order. In 
their view, the emergence of trading blocs and bilateral regu­
lation of international economic exchange in the wake of World 
War I and the Depression had been leading causes of World War 
II. They aimed, therefore, for economic, financial, and mone­
tary post-war institutions that would outlaw discrimination 
and would prevent the emergence of narrow nationalistic inter­
ests through the neutral regulation of exchange in 'multilat­
eral' free markets (Brian Johnson, 1970:108-110). The
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preferential tariff system of the Commonwealth and the tight 
British control over the foreign exchange reserves of the 
Sterling bloc were, in this view, major obstacles to the re­
alization of such institutional plans. The U.S. suggested, 
therefore, that the promise of a future elimination of the 
British Imperial Preferences would be compensation enough for 
the lend-lease program. The British government refused to en­
ter into such a clear obligation, partly because of internal 
political reasons, partly because of the realization that re­
construction demanded special safeguards to protect her balance 
of payments and internal full employment. However, in view of 
the desperate situation in which Britain found herself at the 
time, she finally agreed to a watered down 'consideration', 
Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement of February 1942 (Harrod, 
1972:11; see also Gardner, 1969:54-68):
In the final determination of the benefits to be pro­
vided to the United States of America by the Govern­
ment of the United Kingdom in return for Lend-Lease 
aid, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such 
as not to burden commerce between the two countries, 
but to promote mutually advantageous economic rela­
tions between them and the betterment of world-wide 
economic relations. To that end, they shall include 
provision for agreed action by the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom, open to participation 
by all other countries of like mind, directed to the 
expansion by appropriate international and domestic 
measures of production, employment, and the exchange 
and consumption of goods, which are the material foun­
dations of the liberty and welfare of all the peoples; 
to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce, and to the re­
duction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in 
general, to the attainment of all the economic ob­
jectives set forth in the Atlantic Charter.
The lend-lease agreement illustrates a point made in 
Chapter 3 and illustrated by the development of the relationship
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between Portugal and England in the preceding section. 
Structuring processes on the basis of differences in meta­
power involve normally higher level multiplex exchanges 
where the country in a relatively weak position gives away 
concessions and valuables with long-term potential, especially 
with long-term power implications, in return for the satisfac­
tion of short-term n e e d s . T h e  Mutual Aid Agreement is ex­
actly of this type. For the receipt of badly needed war sup­
plies of an initially undetermined quantity, price and value, 
Britain essentially accepted to concur with the U.S. concep­
tion of the future world order. This agreement entailed the 
exchange of economic valuables (goods and services) against 
economic concessions of an institutional and structural nature, 
i.e., a promise to eliminate future barriers to international
1 0 A
Leading figures in the U.S. State Department and the 
Treasury were reluctant to agree to a final settlement of the 
lend-lease issue later on because they wanted to use their 
bargaining power on this open question to force Britain into 
embracing a policy of multilateral trade (Gardner, 1969:172). 
Promptly, at the end of the war, it was argued, in a report to 
the House of Representatives that the "advantages afforded by 
U.S. loans and'other settlements are our best bargaining assets 
securing political and economic concessions in the interest of 
world stability". Again the Administration was urged to ex­
tract commitments on multilateral policies before writing off 
lend-lease debts (Gardner, 1969:198).
In the initial discussion in the U.S. on the ratifica­
tion of the Mutual Aid Agreement in 19^2 and later on again in 
19^5, many voices demanded that Britain should give guaranteed 
access to the U.S. to British raw materials in the form of a 
U.S. lien on the rubber and tin resources of the British Empire 
or that the U.S. should claim tangible and intangible assets 
like rights to control raw materials, bases, aviation rights, 
sites and buildings for embassies, etc. (Gardner, 1969:172).
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trade.-1-®-1- Moreover, the meta-level economic concessions 
(determining future interaction possibilities in world mar­
kets) had profound political, social, and cultural implica­
tions (Gardner, 1969:1, quoting from The Economist of 1942):
Let there be no mistake about it. The policy put 
forward by the American Administration is revolutionary. 
It is a genuinely new conception of world order. It is 
an inspiring attempt to restate democracy in terms of 
the twentieth century situation, and to extend its mean­
ing in the economic and social sphere.182
The lend-lease agreement had immediate results that were 
more than just economic. Besides the increase in military
1 P> "1xThe agreement included the exchange of political 
valuables. The large U.S. commitment expressed the political 
agreement of the U.S. with the British war aims and it also 
strengthened the determination of the British people to sus­
tain the war effort and the resultant deprivations.
l82iphe whole American concept of a peaceful post-war 
world order was based on the recognition of the multi-dimen­
sionality of economic valuables exchanged internationally 
(Gardner, 1969:14-15):
The case for multilateralism (i.e., restrictions on trade 
and capital flows only of moderate degree and applied non- 
discriminatorily) also has its non-economic aspects. The 
economic benefits of multilateralism can be said to pro­
mote, in a general way, the cause of peace. Human beings 
whose economic circumstances are improving will be less 
likely, everything else being equal, to challenge the 
internal or external order. It can be argued also that 
multilateralism, by insuring equal access to markets and 
raw materials, avoids the grievances felt by the victims 
of discrimination. Finally, as a very rough rule of thumb, 
it is probably true that the cause of peace is assisted by 
the reduction of government interference in international 
economic life.
The Roosevelt Administration, and especially the policy-makers 
in the State Department before, during, and after World War II 
believed essentially that economic magnanimity in international 
relations would bring about a peaceful world order (Gardner, 
1969:7-11). Gardner calls this view ’economism' and thinks it 
was utopian because it neglected the existence of nationalistic 
political interests (Gardner, 1969:11).
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fighting capability, the deal facilitated the purchase of 
consumer goods with foreign exchange that did not have to be 
spent on the purchase of weapons and other military articles. 
This permitted the maintenance of an acceptable standard of 
living in Great Britain and thus clearly helped maintain sup­
port for the government's policy of total resistance. The 
ability to sustain the war in turn can be seen as having con­
tributed to Britain's preservation of her cultural, social and 
political values and beliefs. Again, this points up the non­
economic aspects of purely economic goods.
Thus, although Article 7 might not have made sense from 
a 'rational' economic viewpoint, the total threat to British 
national survival shifted her value ordering of the various 
options to a predominantly non-economic basis.
The elimination of discriminatory tariffs and other 
trading restrictions would, if realized, change the relative 
access opportunities to world markets of the corporate units 
of the contracting parties as compared to the situation during 
the interwar period. In fact, in light of the extensive war 
damage and the deterioration of civilian productive capacity 
(and the problem of reconversion) in most countries, the end 
of tariff discrimination and other trade barriers implied the 
creation of favorable business opportunities for American cor­
porations . "^3
strong American desire to end preferential trad­
ing areas, and the additional desire to do away with exchange 
controls and quantitative trading restrictions had very strong 
ideological motives. U.S. demands were not motivated so much
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Furthermore, it must have been clear from the begin­
ning to both the U.S. and Britain that the British agreement 
to consider the U.S. plans for the future international trade 
order would have significant implications for the institutional 
organization of the monetary and financial aspects of interna­
tional exchange and relations. In fact, both governments began 
to draft plans for institutions in this area which would be 
able to support the envisaged open, non-discriminatory world- 
trading system. ^ 84 The British government signed the Mutual
by a desire to see free trade enacted, than to preserve the 
role of the market and price mechanism in international econom­
ic exchange (Gardner, 1972:22):
Thus tariffs were permissible, but not direct controls.
The concept was practical as well as ideological. The 
U.S. wanted an environment in which American trade could 
expand —  in which the comparative advantage of the U.S. 
in key sectors could make its impact, free from unreason­
able burdens and restrictions.
The planned organization of the institutions governing future 
international economic transactions implied certain specific 
political and social institutions in the participating coun­
tries themselves. It seems impossible that a country partici­
pating in such a scheme could conceivably choose a socialist 
framework. Gardner, (1969:lxxxviii) describes the planning 
for these multilateral international institutions as not mak­
ing "very many concessions to the special problems of commun­
ist participation." The subsequent withdrawal of the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern European countries in the years immed­
iately after the war bears this out (although other arguments 
for their withdrawal are also valid).
The entire planning leading up to and including the ne­
gotiations at Bretton Woods in 1944 were clearly dominated by 
the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada. The eventual solutions 
may have been facilitated by their common ideological and in­
stitutional background. Not surprisingly, the special problems 
of the developing countries were not recognized at the time and 
no special provisions were made for them (Rasminsky et_. al. , 
1972:44-45; 47).
l84The British tried to solve three problems which would 
necessarily arise if such a liberal trading regime was super­
imposed on a world coming out of the war. For one, the monetary
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Aid Agreement containing Article 7 only after it had reached 
an understanding with the American Administration about a 
trade-off between commercial and financial considerations: 
Britain would essentially accept the ideas of the U.S. about 
the features of a common commercial policy as outlined in Ar­
ticle 7 if the U.S. would accept the establishment of an in­
ternational monetary institution that would be able to issue 
gold notes (i.e., international credit facilities) on a gen­
erous scale with the intent of helping countries with a de­
ficit in their balance of payments due to their reconstruction 
effort.185
The preparation for, and the actual negotiations at 
Bretton Woods in 19M4 —  out of which emerged the statutes of 
the major international institutions: the IMF, the World Bank 
(IBRD), the unsuccessful ITO (International Trade Organization) 
and its substitute, GATT (the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs) —  proceeded with the U.S. believing that Britain had 
entered into a contract to abolish restrictive policies. -^6
arrangements had to cope with expected large balance of payments 
deficits. Secondly, large amounts of finance capital would be 
needed to rehabilitate and reconstruct civilian productive ca­
pacities. And thirdly, raw material buffer stocks would have 
to be financed to stabilize payments deficits and surpluses and 
thus minimize the need for reserves. Only the U.S. had the nec­
essary resources to accomplish these goals and it is no surprise 
that the final solution reflected the restrictive U.S. and not 
the generous British viewpoint.
l85narrod (1972:12) mentions that only Keynes' persua­
sive powers and the overwhelming power position of the U.S. con­
vinced Britain to accept this trade-off.
1 ft f\In fact some in the U.S. wanted to use their tactical
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Of course, the U.S. had its way. She was in a dominant po­
sition partly because the important economic powers on the 
enemy's side were absent from the negotiations.
Prance was represented only by a government-in-exile 
and the Soviet Union participated only reluctantly and remain­
ed a passive participant. The allies had just landed in the 
Normandy when the actual conference began and it was still 
unclear how and when the war would be won. Only the U.S. had 
the resources to ensure a rapid end of the war and then to make 
the planned post-war institutions work. The U.S. was therefore 
in a position of military, political, and economic dominance 
and so her role at the conference was decisive. Gardner (1969: 
21) notes that the U.S. will most probably never find herself 
again participating in a world conference where her power is 
as preponderant as at that moment. The British recognized 
their complete dependence on the U.S. and their lack of any 
equivalent leverage they could exert. Britain cooperated there­
fore with the U.S. in the construction of the post-war institu­
tions in order to ensure the pursuit by the U.S. of a success­
ful end of the war and her help in the reconstruction effort 
(Gardner, 1969:24-25)•187
advantage created by the lend-lease obligations to defeat once 
and for all British imperialism (Gardner, 1969:xcix).
^■^Gardner (1969:xxxix) argues that only the war situa­
tion enforced Anglo-American cooperation. The common war effort 
provided a framework of mutual orientation which was translated 
into economic and political cooperation. This mutual under­
standing dissipated rapidly with the end of the war.
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In this situation, the compromise bringing about the 
formal results of the Bretton Woods Conference and the fol­
lowing negotiations seemed to be overshadowed by the reality 
of continuous U.S. dominance. Both the Anglo-American Loan 
Agreement of December 1945 settling the lend-lease issue and 
the inaugural meeting of the IMP and IBRD at the Savannah 
Conference in March 1946 bear the stamp of American power 
(Gardner, 1969 : 267):188
The Savannah Conference revealed a serious division 
between the United States and Britain on the character 
of the financial institutions they had constructed in 
the war. The British, led by Keynes, inclined towards 
the view that the Fund and Bank should be purely finan­
cial institutions, directed mainly by a staff of inter­
national civil servants. The Americans, led by Vinson, 
sought to subject the institutions to close control by 
national governments. The political and economic cir­
cumstances of the transition period made it virtually 
inevitable that the American view point should finally 
prevail.
The Bretton Woods compromise itself appeared as a trade­
off between U.S. and British aims. The U.S. managed to scuttle
l88The U.S. made increasingly sure that the IMP and 
World Bank lending policies did not contradict U.S. foreign 
policy once the tensions with the Soviet Union began to in­
crease (Gardner, 1969:196):
In the case of the Bretton Woods institutions....American 
resources had already been put under international control. 
But it was not too late to ensure that the resources of 
the Fund and Bank were employed in conformity with American 
political interests. The powerful voice which the U.S. had 
in the operation of these institutions soon began to make 
itself felt. The political question came up most directly 
in the case of the Bank. Although the Articles required 
it to be non-political in its lending policy, the Bank made 
it clear almost from the very beginning of its operations 
that it would take account of political factors in consid­
ering requests from members of the Soviet bloc.
See Hayter (1971) and Payer (1974) on the use of these institu­
tions to pursue U.S. objectives in UDC.
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the far-reaching institutional proposals of the British gov­
ernment. In turn Britain gained recognition for many excep­
tions and safeguards which were deemed necessary, as a second 
best solution, under the general American framework. The U.S. 
succeeded in obtaining a general commitment to liberal trade 
rules. Preferential tariffs were to be reduced in the course 
of a general tariff reduction. Non-tariff barriers (e.g. quo­
tas) were ruled out in principle. They would be tolerated .or 
a unspecified transition period in order to support similarly 
transitional capital controls under IMP rules. After the nec­
essary adjustment to peace time, such barriers would be allowed 
only in support of protective agricultural policies (of the 
American type) and in case of certain persistent payments de­
ficits (Gardner, 1969:148-153).189
Britain gained a general commitment from the U.S. to 
full employment policies, although the guarantees were far 
from iron-clad. Britain had hoped for a rule that would pre­
vent deflationary internal policies spreading unemployment to 
the world at large as was the case in the Depression. Britain 
herself was determined to insure full employment at home in 
order to protect her internal order even if in the course of 
such policies the balance of payments would go into a deep def­
icit. However, the general rule adopted stated that such pol­
icies were only in conformity with the principles of Bretton 
Woods if they were compatible with the "international under-
IB9But even then quotas would have to be applied in a 
non-discriminatory way.
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takings designed to promote an expanding volume of inter­
national trade and investment in accordance with compara­
tive efficiencies of production" (Gardner, 1969:147)-
In the financial sphere, the U.S. succeeded in incor­
porating most of its restrictive views into the articles of 
the IMP and IBRD. Both the Fund and the Bank would have only 
limited means available. The Fund was not to finance funda­
mental deficits. Britain did not realize her goal of estab­
lishing an institution that could grant the large and unre­
stricted credits necessary to finance the payments deficits 
that would surely arise in the course of British reconstruction 
and full employment policies. Gardner (1969:110-144) shows 
convincingly how in the course of the negotiations the burden 
of adjustment was shifted from the creditor to the debtor coun­
try. Britain was expected to be the latter, the U.S. the form­
er. The second-best solution to the adjustment problem in the 
form of exchange rate changes gave the IMF the right to criti­
cize the national policies producing the need for a devaluation 
This gave the U.S., which dominated the Fund, substantial moral 
and political influence over other countries’ internal policies 
Capital controls were to be abolished after a transition period 
however, the problem of the Sterling balances was left unde­
cided. Britain had accumulated extensive Sterling obligations 
during the war and had no way to redeem them with foreign cur­
rencies. For one, Britain did not want to give up the reserve 
currency status of Sterling as this was viewed as an important 
mainstay of the British imperial and commonwealth policy. On
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the other hand, the U.S. was quite aware that the proposed 
solution prevented the holders of Sterling balances to ful­
fill their needs on the American market (Gardner, 1969:112- 
121; 213-221).
The financial compromise seemed without any real bene­
fit for Britain. Brian Johnson (1970:120) sees the outcome as 
a victory of U.S. conservatism over Keynesian liberalism:
The achievement of getting 44 nations embracing the 
opposite poles of political ideology together to hammer 
out a new world monetary order was certainly impressive.
The spirit of Bretton Woods seemed to give real grounds 
for hope; but the Fund had a pathetically small 'kitty' 
in relation to the adjustment task at hand, while the 
Bank idea had also been hobbled by inadequate capital. 
Indeed, the yawning gap between these institutions' ob­
jectives and their substance was so curtailed by the forces 
of conservatism as to invite dangerous delusion.
Both the governments of the U.S. and Britain presented 
diametrically opposed interpretations of the agreements to 
their respective parliaments during the ratification process. 
But since the U.S. had emerged from the war as the dominant 
political, military, and economic power and controlled the 
world currency, its views and demands prevailed. The history 
of the Bretton Woods agreements and the years after the war 
showed clearly that the U.S. was quite willing to use her dom­
inance to push her ideas on the appropriate economic institu­
tions, and, indirectly, on decolonialization, free market in­
stitutions, and other ideological viewpoints (Gardner, 1969: 
224-253)•
The legal framework of the Bretton Woods institutions 
reflected the power situation among the Allies at the time of 
1944. Or rather, it reflected the conception of relative power
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relations that the major powers, essentially Britain and the 
U.S., possessed. The two were not exactly the same. Britain 
was one of the two countries carrying the major burden of the 
war. She still headed a far-flung empire and Commonwealth.
She perceived herself as victor and therefore as rightful pos­
sessor of a role in world leadership. She did not accept an 
inferior position in the post-war world and was willing to en­
ter into sizable obligations to underscore this leadership 
role. The U.S. was well aware of the historic shift in rela­
tive power that had taken place over the last decades and es­
pecially during the few years of World War II. As the domi­
nant country, she took a leading role in planning a post-war 
world order reflecting her interests. She succeeded in pushing 
through the major features of her grand design not without ac­
cepting certain British claims that were granted in view of 
Britain’s historical position.
However, both governments underestimated the serious con­
sequences the war effort had wrought on the British economy, 
and especially the time required to overcome the basic imbal­
ances created in British productive capacity due to the total 
war mobilization. Keynes and others were probably aware of the 
exhaustion of British productive capacity and the seriousness 
of the shift in British indebtedness. Keynes suggestion for 
a Clearing Union, which would have granted unlimited credits 
for British reconstruction and maintenance of full employment 
at home was, in British eyes, the vehicle to reconcile these 
needs and the actual impoverished situation of Britain. How­
ever, the unwillingness of the U.S. to accept such a generous
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scheme, as well as her Inability to see the problem In such 
stark terms, led to the scuttling of this Idea. On the other 
hand, the British, unwilling to openly recognize the decline 
in their power, opted for the incorporation of numerous safe­
guards and escape clauses that would essentially guarantee an 
independent British policy in the face of the adoped market 
institutions unfavorable to British interests. The resultant 
compromise was interpreted in the two countries in divergent 
ways.
The U.S., as the dominant power, could enforce her view 
of what Bretton Woods was all about. The British were forced 
to embrace the American plans. The result was the collapse of 
Sterling, British default on the American loan, and the rapid 
introduction of bilateral control mechanisms by all the Euro­
pean nations bringing about a world Bretton Woods was supposed 
to prevent. And in the end, the U.S. had to pour $30 billion 
of Marshall Aid grants into Europe, doing essentially what 
Keynes' Clearing Union was supposed to do (with the difference 
that Marshall Aid would not have to be repaid, which had major 
implications 25 years later). In order to make the aid more 
effective, the U.S. accepted to support the creation of a Euro­
pean multilateral regionalism that discriminated against Ameri­
can commercial interests, something U.S. policy was determined 
to prevent when she made the end of imperial preferences one 
of the central demands during and immediately after World War 
II. Bretton Woods was essentially suspended; it had been cre­
ated for a world of greater equality than existed at the end of 
the war.
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In 1958, the reconstruction of Europe ended. The pre­
war power relationships (at least on the economic level) were 
more or less reestablished. The formation of the European 
Economic Community created a market comparable in size to the 
American one. The dismantling of the controls on currency as 
well as on capital transactions created for the first time the 
climate in which the International Monetary Fund and its rules 
could play the role planned at Bretton Woods. World power re­
lations and the institutional framework were basically compati­
ble, at least temporarily (but see Boyer, 1974:3)- However, 
the continuous rapid growth in Europe and Japan, and the world­
wide military and political involvement of the U.S. altered the 
relative power relationships in the economic and political 
spheres in favor of Europe and Japan. Bretton Woods, in con­
trast, was basically a system compatible with a world where 
one country, in this case the U.S., was dominant although not 
completely so (as in the years immediately after the war). As 
the relative power of the U.S. relative to Europe and Japan 
declined even more, the system of Bretton Woods and the struc­
ture of international relationships it assumed were once more 
out of step with the real world (Rolfe and Burtle, 1973:60).
The early warning signals of the Sterling devaluation of 1967 
and the establishment of the two-tier gold market in 1968 did 
not produce a fundamental alteration of the Bretton Woods in­
stitutional framework: above all, the pivotal role of the dol­
lar and the U.S. was not reduced. The collapse of the inter­
national monetary system in 1971 and the continuous instability
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since then exposed this underlying contradiction between 
changing power relationships and an institutional framework 




STRUCTURING AND RESTRUCTURING: DILEMMAS AND TURNING POINTS
The preceding chapter looked at two structuring pro­
cesses with respect to the IES. In both cases, the dominant 
power succeeded to a substantial degree in creating interna­
tional structural and institutional conditions favorable to 
its interests and those of its actors. The unequal exchange 
system between England and Portugal was characterized by a 
compatibility between the power relationships with Portugal 
and those characterizing the IES. The output of the system 
itself maintained and strengthened this structure of inequal­
ity for several centuries. The post World War II system, in 
contrast, underwent considerable change over the relatively 
short period of thirty years as exemplified by the modifica­
tions of the institutions decided upon at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944. These modifications and transformations 
were the result, as argued at the end of the preceding chap­
ter, of contradictions between the actual power relationships 
among the participating countries, those power relationships 
implied by the created institutions, and the unequal exchange 
outcome of the structured IES which favored the countries of 
Western Europe and Japan.
In Chapter 3 it had already been pointed out in ab­
stract terms that dominant actors may be unable to assure 
their continued power dominance over a system for two reasons.
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For one, the systemic ramifications of economic exchange and 
relational control activities may have contradictory charac­
teristics to the extent that they affect positively (nega­
tively) the growth and development of the system but have 
negative (positive) consequences for the power position of 
the dominant actors. In this case, the dominant actors face 
the dilemma of having to choose between continued domination 
and retarded growth and development of the system. This di­
lemma is illustrated in Section 1 on hand of the development 
of the Comecon —  the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) —  and the related policies of the Soviet Union.
Secondly, power reversals are possible in an unequal 
exchange system because hitherto powerless actors may ex­
perience an improvement in their power position in the course 
of the operation of the system itself or due to interventions 
in their favor by external actors. The relatively powerless 
actors can then use their improved power position to engage 
in a struggle to restructure the system into one more favor­
able to their interests and power positions. The events con­
nected with the oil crisis, the struggle between the countries 
joined in OPEC and OECD, and the current negotiations for a 
NIEPO provide an excellent illustration of the origins, and 
possibly early phases, of such a process of power reversal. 
Section 2 will therefore deal with the recent history of the 
relationship between OPEC and OECD and try to discern a scenar­
io for the future.
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1. The Dilemma between Domination and Development: 
The Case of Comecon
A. Divide and Rule as a Strategy of Relational Control
Divide and rule strategies are a subset of relational 
control strategies used by dominant actors to ensure their 
continued dominance.^90 Burns and Buckley (1974) have in­
vestigated a number of instances where higher-level actors 
exercise relational control, i.e., control over social re­
lationships and structures, by manipulating and managing in­
teraction conditions and processes with the goal of producing 
non-cooperative, competitive and conflictive, or cooperative 
and harmonious socio-economic relationships and structures. -*-91 
Any ongoing social system, like e.g. the IES, entails 
a system of exchange and interaction within a structure of 
power differences based on the unequal control over economic, 
political, social, cultural and other bases of power. Such an 
interaction system, involving actors A, B, C,....can be con­
ceptualized as consisting of at least three systems components
1^(^The study by Galtung (1973) of the EEC is an exception 
to the relative neglect of the study of divide and rule strate­
gies in social systems. However, Galtung is not specifically 
concerned with the socio-economic consequences of the use of 
such strategies and the dilemmas dominant actors may face when 
using them. Nonetheless, his treatment of divide and rule 
strategies is much broader and more analytical than that of 
other contemporary students of the subject like Gluckman (1967) 3 
Caplow (1968) and Gamson (1968).
■^lBraun (1975) used recently the term "institutional 
engineering" in connection with her discussion of mechanisms 
for modern incomes policies.
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whose states determine the behavioral outcomes of the inter­
action system made up of the lower-level actors B, C,...;(i) 
the interaction situation, i.e., the action possibilities of 
the actors; (ii) the interaction payoffs, i.e., the outcome 
structure associated with all possible combinations of actions; 
and (iii)the attitudes and orientations of the actors towards 
one another.
In divide and rule strategies, a dominant actor A, e.g., 
an elite, power group, or institutionalized authority system, 
manipulates one or more of these components so as to ensure 
conflictive and competitive social relationships and actions
among the lower-level actors B, C, 192 ip^ g dominant actor
A uses his power to structure such non-cooperative relation­
ships in order to strengthen his dominance over actors B, C,.... 
and to increase the likelihood of his remaining in a position 
of dominance and power compared to the case of cooperative re­
lationships among B, C,.... This means that A uses his power 
to socially segment ("divide") the lower-level actors B, C,.... 
from one another in order to achieve and maintain dominance 
("rule") over them.
In many instances, A's main interest is to weaken B and 
C, not to organize them for any particularly useful purpose.
For example, the rulers of China (as well as rulers of other 
ancient empires) played barbarians on her borders off against
 ^Baumgartner et_. al. (1975a) examine the structuring 
of cooperative relationships in the case of management-labor 
interaction.
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one another with no other purpose than weakening them. On 
the other hand, A may seek to promote a certain degree or 
type of cooperation between B and C for his own purposes.^93 
Thus, in order to exploit their subordinates more effectively 
for productive or defense purposes, rulers bring about or 
maintain a social and political organization among the sub­
ordinates; but this organization, potentially, can be used by 
them to oppose their rulers. Therefore, A typically tries to 
form or structure associations between B and C that are under
IQ?•7JWhile it might be possible for rulers to foster con­
flict, it is likely to impede the performance of intricate 
administrative or productive operations. The dilemma is point­
ed up nicely by an example from Russian history (Hill, 1947). 
During the 1st World War, when the President of the Duma wished 
to hold a meeting with various mayors and industrialists to 
accelerate the supply of boots to the army, the Minister of 
the Interior forbade it, suspecting that they were only meeting 
to formulate plans to agitate for a broader constitution.
Yet, because of the potentiality of cooperative link­
ages and structures being used for political purposes, rulers 
develop strategies such as cooptation, offering mobility op­
portunities in productive enterprises or in national bureau­
cracies (including the educational system) and creating status 
and reward differentiation. Certainly, the ideology of a 
'classless society', equal opportunity, and upward mobility 
for hard working, 'meritorious' individuals gives persons a 
sense of being on their own, and hence maximal social frag­
mentation. At the same time, they must, for purposes of ad­
vancement, realize some minimal degree of cooperation with 
others, especially at their work place. Other ideologies which 
contribute to social fragmentation are those asserting that 
social rewards should be —  need to be —  distributed on the 
basis of individual achievement thus emphasizing individual 
career orientations and status competition.
Such diffuse fragmentation may be more efficient, when 
combined with the ideological and motivational beliefs and 
institutions mentioned above, in insuring power-reducing di­
visions than if the fragmentation entails simply a few large 
aggregates, even if the latter are clearly separated on grounds 
of ideology, distribution of income, status, or power.
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his control.194 That is, he attempts to establish a super­
vised association or limited cooperation between B and C, in 
which they relate to one another cooperatively either under 
A's direct supervision or according to rules or conditions A 
sets down. He encourages association for productive purposes 
at the same time that he works to prevent the association (its 
’cooperative power’) from being used to challenge his dominant 
position.
B. Domination and Development in the Case of Comecon
This dilemma facing a dominant power is well illustrated 
by the policy problems within Comecon. For control purposes,
194lOU;lS XIV’s policy of assembling all the important 
nobels at Versailles under his close surveillance, making them 
dependent on him(for life style, consumption, settlement of 
debts, etc.), and controlling their visits to their palaces 
was a strategy of reducing their unsupervised association, 
particularly of those who could be potential leaders of a re­
bellion or whose estates could serve as meeting places to or­
ganize challenges to the king's power (Elias, 1969:272).
Obviously the court of Versailles provided considerable 
opportunity for interactions among the nobles. However, court 
life was a succession of public events (demanding the presence 
of the nobles) where conspiratorial conversations and the mak­
ing of plans were difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, 
Louis XIV had a number of Swiss in his direct employ whose only 
task was to patrol all the hallways and passages of the palace 
day and night in order to observe, follow, and listen to the 
people of the court and to report back to him (Elias, 1969:273).
Similarly, interaction between conspiratorial lords and 
the masses or their bourgeois leaders in Paris was made diffi­
cult because of the isolation of Versailles.
In any event, increased density and interaction oppor­
tunities in and of themselves are not sufficient conditions for 
group formation among subordinates in opposition to superiors.
As suggested here, the rulers may control the interactions by 
obtaining information and regulating them in a variety of ways. 
Indeed, association under conditions controlled by rulers may 
serve as a reliable prophylactic against associations outside 
of their control.
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the Soviet Union wants to keep the socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe divided and dependent on herself. At the 
same time, the need to compete economically with a rapidly 
developing Western Europe forces the Soviet Union and Comecon 
to encourage intra-Comecon trade and cooperation in order to 
reap the benefits of an international (socialist) division of 
labor.195
Comecon was established in 19^8 to allow for a system­
atic economic cooperation among European socialist countries. 
Originally, cooperation was limited to coordination of trade.
But since the mid 1950's, economic integration was systemati­
cally furthered through coordination of investment plans, 
product specialization, joint undertakings, and financial, 
scientific and technical cooperation (Wilczinsky, 1970:195)- 
The implementation of such cooperation has followed a seesaw 
pattern, partly due to the inherent difficulties in coordinat­
ing planned economies, but mostly due to the conflicting goals 
of the member countries which were at different stages of de­
velopment and the inherent dilemma between fostering coopera­
tion and maintaining dominance (Kaser, 1967). In the beginning, 
the Soviet Union was able to exert close control over the eco­
nomic development of the whole area through the yearly coordin­
ation of plans and the conclusion of bilaterally balanced trade 
contracts. The Soviet Union possessed both the raw materials,
^This example raises questions about the general argu­
ment of Galtung (1973) which strongly emphasizes the interest 
of the dominant power in simply maintaining its power through 
divide and rule strategies to the neglect of other interests.
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technology and Investment goods needed by the other countries. 
The Comecon headquarters was located In Moscow; the head­
quarters served essentially as a clearing-house. The domi­
nance of the Soviet Union as the center was reinforced by the 
development of rubel imbalances in the bilateral trade rela­
tionships and the rule that positive balances from trade with 
one country were not allowed to be used to pay for a negative 
balance with another country. Therefore, planned clearing 
through Comecon action was essential if such imbalances were 
to be resolved. Moreover, to strengthen Comecon and there­
fore the leading role of the Soviet Union, stress had been 
placed on mutual trade relations rather than on relations with 
the outside which might lead to linkages and access to power 
resources to challenge the center or to counterbalance its 
power.
Economic development, while reinforcing peripheral de­
pendency on the Soviet Union based on growing raw-material 
needs, generated at the same time increasing dependence of the 
Soviet Union on the productive output of the peripheral coun­
tries. The diminishing benefits of early forced industriali­
zation increased pressures for an international division of 
labor as a device to accelerate growth. In order to keep the 
bilateral dependency structure intact at the same time that 
the overall level of multilateral coordination increased, the 
Goncept of horizontal specialization was proposed. Each coun­
try was supposed to specialize in a number of industries and 
serve as the chief supplier of these products to the entire 
Comecon area. The Soviet Union, due to its size, would have
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been the least specialized at the same time that it would 
have been host to the largest number of bureaucratic agencies 
performing integrative functions. On the basis of this struc­
ture of interaction, the Soviet Union seemed willing to push 
for a supra-national identity of Comecon in the early sixties.
Rumania, the least developed Eastern European country, 
was anxious about becoming locked into the position of raw 
material producer. At the same time, it was the country least 
dependent upon the Soviet Union due to its own oil supplies 
and significant trade relations with Western countries. The 
other Socialist countries seemed willing enough to forego po­
litical and ideological independence in order to gain economi­
cally, but Rumania refused to participate in this economic 
scheme, fearing that economic supra-nationality would be a 
tool to ensure political and ideological dominance by the Sovi­
et Union (Schaefer, 1972:22; Kaser, 1967:92-129).
Following the failure of the Soviet Union’s plans in 
1962, further economic development, combined with the attrac­
tiveness of trade with Common Market countries and the reduc­
tion of cold war hostilities, led to a rapid increase of trade 
between the countries of East and West Europe (Kaser, 1967: 
142-143; Schaefer, 1972:6). This shift from the dependency 
mechanism of intra-Comecon trade to an increased involvement 
with the capitalist economies began to threaten the Comecon 
system of center and periphery. The Soviet Union was squarely 
faced with the dilemma of 'divide and rule’, especially in the
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years 1968 and 1969 (Schaefer, 1972:6-7):^^
It apparently didn't want economic relations among 
Eastern European members to become significantly closer 
unless the Soviet Union was also included. It didn't 
want Comecon members to become too economically involved 
with the Western Countries or to develop relations to 
the EEC. Perhaps most significantly, it did not want 
Comecon reform to lead to domestic reform movements or 
to help provide its members with the means to slip out 
from under the Comecon yoke.
At the same time, despite its growing complaints 
about the economic burden of Eastern Europe, the USSR 
had no clear idea of the sort of institutional forms 
really needed to solve Comecon’s problems and thereby 
bolster the East European economies and reduce the 
economic burden on itself.
In the aftermath of the Czechoslovakian crisis of Aug­
ust 1968, the problems of continuing the balancing act between 
maintaining control and increasing productive cooperation
 ^The delicate balancing act of the Soviet Union to 
satisfy the competing objectives of dominance —  political and 
ideological leadership —  and rapid economic expansion becomes 
quite clear in this description of the Soviet position before 
the Comecon anniversary meeting in January 1969 (Schaefer, 
1972:35) :
However, whatever its supposed rationale, Soviet com­
mitment to the sort of integrated regional grouping that 
would include some sacrifice of Soviet sovereignty and 
increasing dependence of the East European countries on 
each other —  particularly in new industrial fields and 
for advanced technology -- had to be ambiguous at most. 
What was frequently interpreted as an almost self-evident 
Soviet interest in a strenghtened, centralist Comecon was 
often simply the much more■self-evident Soviet interest 
in bilaterally binding these states to itself. Moreover, 
the supranational threat to Western Europe posed by the 
EEC was a very popular theme at this time, as was the 
plan for an international Communist conference, and a 
drive for a supranational Comecon would hardly have 
served Soviet interests either in developing an alter­
native design for Europe or within the Communist move­
ment. Although Eastern Europe might be an increasingly 
costly burden to the USSR and although it was clear that, 
for the long-run economic viability of the Comecon area, 
a more sophisticated approach had to be found than in the 
past, the way out had not yet been determined.
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increased drastically. In particular, the Soviet Union was 
faced more and more with the dilemma between maintaining 
existing socio-economic arrangements and social control 
mechanisms on the one hand and introducing risky reforms in 
the institutional and ideological basis of Eastern Europe in 
order to increase cooperation among periphery countries, on 
the other. Political and military tightening up combined with 
the scrapping of risky economic reforms continued to fetter 
the possibilities for economic development at the same time 
that it entailed considerable political costs, internally and 
internationally, as well as an increased level of military 
expenditures.
Of course, the dilemma for the Soviet Union arises be­
cause she is not solely concerned with her continued dominance 
but has to ensure a certain level of economic growth both for 
herself and the other member countries of the Comecon. This 
need to perform arises for one because of the ideological 
claim that socialist economies perform better than capitalist 
ones. Secondly, the Soviet Union finds herself in a general 
competition and conflict with the Western countries for world 
leadership and dominance. Continuation of the conflict and 
maintenance of the already achieved position of world leader­
ship demand continued economic development, at least as long 
as the industrialized countries of the West avoid long-run 
stagnation and recessions.
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2. A Turning Point for the International Economic 
System: The Oil Crisis
A. Origins of the Power Reversal
It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that a struc­
tured system of inequality is generally reproduced and main­
tained because it generates unequal exchange. However, in­
ternal and external events and processes can reverse such a 
process of systems reproduction and set in motion a process 
of restructuring of the system which brings about greater 
equality. -^97 The redistribution of meta-power in favor of 
hitherto relatively powerless actors, the starting point for 
such processes of systems transformation, can come about for 
three reasons: (i) The multi-dimensionality of valuables and 
action outcomes generates positive and negative ramifications 
for the maintenance of the structured system of inequality.
In part, these ramifications are unanticipated and unintended 
by the dominant actors. (ii) The operation of the system 
changes resource availabilities and distributions as well as 
their strategic importance for structuring activities. (iii) 
Actors external to the system may intervene and provide sub­
ordinate and dependent actors with additional power resources, 
new relationships, and different conceptions of acceptable
197^'0f course, such a process of systems transformation 
may end with the elite being replaced by formerly subordinate, 
relatively powerless actors, without a change in the degree 
of inequality and dependency patterns.
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198Institutions and structured action possibilities.
Restructuring activities and systems transformations
can be based on or generated by a combination of these fac- 
199tors. The reasons why such initial meta-power shifts go
unchallenged by the dominant actors in the system while there 
might still be time to intervene successfully and stop the 
emergent process of restructuring lie in the fact that often 
the long-term significance of such meta-power redistributions 
may be unknown, misjudged, and disregarded (especially by 
those in relatively powerful positions). Several of the spe­
cific reasons for this are: (i) Those in dominant positions 
are distracted by wars, internal crisis, and problems, so 
that others not affected adversely by these events gain op­
portunities to develop themselves. (ii) As a result of pre­
vious commitments, and the institutionalized system with which 
their position is identified, those in a dominant position 
allocate fewer resources to newer, developing areas than com­
petitors. (iii) Cultural and social constraints, e.g., con­
cern with matters of 'status’, may inhibit or constrain those 
in a dominant position from getting into areas having develop­
ment potential, even though they have the possibility to do so. 
(iv) Those in a dominant position may be more conservative in
1 9 8* The external actors may not necessarily act self­
lessly but hope to establish a dependent relationship with 
those actors of the system which were helped by their actions.
•^^See Baumgartner et. al. (1976a) for a wide range of 
illustrations of power shifts and systems transformations.
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outlook, subject to commitments and constraints associated 
with their position and way of doing things, and less dis­
posed than those in more marginal positions to take advantage 
of new power resources or action opportunities that avail 
themselves as a result of technological innovations, differ­
ential diffusion of education and skills, rise in the level 
of consciousness and self-organization of previously less 
organized, subordinate groups, emergence of new political 
coalitions, and other socio-structural changes.
The history of the oil crisis, which now has resulted 
in renewed demands for a NIEPO, a transformation of the IES 
for the benefit of UDC, illustrates well some of the points 
made with respect to power reversals. The formation of OPEC, 
one source of the recent power shift, is one of the unintended 
outcomes of the operation of the IES and of the multi-dimen­
sional nature of oil production in UDC. Since the beginning 
of international oil exploration and production, UDC with 
proven and potential oil reserves had been pawns in the power 
plays of DC and their integrated major oil corporations 
(Tanzer, 1967)* Until recently, it was the UDC which tried 
to attract oil corporations to explore for oil and hopefully 
produce it when found. Although the major oil corporations 
and their governments often intrigued against each other and
The preceding section has suggested that such a power 
reversal may be accepted by dominant actors if their commitment 
to systems development is greater than their desire to maintain 
their own position of dominance in case they are faced with the 
dilemma between choosing to rule and letting the system develop
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competed for the same concessions, the countries granting 
them did not benefit. The formation of OPEC was a direct 
response to the unilateral reduction of posted prices, and 
thus of the royalty and tax revenues of the producer coun­
tries, decreed by the major oil corporations in 1959 and I960 
in response to the glut of oil in world markets (Tugendhat, 
1968:159-160):201
This was not a large (price) fall, but to the gov­
ernments basing their entire budgets on their revenues 
from oil it was an extremely serious matter. Moreover, 
to add insult to injury, the companies did not consult 
them beforehand. The cuts were thus a blow to their 
pride as well as their profits. All their latent re­
sentments against 'foreign exploitation’ came rushing 
to the surface in a storm of emotion, and for once 
they were able to sink their political differences to 
the point where they could act together.
OPEC was the tool "to make unilateral action impossible 
in (the) future, and to ensure that the companies always kept 
the producer governments' interests rather than those of any­
body else in the forefront of their minds" (Tugendhat, 1968: 
160). The most effective way to prevent the divide and rule 
tactics, used by the oil companies and their governments to 
play the producer countries off against one another during the 
Abadan crisis in 1952, was the formation of a united front 
like OPEC.
The creation of OPEC did not immediately produce success. 
Efforts on the part of the Arab oil-producing countries to or­
ganize an embargo immediately following the Israeli victory in
P 01This reassertion of self determination has to be seen 
in the context of decolonialization and the beginnings of the 
organization of non-aligned nations.
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1967 failed, and confirmed the viewpoint of many, that the 
producing countries were essentially in a weak position. How­
ever, OPEC and its Arab sister organization OAPEC provided an 
organizational focus for discussion, the exercise of coopera­
tion, exchange and evaluation of information, and the learning 
of trust, factors which in itself affect relative power. The 
military defeat in 1967 spurred the desire for Arab cohesive­
ness (Safran, 1974). The formation of OPEC and the increased 
cohesiveness of the producer countries were important factors 
in shifting relative power in their favor. More important, 
however, were the shifts in the demand and supply conditions 
for oil, a result of the successful operation of the capital­
ist IES of the post World War II period.
In the late fifties and early sixties, most countries
in Western Europe drastically reduced their reliance on coal
as a major source of energy. All of the DC experienced rapid
economic growth based on energy intensive modes of production
POP(Commoner, 1976). Oil satisfied a high proportion of these
additional energy needs. Demand projections assumed continued 
rapid motorization, increased use of synthetic materials, and 
a dramatic rise in the use of fertilizers in conjunction with 
the Green Revolution. These demand projections, especially if 
they assumed rapid economic growth and development in UDC based 
on the same economic structure as in DC, suggested a rapidly
POPCipolla (1970) contains several papers showing how 
shifts in demand changed the power positions of countries.
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worsening supply situation.^03 pn addition, significant im­
balances between loci of demand and supply started to emerge 
in the late sixties. Oil and gas production in the U.S. and 
Western Europe stagnated or even declined beginning in the 
late sixties, suggesting that any additional oil supplies 
would have to come predominantly from the oil fields of the 
Middle East (Helbling, 1975).
This long-run shift in power in favor of the Middle 
East oil producing countries was reenforced by several factors 
which affected the short-run supply situation in the years af­
ter 1967. The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 and the si­
multaneous interruption of the TAP pipeline connecting the 
rich Saudi fields with ports in the Mediterranean sea increased 
market uneasiness as long as tanker tonnage remained scarce. 
Also, the market structure of the world oil industry had 
changed over the years. Smaller, independent companies suc­
ceeded in gaining concessions. However, their supplies origi­
nated mostly in just one country, making them vulnerable to 
threats against their right to continue producing oil.^^
This shift in relative power was first utilized by in­
dividual countries and then OPEC collectively to improve the
M^. Adelman (1972b) contends that there was never any 
basis for this view about a worsening supply situation. He 
maintains that official and corporate statements were propagat­
ing this view until the public ultimately believed it, maybe 
helped by the beginning discussion on the limits to growth.
It was Libya which perfected this technique at the 
beginning of 1970 and realized the first significant improve­
ments in the terms of its concessions.
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terms of their concessions. 1970 saw increases of the posted 
price by up to 25%- This together with a rise in the tax rate 
on profits to 55% increased the projected oil revenues of the 
OPEC countries by $10 billion. The Teheran meeting at the 
beginning of 1971 produced another major setback for the oil 
companies and set OPEC firmly on its way of escalating demands 
and ultimately unilateral decisions culminating in the oil em­
bargo at the end of 1973 and the quadrupling of oil prices 
within a period of about 16 months in 1973 and 1974.^05,206
B. The Transformation of the International 
Economic System
The immediate result of the power shift in favor of 
the countries organized in OPEC and their actions in 1973 and 
197  ^was a dramatic increase in present and predicted future
5> T h e  shah Qf Iran apparently felt up to the time of 
the Teheran meeting that the slightest failure of OPEC to real­
ize its maximal demands would shatter OPEC unity and coopera­
tion (M. Adelman, 1972b:8l). M. Adelman (1972b:90-92) mentions 
that U.S. obstruction, or at least inaction, prevented OECD 
from developing a common strategy of the consumer countries 
in the crucial years 1970 to 1972. Also, the constant talk 
by U.S. officials about the danger of higher oil prices and 
limited production levels for the well-being of DC, as well as 
the admission of OECD that contingency plans were non-existent, 
actually encouraged OPEC to up its demands and escalate the 
threats in case of their non-acceptance.
206 j^hiie the successes strengthened the cohesion, and 
therefore the power of OPEC, the differential impact of in­
creased oil prices on the OECD countries as well as their 
different political, military and cultural interests in the 
Middle East led to increased divisions and distrust among 
them (M. Adelman, 1972a).
These divisions were very cleverly encouraged by the 
various producer countries in a reverse divide and rule strategy. 
The administration of the embargo and production cutbacks were 
a prime example of the use of this tactic (Field, 1975).
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state revenues, and for some countries, In foreign exchange 
reserves. A World Bank Study in June 1974 predicted accumu­
lated foreign exchange reserves by all the OPEC countries to­
gether of $650 billion by 1980 with yearly additions there­
after of $100 billion until 1990. Later studies were more 
optimistic assuming a total accumulation of reserves of $300 
billion (in 1974 dollars) by 1980 with net reductions begin­
ning in 1990 (Chenery, 1975).^07
Some voices called for a serious consideration of a 
U.S. military intervention in the Middle East to destroy OPEC 
and save the DC from economic strangulation and political
2 n O
blackmail (Kissinger, 1975a; Tucker, 1975a). Others plead­
ed for a collective search for a compromise between the con­
flicting interests of OPEC and OECD countries instead of the 
dangerous and destabilizing scramble to conclude bilateral 
deals or to seek individual solutions (Farmanfarmaian et. al., 
1975)- In this situation, Chenery (1975) took the position 
that the oil-price and recycling problem was likely to remain 
a short-run one. Substantial financial net flows to the OPEC 
countries would exist only up to 1985- The only required re­
sponse was therefore the creation of institutions capable of
2°7aH  these forecasts are based on highly conjectural 
assumptions about economic growth rates, future rates of energy 
growth, the development of alternative energy resources, OPEC 
pricing policies and the absorptive capacity of the OPEC coun­
tries. The latter is very much subject to political decisions 
on foreign aid and the stockpiling of weapons (Tucker, 1975b: 
49-51).
208prj_ecj an(i Schultze (1975) conclude that the economic 
policies chosen in response to the oil price increases worsened 
their recessionary effect in the OECD countries.
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recycling the funds accruing In the treasuries of the OPEC 
countries and a step-up in foreign aid to finance the in­
creased payments deficits of the non oil-exporting UDC.
Chenery arrived at this optimistic view by comparing the mag­
nitudes of the financial flows of the Marshall aid program 
and the OPEC-OECD case.
For Chenery, the major difference between the two 
cases is that Marshall aid was largely grant aid while a sub­
stantial portion of OPEC revenues will be invested in stocks, 
bonds and real estate in DC. Consequently, Chenery corrects 
the Marshall aid example for hypothetical debt services in the
form of interest and dividend payments at 5$ as well as a re­
payment of the principal over six years. Chenery's calcula­
tions show that the present problem is in fact no problem as 
long as the DC keep their growth rate at their historical lev­
el (Chenery, 1975:256-287):
When put in these terms, the adjustment to higher oil 
prices that is now required is shown to be of somewhat 
lesser magnitude than the postwar adjustment process.
The proportion of imports to be financed by external 
capital in the first five years is only half as great, 
and it will not be necessary to limit the growth of
non-oil imports in order to close the trade gap with
OPEC. Although there was little repayment of the actual 
postwar debt, the growth of exports and GNP after 1950 
was rapid enough to have permitted such repayment with 
little effect on continued growth. The important les­
son of the postwar period is that such a large restruc­
turing was accomplished with relative ease because eco­
nomic growth was sustained at a high rate.
This reassuring analysis is misleading because of its 
purely economic focus and reasoning. The oil price problem 
is merely one facet of a multi-dimensional problem which in­
cludes the Arab-Israeli conflict and has at its root a struggle
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over the distribution of control and power within the world 
system. The OPEC countries are now in a position to demand 
a greater influence in the determination of the form and con­
tent of this system. They seek to utilize their increased 
power to increase their power and control in other spheres, 
for purposes of structuring a world system which would allow 
them to realize more effectively their own aspirations for 
self-determination, economic development, and political im­
portance (Hoveida, 1975).
Seen in this light, the difference between the flow of 
Marshall aid and petro-dollar recycling is not just a formal 
one. The former took the form of grants, the latter will be 
based mostly on commercial financial transactions according to 
capitalist rules applicable to consumers who produce less than 
they want to consume, and who then have either to sign future 
claims on their productive capacity or to transfer property 
rights. It is therefore inappropriate to proceed in the anal­
ysis, as Chenery does, simply by adjusting for debt amortiza­
tion in order to make the Marshall aid case comparable to the 
present one. Rather, the various power and control aspects of 
international relations in the Marshall aid situation and the 
current oil crisis, must be taken into account in a systems 
analysis. Prom such a perspective, several comments can be 
made about specific limitations of Chenery's analysis as well 
as about the likely scenario for the restructuring of the 
world system.
In arguing that the problem of recycling may not be as 
acute as first appearances would have suggested, Chenery shows
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that the debt service on the funds accruing to OPEC will re­
quire only half as much of GNP or exports of the OECD coun­
tries in 1985 as the Marshall aid countries would have had to 
pay in 1955 had their grants in fact been loans, In this hy­
pothetical case, the industrialized countries of Western Eu­
rope would have had to use maximal 3.1$ of their GNP or 13$ 
of their export revenues, to service their debts. However, 
these countries did not have to do this. To argue, therefore, 
that the OECD countries could easily manage the predicted en- 
debtedness to OPEC because it would require, in 1985, at most 
half as large a debt service charge as one never paid in the 
first place for Marshall aid is a non sequitur. Since Europe 
did not undergo the type of experience which she will now go 
through, Chenery's calculations cannot provide us with a re­
liable yardstick against which to assess the future.
The reparation payments and massive capital flows in 
the wake of wars in recent history give clear evidence of the 
problems related to such financial flows and the attendant 
transfer of real resources. The disaster in connection with 
the German reparation question after World War I illustrates 
dramatically enough the serious socio-political consequences 
such a transfer can entail if the appropriate conditions are 
not met (Kindleberger, 1968b). One has instead to ask oneself 
what the consequences for the growth rate in per capita con­
sumption would have been if the Western European countries 
would have had to repay the aid received under the Marshall 
Plan. The outcome of such an inquiry depends on the assump­
tions made about what would have been the maximum feasible
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growth rate of investment in these countries where the debt 
service charges would have reduced the GDP by approximately 
3% below their GNP (in countries that were major aid recipi­
ents, this percentage would have been substantially higher).
It is obvious that the living standard of the European coun­
tries would have recovered much more slowly and would have 
been substantially lower in 1958 than was actually the case.
At a time when internal political conflicts and social dis­
ruptions were frequent, even a marginal decrease in standards 
of living might have negatively affected the political and 
social stability in many European countries, with likely 
adverse effects on economic performance.209 in particular, 
it would have certainly undermined the claim, so crucial at 
that time, of superior performance of capitalist economies as 
compared to socialist ones.
One can wonder how such reduced economic recovery in 
the years 1948-1960 would have affected France's reaction to 
the trauma of the military defeat in Indochina, the loss of 
Algeria, and the dramatic ascent to power by de Gaulle which 
brought France close to a civil war, even under more favorable 
conditions. Similarly in Germany, the adoption of the Bad 
Godesberg program by the Social Democratic Party and thus its 
ultimate transformation into an acceptable governmental party 
might never have occurred, with altogether different con-' 
sequences for political development in Europe. And Great Britain
%. D. Wallace (1974) shows that continuous economic 
expansion and growth in real wages contribute to the mainte­
nance of political stability.
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would have been forced Into even more disruptive 'stop and 
go' policies in an attempt to reconcile an even larger defi­
cit in her balance of payments with the need to dampen class 
antagonism through a satisfactory level of consumption growth. 
The international implications of such developments in Europe 
might have been an earlier decolonization and withdrawal from 
East of the Suez with all the ramifications that would have 
had in the Third World.
One cannot be as sanguine as Chenery about the socio-eco­
nomic and political stability of some of the European countries. 
To subscribe to an a priori assumption that these countries 
could give up part of their GNP growth increment to service 
their debts to OPEC in the years to come without substantial 
non-economic consequences is a questionable basis for prognosis. 
The dubious nature of Chenery's assumption is reinforced by the 
likelihood that most European countries will not be able to a- 
chieve the growth rates experienced during the fifties and six­
ties, for reasons unrelated to the oil crisis but related to 
the deep structural misallocations of resources in most advanced 
capitalist countries (Tucker, 1975a:50-51; Barraclough, 197^0 •
A global and systematic analysis of world restructuring 
has to be based upon a careful and extensive examination of 
international economics and politics and their interrelation­
ships. One should not forget that at any one moment, a coun­
try's position as either an international net-lender or net- 
borrower can determine its options in international politics. 
Great Britain used her foreign assets (held by government and 
citizens) to acquire the foreign exchange necessary to finance
173
her military efforts both in World War I and in the begin­
ning of World War II. When she began to run out of foreign 
exchange reserves shortly before the U.S. entrance into 
World War II, her need for U.S. financing of her continued 
war effort (which ultimately occurred through the lend-lease 
program) led throughout the war to attempts by the U.S. to 
use the leverage thus gained. The U.S. used her position to 
pressure Britain into acceptance of her grand design for a 
post-war world order as illustrated in Section 2 of Chapter 5* 
The U.S. found herself similarly restricted in her freedom to 
pursue her interests in the sixties when the unwanted dollar 
accumulation in European hands forced the U.S. government to 
restrict capital exports as well as revise the Vietnam strat­
egy. If the Marshall Plan had been based on loans instead of 
grants, this dollar overhang would never have occurred, since 
the European countries would have had to use their dollar 
earnings to repay their debts to the U.S.
Mot only does Chenery disregard these economic and non­
economic differences between grant aid and straight forward 
lending and borrowing as in the OPEC - OECD relationship, but 
he fails to consider the essential nature of debt financing. 
Financial flows are always balanced by a flow of property rights 
in the opposite direction. Either the property rights take the 
form of direct ownership of productive assets as in the case of 
the purchase of corporate stock and real estate, or they rep­
resent indirect claims on productive assets or future produc­
tion through the acquisition of government and private securi­
ties, and monetary claims in the form of foreign exchange
174
reserves. In any case, such property rights are multidimen­
sional in a capitalist system. Their holders are, explicitly 
or implicitly empowered to ensure the safety and profitability 
of their investments. They have the right to use the property 
thus controlled commensurate with their overall objectives, 
not just their economic goals (Friedman, 1962). The property 
owner in the capitalist system has the right to influence, or 
to try to influence, social, cultural and political processes 
by using the economic resources under his control. This in­
cludes the right to try to secure a political regime amenable 
to his own ideological and political views. Many historical 
examples show that foreign investors used their own and their 
government's resources to put pressures on the governments of 
the country in which their property interests lay if they felt 
these interests threatened.210
The members of OPEC as well as LDC's in general have a 
vision of a world order where there is less material inequity 
and where countries can participate on a more equal basis in 
international affairs. This vision is fundamentally incompat­
ible with the present system in which the industrialized coun­
tries consume most of the world's resources and, until re­
cently, imposed their views and interests on international 
organizations and the world community as a whole. The member
PI 0Chenery argues that even at the height of OECD en- 
debtment to OPEC, at most 2% of total OECD assets would be 
owned by OPEC members and that this amount would not be suf­
ficient to exercise any influence on government policies of 
OECD countries. Such an aggregate assessment neglects the 
fact that certain countries will find themselves in debt to 
OPEC to a much larger extent than 2%.
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countries of OPEC are utilizing their newly gained power to
try to restructure the present world system into one more
Pi 1compatible with their desires and aspirations.
Therefore, we would expect that official and private 
investors from OPEC countries will sooner or later exercise 
all their property rights, acquired in the process of in­
vesting their surplus revenues, to the fullest extent possi- 
PIPble. One can already see how those OPEC members with sur­
plus funds use them to begin restructuring international rela­
tionships and institutional forms along lines of their 
vision. This includes attempts to bring about conditions and 
policies in other countries as well as in international agen­
cies which are more supportive to their interests or at least
PI 1Reference has already been made to the statement by 
the Iranian premier Hoveida (1975) in the New York Times. The 
resolutions and action programs passed by the two special ses­
sions of the UN General Assembly in May 197^ and September 
1975 (reprinted in the UN Monthly Chronicle of May 197^ and 
the UN Chronicle of October 1975) leave no doubt about this.
This is widely realized and feared in the DC. Hence, 
the entreaties to OPEC investors to behave 'rationally' and 
limit the use of their investments to simply receiving an ap­
propriate rate of return without in any way influencing corpo­
rate policies; and hence, also the increasingly obvious at­
tempts to scrutinize OPEC investments and to refuse their di­
rect investments, if not indirect acquisition of control over 
assets, in areas, sectors, and corporations deemed to be of 
strategic importance or to be related in some way to national 
security interests. However, one important implication of the 
present analysis is that it would be naive to believe that the 
OPEC countries will remain satisfied with the suggested role 
of emasculated capitalists. Their reluctance so far to actively 
participate in the management of their investments is much more 
the result of their inexperience than their unwillingness to 
do so (Field, 1975).
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not detrimental to them. Already before the 1973 war in the 
Mid-east, oil revenues were the basis of foreign aid to sev­
eral African states in exchange for their break of diplomatic 
and economic relations with Israel. The first important po­
litical results of this new alliance have emerged during the 
197^ General Assembly of the United Nations with the suspen­
sion of South Africa, the invitation to the Palestinian Liber­
ation Organization to present their viewpoint, and the exclu­
sion of Israel from UNESCO regional activities. The U.S. de­
nounced the recent majority votes in the 197^ General Assembly, 
which went against its own interests, as a dangerous dictate 
by countries possessing only nominal voting power. However, 
these majorities are significantly different from those that 
used past UNCTAD conferences to demand new international trade 
and finance relationships, demands which were simply ignored 
by the industrial countries when they went against their own 
interests.^13
Of course, there remain questions as to the extent that 
OPEC members can transform oil wealth into military and indus­
trial power. There is also a question as to how solid money 
power can be if it is based largely on foreign currency re­
serves which have ultimately to be kept in the banks of the in­
dustrialized countries (Mikdashi, 197^:29-30; Bergsten, 197^a).
^The present majority obviously possesses more than 
purely nominal votes. The Middle East countries have demon­
strated their ability to realize a transfer of wealth of ex­
traordinary proportions —  enabling them to buy industries and 
arms —  as well as to threaten the stability of the world fi­
nancial system, which is still of greater importance to the 
well-being of the industrialized nations than to their own.
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However, the reserves provide the tool to exercise power now 
and to protect those reserves In the future. The OPEC coun­
tries, together with other UDC, have already used their newly 
won leverage to demand and obtain an increase In their IMF 
quotas (McDonald, 1975)* They have also carefully limited 
the role of the IMF and the World Bank in the oil revenue re­
cycling. The IMF oil facility has not been renewed for 1976, 
and most countries in the Middle East seem to prefer to allo­
cate their surplus funds to their own development funds and 
regional development banks under their control (Field, 1975)* 
However, an increase in OPEC lending to the World Bank and the 
IMF will provide these countries generally with the subtle 
policy influences in borrowing countries which the U.S. and 
other DC have enjoyed in the past.^l^ And while the OPEC coun­
tries do not yet possess the military power necessary to protect 
their interests in case some major industrial countries default 
on their loans, the threat of a selective boycott, which will 
be easier to enforce once oil supplies are arranged directly 
between state-controlled oil corporations in the producing and
g-p
The discussion by the OECD countries about the es­
tablishment of a recycling and credit facility was a repeti­
tion of the negotiations in Bretton Woods (see Chapter 5)- 
The European countries tried to establish a credit facility 
under IMF control where they possess a collective veto. The 
U.S., however, proposed and succeeded in gaining approval of 
a relatively large emergency credit facility under the auspices 
of OECD. This would have ensured U.S. control. Kissinger 
(1975a) indicated that European countries in need of credits 
would have to adopt policies in line with American views on en­
ergy conservation, a common front of oil-consuming countries, 
and- appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. France’s oppo­
sition to this plan was essentially based on its reluctance to 
accept reestablishment of U.S. hegemony.
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consuming countries, will suffice to extract appropriate 
compensation.
Although some assurances have been given by Mid-East 
Investors that they do not Intend to exert management control 
over the corporations In which they have Invested, they none­
theless acquire a base from which to isolate Israel commer­
cially and, in general, to lobby in other countries for pro- 
Arab policies. In early 1975, we already witnessed the first 
attempts to boycott Western investment banks doing substantial 
business with Israel. It also seems that most manufacturing 
corporations and large trading firms participate in the Arab 
League's economic boycott against Israel.
The Middle East oil countries and OPEC clearly intend 
to use their newly acquired power to the fullest in order to 
remodel the world system, particularly its institutional 
structure, in a way that would guarantee their long-run eco­
nomic development and their leverage in world politics. Under 
present conditions, they have a unique opportunity to reverse 
the long trend of uneven development that was imposed on them 
by the DC. Of course, it is too early to tell if they will 
succeed in this endeavor, even if they participate in a close 
alliance with other UDC. However, it is clear that the DC
have already lost their freedom to act unilaterally and that
they have to at least discuss with some seriousness together




The five case studies in the preceding chapters illus­
trated and elaborated on the concept of the structuring and 
restructuring of various aspects of the past and the present 
IES. They have illustrated in a preliminary way the useful­
ness and fruitfulness of the systems approach to the political 
economy of the IES advocated in the beginning chapters.
This particular approach is clearly applicable to the 
type of problems which involves changes in the institutional 
and structural conditions of a system. This is the case, of 
course, with the development of new economic institutions it­
self. We are not lacking examples in the IES of today: New 
international monetary rules, rules governing foreign direct 
investments, the issues discussed at the UN conferences on the 
Law-of-the-Sea, or the discussions at a wide range of forums 
concerned with the realization of a NIEPO itself.
Another area of economics where the systems approach 
is fully justified is in the analysis and modelling of devel­
opment and the economic activities related to it. Economic 
development is not possible without development in other spheres 
of a system. It is a multi-spheric process and therefore in­
volves the multi-dimensional qualities of valuables in an es­
sential way. Development also means changes in traditional 
forms of behavior, the adaptation of institutions to changing
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economic forces, and the structural transformation of rela­
tionships among actors and of actors to forms of property. 
Development, therefore, involves necessarily the redistribu­
tion of relative, if not absolute, shares of income and wealth.
It also changes the strategic importance for further develop­
ment of resources, skills, knowledge and capabilities, of 
status and positions in networks of relationships. Consequently, 
development affects the positions of power and meta-power of 
the actors in the developing system. It is therefore by neces­
sity a process full of conflicts and struggle and will involve 
structuring and restructuring processes. That is, development 
is a social process which builds on the basic elements and 
concepts of the systems approach advocated here. To the extent 
that one wants to derive policy implications, for example for 
international trade, finance and investment, in the context of 
development, the systems approach developed and illustrated 
here is necessarily the correct one.
In general, one can say that the study of any economic 
problem or topic should be based on the systems approach the 
longer the time period is over which the problem is to be 
modelled, studied, and analyzed. Increasing lengths of time 
imply greater probabilities that institutional and structural 
changes and transformations may occur and introduce changes 
in the values of the structural parameters of an economic 
model. This means that the investigator has to be open to the 
possible occurrence of such systems transformations and break­
points in the behavioral patterns to be modelled. The choice 
between the traditional ceteris paribus short-run approach where
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systems stability is assumed, and a long-run systems approach 
where systems transformation is possible, cannot, however, be 
based on an a priori and rather arbitrary judgement by the 
researcher himself. Rather, the decision has to be made after 
the situation has already been assessed in a preliminary way 
with the help of such a multi-level systems approach itself 
(Baumgartner et_. al. , 1976b).
Such a procedure and the actual formal modelling of 
systems transformations demand the availability of a multi­
level methodology which can determine the presence of and eval­
uate the nature of such transformations. Unfortunately, this 
methodology is not yet available and we are still stuck with 
the ad hoc techniques used in econometrics to deal with break­
points and transformations: A judicious choice of the time 
period for which the data is analyzed, the introduction of 
dummy variables, and the re-estimation of the structural vari­
ables of a model whenever its predictive power diminishes 
(Baumgartner et_. al. , 1976b The lack of such a method­
ology as well as the early stage at which the systems analysis 
of economic problems finds itself have limited the present in­
quiry to the use of historical case studies in support of the 
arguments and propositions advanced. It is clear that further 
systematic research and a formalization of the, often implicit,
215These econometric techniques indicate that economists 
frequently encounter economic systems which exhibit feedback 
patterns linking the operation of the systems and their struc­
tural and institutional constraints. Economists, however, seem 
to be reluctant to accept the consequences and struggle openly 
with the theoretical and methodological problems involved in 
the modelling of the complete systems.
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propositions contained in this inquiry are necessary in order 
to fully exploit the richness of the systems approach.
Of course, the particular systems approach to the po­
litical economy of the IES presented here is only the begin­
ning of a longer-term research effort. It is therefore some­
what premature to develop specific policy implications with 
respect to international economic exchange problems and future 
forms of the IES. The research reported here is primarily de­
signed to propagate the systems approach to problems of the 
IES and to alert researchers to the possibility of break-points 
and the importance of modelling economic problems in the way 
it has been attempted here for problems of the IES.
Future research should give some priority to the fur­
ther investigation and development of three concepts introduced 
here. For one, it is essential to clarify the concept of sys­
temic ramifications. This includes the concrete specification 
of (i) the decision models used by the different actors in the 
hierarchy of actors, (ii) the multiple dimensions of the valu­
ables used by actors in a system, and (iii) the spin-off and 
spill-over effects that occur because of economic actions in 
specific socio-economic contexts. Secondly and related to the 
first topic, it is important to fully develop a theory of power. 
This includes the determination of the valuables which give 
actors power and meta-power, and under which circumstances and 
to what degree. It also involves the development of a complete 
model of the processes through which power is translated into 
actual systems states. And thirdly, the multi-dimensionality 
of valuables, the concept of systemic ramifications, and their
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power implications imply a theory of value different than the 
ones commonly implied by neo-classical and marxist economic 
theories. But this problem raises a whole series of philo­
sophical and scientific questions which it is difficult to 
treat so early in this research effort.
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